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Preface 
This volume contains the proceedings of the first of a 
series of seminars initiated in 1985 by the Faculty of 
Law. The series focussed on some of the main areas of 
teaching, research and dissemination of legal thought. 
The initiative for the series sprung from the ingenuity of 
some scholars, particularly Dr. C. O. Okidi, Chairman of 
the Faculty's Research, Library and Legal Publications 
Committee. 
In Africa, the law, especially enacted law, has been seen 
as the main instrument for implementing economic and 
political policy and for resolving stresses arising f rom 
policy decisions. This approach to societal problems 
prevailed even in colonial times, when the legal process 
was used to facilitate political and economic management 
programs. Partial responsibility for the chronic underde-
velopment of much of Africa before independence lies 
with this use of the law. 
That such a role for the legal process still remains was 
c o n s i d e r e d i n t r i g u i n g e n o u g h to j u s t i f y n e w , 
development-based studies in the Faculty of Law. Law 
has a role in stabilizing social institutions, and changes 
wrought by development initiatives need to be founded on 
institutional stability. Thus, how law responds to 
development is an important subject. 
Of the several seminar proposals prepared by the 
Faculty, the first to attract the interest of donors and 
part icipants was the one on "Law and the Publ ic 
Interest." The purpose of the seminar was to consider, 
through specific examples, the role of law in promoting 
and safeguarding the public interest. Public interest here 
refers to a whole set of developmental matters set to 
benfc'fit people socially, economically, culturally and in 
other related senses. 
Development in Africa is primarily state-directed. The 
private sector, even when ostensibly dominant, is regu-
lated by the state through legislated codes or administra-
tive practices. In many third world countries, the state, 
through its ability to command bureaucratic, financial and 
technological resources, becomes the main agent in 
mobilizing development. Public interest then includes 
those expecta t ions which the ci t izens enter ta in in 
exercising their civil status. The state generally inter-
venes in the interest of its citizens through the device of 
law. Thus, clear perspectives need to be developed on the 
interplay between the law and the public interest in the 
process of national development. 
This concern is shown in the character, form and order 
of these proceedings. W e hope that this volume will be 
useful to scholars and policy makers, as well as providing 
a basis for more specialized discussions on important 
topics such as population and resource management, the 
character of the law and its effectiveness in relation to 
policy, and resource rent and taxation. 
Funding for the seminar came f rom the International 
Development Research Centre ( IDRC), the National 
Council for Science and Technology (NCST) and the 
University of Nairobi. We are greatly indebted to these 
donors for supporting the seminar and for permitting the 
use of the remainder of the funds to produce this volume. 
W e also appreciate the role played by the participating 
scholars, f rom as far afield as Botswana, Cote d'lvoire, 
Egypt, Indonesia and the United Kingdom. This kind of 
participation brought forth the experience of many soci-
eties, in both the industrialized and the non-industrialized 
world. 
W e acknowledge the co-operation of members of the 
Faculty of Law who performed a number of essential 
tasks during the seminar, including serving as chairmen 
of sessions, rapporteurs and discussants. W e thank Mr. 
A. G. Ringera, who served as chairman of the Kisumu 
Seminar Committee. 
Finally, we are indebted to the Institute for Develop-
ment Studies for agreeing to have this work published in 
its Occasional Paper Series. Apart f rom the IDS person-
nel, in particular Dr. I. Riak, the Seminar Co-ordinator, 
we have also greatly benefited f rom the assistance of 
Alison Field-Juma of Initiatives Ltd. for edit ing and 
production, and of Dr. Calestous Juma of the Afr ican 
Centre for Technology Studies. Special thanks are due to 
Dr. John Oucho, of the Population Studies and Research 
Institute, who helped edit the two papers on population. 
J. B. Ojwang 
J. W. Kabeberi 
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Chapter 1 
LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
Some Introductory Remarks 
J . B . OJWANG 
This volume covers a wide range of subjects—agrarian 
reform, commerce and industry, petroleum exploration, 
environmental management , public health, and popula-
tion. It has, however, but one theme: law and its appli-
cation in matters of public interest. This volume does 
not pretend to be the most internally coherent, focussed 
on a limited number of issues. Rather, it brings together 
the contributions of different authors, and can claim a fair 
degree of uniformity at the level of its main theme. 
The studies contained in this volume examine the rela-
tionship of law to the problems of development and the 
special conditions under which law operates in developing 
countries. 
The General Problem of Development 
The seminar began with the common understanding that 
"the public interest" refers to "a whole set of development 
matters set to inure to the benefi t of the people as a 
whole, in social, economic, cultural and other related 
senses." Ultimately, the guardian of such interests is the 
state and its public agencies. The state designs and 
implements relevant policy and law validates it. Not 
only ought the "right" policy choices be made; suitable 
laws must be formulated and effectively applied. The 
management of policy and its legal validation should thus 
be priority areas in order to achieve social, economic and 
other changes. 
In practically all Afr ican countries, agriculture takes 
priority as an economic activity. It is fi t t ing that this 
volume begins with agrarian reform, discussing its rela-
tion to development and laying bare the relevant law. 
Besides agriculture, economic development must incor-
porate commerce and industry. The interplay between 
these sectors can expand peoples' economic fulf i lment , 
create condi t ions for se l f - re l iance, and enhance the 
productivity of each sector. The laws for implementing 
appropriate policy in these spheres need to be ful ly 
understood. 
Africa's development rests upon its natural resources— 
even those still unknown. Lack of technology still 
largely leaves the exploitation of such resources to for-
eign entrepreneurs and capital. Under these conditions, 
Africa can secure its resources only through policy and 
law. Hence, it is important to show the role of law in 
relation to natural resource utilization. 
Although development is often described in quantitative 
economic terms, the status of health, the condition of the 
environment, and the mode of population management 
are very relevant. The three last chapters illustrate how 
the legal process relates to these qualitative aspects. 
Special Problems of the Law 
in Development 
Although law validates off ic ia l policies, it too has 
inherent problems, especially in Afr ica . For example, 
the law in most African countries lacks a social equilib-
rium insofar as it has a foreign orientation resulting f rom 
colonialism. Prior to colonialism, law was traditional 
and ethnically-based. Although this ethnic law remains 
in force to some extent, its authority and future prospects 
are much compromised. This situation can be described 
as follows: 
Western law, with the entrenchment of the modern 
state, became the instrument for modelling a uni-
form legal system which grows by legislation and 
judicial interpretation, invalidating and supplanting 
traditional law. As a result, the various indigenous 
legal systems have progressively declined, as 
application of Western law has extended to cover 
all spheres of life. Although traditional law (for 
reasons of inertia, and owing to the fact that there 
will be many marginal areas not directly affected by 
the impact of the State and its attending institutions) 
is certain to remain, in certain respects, operative 
for many more years, it is no less evident that the 
application of Western law must move towards 
universality in the years to come.1 
This instability in the law is deepened fur ther by the 
context of change, which, in Africa, is remarkably rapid. 
Of this reality, President Kaunda of Zambia writes: 
We live in a changing world, and one in which the 
pace of change is becoming even greater. Neither 
the character nor the needs of any given society can 
remain static, and if the law is to fulfil its proper 
function it must keep pace with the changes. This is 
not to say that the law must be a straw in the wind; 
if law is to be an effective instrument of social order 
it must be a stabilizing influence, but it must be 
flexible and it must be progressive else it will hinder 
society in its progress and development . . . 2 
The law is therefore handicapped, both by its internal 
shortcomings and by the pressures of social change. This 
compl ica tes the task of designing sui table laws and 
applying them correctly, and in translating developmental 
policy in the interest of the public. Law and the public 
interest is thus a problem with no ready answer. This 
volume illustrates specific difficulties and points to pos-
sible solutions. 
The different studies in this volume provide a compara-
tive f ramework and emphasize the common human char-
acter of public interest issues. For example, a country's 
approach to population or natural resource management is 
basically an approach to the problem of human survival; 
which appears to be the ultimate objective of the public 
domain in all countries. 
Prof. Okoth-Ogendo isolates some of the main imped-
1 
iments to effective agricultural production and the func-
tion of the law within this context. His study of agrarian 
reform will be found relevant for many countries. Prof. 
Takirambudde's paper illustrates the interplay between the 
law and industrial and commercial enterprises in Southern 
Afr ica , and is thus particularly relevant for developing 
counties 
Prof. Danusaputro, Mr. Macrory and Mr. Hunt Talmage 
III exemplify the delicate balance that must be struck— 
essentially through the legal process—between sheer 
economic output and the long-term national interest of 
planned growth and a sound environment. This is a 
complex subject, in which man must not only protect 
himself f rom natural dangers, but also from his own am-
bit ions and enterprises. The examples given,f rom a 
number of countries, will serve as a reference which could 
in f luence deve lopment e lsewhere . The studies on 
population by Profs. Azer and Sharkawy, and on health 
by Mr. Ogolla, will also o f fe r valuable pointers for 
policy-making and legal regulation. 
This work does not offer certain answers to the complex 
problems outlined above, but rather suggests possible 
solutions. The matters covered also have ramifications 
beyond the subject of the seminar. In the future, it would 
be desirable to address some of these subjects individually 
and subject them to a more detailed treatment and deliber-
ation. This might lead to isolating the main elements of 
policy and legislation affecting the public interest. 
Notes 
1. J. B. Ojwang, "Legal Transplantation: Rethinking the Role 
and Significance of Western Law in Africa" (In P. Sack and E. 
Minchin, Legal Pluralism. Canberra: Australian National 
University, 1986), vol. 99, p. 114. 
2. K. D. Kaunda, "The Functions of a Lawyer in Zambia 
Today" (Zambia Law Journal, vols.3 & 4, 1971-72), p. 1. 
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Chapter 2 
AGRARIAN REFORM IN 
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
The Implications for Agricultural 
Development* 
H . W . O . OKOTH-OGENDO 
Perspec t ives 
Sub-Saharan Afr ica is in the throes of an agrarian cri-
sis.1 With a food sufficiency ratio of less than eighty-five 
per cent, it is the only region in the world which does not 
produce enough food for its people. Although much 
literature has focused on this crisis, the specific measures 
adopted by the states to resolve it have hardly been 
evaluated. 
This essay discusses measures directed at the primary 
causes of the crisis as viewed by Eastern and Southern 
African states. These measures include agrarian reform 
policies and p lans and p r o g r a m m e s to inc rease 
agricultural productivity through better access to and 
control of land, production, and support services. 
The Nature of the Crisis 
The Afr ican agrarian crisis is a complex interaction 
between land availability, the productive organization of 
labour, the state of agricul tural technology, and the 
resilience of social ideologies which reinforce systems of 
access to and con t ro l of land. T h e n e g a t i v e 
manifestations of this interaction—extreme population or 
land pressure, stagnation in agricultural product ivi ty , 
severe food shor tages , and de ter iora t ion in l iv ing 
conditions especially in the rural a reas—are the most 
quantifiable and visible symptoms of the crisis.2 This 
condition suggests, inter alia, normative confusion, if not 
total anomie; structural contradiction, if not collapse; and 
basic systemic instability, if not disintegration in African 
agrarian relations. 
The Causes of the Crisis 
Scholars are d iv ided about how to expla in this 
condit ion. S o m e say that it is the result of the 
continuing ef fec ts of colonial exploitat ion, excess ive 
population growth, ineff icient or obsolete product ion 
technologies, chaotic tenure regimes, market distortions, 
or inherent or fundamental deficiencies in African social 
structures. Some presume that Afr icans are unable to 
manage their own economies, or that domestic policies 
discriminate against the rural, food-producing sectors of 
the economy. 3 
Some of these explanations see external social forces as 
the guilty party; others see the vict im—African agrarian 
systems—as the villain. These two arguments reflect the 
policy positions upon which most African states founded 
their agrarian reform plans and programmes. 
The crisis as externally induced 
That the African agrarian crisis is primarily the product 
of external forces has been argued in dif ferent ways. 
Progressive scholars suggest that Sub-Saharan economies 
opera te in an inherent ly explo i ta t ive in te rna t iona l 
context. The way out, it is argued, is for Afr ica to make 
the "correct" ideological choices and/or insist on the 
establishment of a new international economic order.4 
This view has merit for its global, compara t ive and 
historical perspect ive , but also needs a micro- leve l 
analysis to yield explanations of immediate value. At 
that level, the most important aspect of the argument is 
that much of the Afr ican agrarian crisis concerns the 
system of resource management and exploitation erected 
and pursued by colonial capital ism throughout Sub-
Saharan Afr ica for nearly a century. This system again 
became entrenched by the way in which decolonization 
occurred in the 1960s. 5 This was most ruthlessly 
executed fo r land, inc luding minera ls , and l abour 
resources in British Colonial Africa. 
British colonial policy recognized early on that efficient 
exploitation required effect ive control of land. Control 
was usually achieved through various systems according 
to the purpose and enforced with more or less deceit and 
intrigue. Control was the goal; the means were of ten a 
mere r a t iona l i za t ion . 6 In Swazi land, South Afr ica , 
Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and Kenya, control 
involved a series of military and juridical exercises of 
varying intensity, duration, complexi ty and absurdity, 
depending on the manner in which the colonial conquest 
itself was achieved. 
Swaziland. Swaziland, first invaded in the mid-nineteenth 
century by the Boers , presents an interest ing case. 
Accord ing to a report issued by Br i t i sh co lon ia l 
authorities in 1907: 
Practically the whole area of the country was [by 
the turn of the century] covered two, three and even 
four deep by concessions of all sizes, for different 
purposes and for greatly varying periods. In but 
very few cases were even the boundaries defined; 
many of the areas had been sub-divided and sold 
several times and seldom were the boundaries of 
the super-imposed areas even co-terminus.7 
When the British superseded the Boers in Swazi land 
after the Anglo-Boer war of 1899, and the country began 
to assume the style of a settler colony, the first thing 
* This paper was also presented at the 15th Annual Spring Symposium, Centre for African 
Studies, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, USA, April 10-11, 1988 on the theme 
"Land in African Agrarian Systems" and is an edited version of the original. 
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done was to confirm the validity of those concessions. 
The concessionaires were forced to surrender at least one-
third of the land covered by their concessions for "the use 
and occupat ion" by the Swazis . 8 The effect of this 
"partition"—which the Swazis never accepted—was that 
the Boer concessionaires retained more than sixty-three 
per cent of Swazi territory. A system of deeds regis-
tration enacted soon after allowed them to record these as 
absolute estates in accordance with the Roman-Dutch law 
which the British had extended to Swaziland. 
South Africa. Land expropriation in South Africa was 
more brutal and protracted. The Boer invasion and 
settlement was based (as all British settlements were) on 
the assumption that the land was ownerless and therefore 
open to acquis i t ion by right of conques t or f irst 
settlement, as observed by a noted colonial scholar and 
administrator: 
When towards the end of the eighteenth century the 
Boers advancing northwards first met the southward 
movement of the Bantu, neither Boer nor Bantu 
could justly claim to have any superior title to the 
land.9 
The superior military power enabled the Boers, by mid-
nineteenth century, to dismantle most of the political and 
social organizations of the African peoples in that region, 
especially the Zulu and the Sotho, who mounted great 
resistance to colonization. The Boers then worked out a 
system of "native" control which the British later 
perfected and legislated in the 1910 Act of Union and the 
Natives' Land Act of 1913. The Natives' Land Act was 
meant to settle once and for all the precise boundaries of 
native land . 1 0 African populations were regrouped in 
"reserves" sited along rivers or streams, or in rugged and 
arid regions. This exercise put approximately eighty-
seven per cent of South African territory beyond the reach 
of Africans. 
Zimbabwe and Kenya. The processes of land 
expropriation in Zimbabwe and Kenya were somewhat 
similar. They were interlaced with a juridical wrangle 
which ran from about 1890 to 1930 in Zimbabwe, and to 
1939 in Kenya. The patterns of land distribution and 
sett lements by the end of the wrangle in both cases 
resembled those developed in Swaziland and South Africa 
several decades earlier. In Southern Rhodesia, a land 
commission chaired by Morris Carter had recommended, 
in 1926, that the separation of Africans and Europeans 
was both expedient and practicable: 
However desirable it may be that members of the 
two races should live together side by side with 
equal rights as regards the holding of land, we are 
convinced that in practice, probably for generations 
to come, such a policy is not practicable nor in the 
best interests of the two races, and that until the 
native has advanced much farther in the paths of 
civilization, it is better that points of contact 
between the two races should be reduced.11 
These views were incorporated in the Land Appointment 
Act (1930), which became the cornerstone of land policy 
in Southern Rhodesia throughout the colonial period. 
Nearly seventy per cent of Southern Rhodesia territory 
was then either exclusively reserved for the colonizers or 
otherwise unavailable for use by Africans. 
In 1934, Morris Carter recommended a similar system 
of legalized segregation for Kenya. The Kenya Land 
Commission had been appointed to review colonial land 
practices ( including "compensation" for expropriated 
Afr icans ) . A f t e r a f f i rming the expropr ia t ions , it 
recommended that a final and secure assurance be made to 
Europeans. Through two Orders-in-Council in 1939, one 
for the European "Highlands" and the other for the 
"native" areas, the land they had seized remained 
inviolable. About seventy-five per cent of all the high 
potential land in the country was thus expropriated by the 
colonizers.12 
Zambia. British land policy in other parts of Eastern and 
Southern Afr ica varied only in degree. In Northern 
Rhodesia (now Zambia), that difference lay—at least from 
the 1940s onwards—merely in the legislative language. 
As early as 1928, a "native reserve" had been created in 
the East Luangwa District. The purpose of the reserve 
was not to protect the rights of the indigenous peoples, 
but to clarify what areas could be expropriated by the 
North Chartered Exploration Company.1 3 
Later , the colonia l government created two new 
categories of land, "crown land" and "native trust lands". 
Crown land was a mechanism to exclude Africans f rom 
land suitable for European settlement or earmarked for 
mining development, native trust lands gave Europeans 
r ights over A f r i c a n areas whenever the co lon ia l 
government thought this desirable. In either case, the 
land rights of Af r icans were clearly insecure. As 
colonialism progressed into the 1940s and 1950s, the 
native trust lands were expanded to enable continued 
expropriation. 
Nyasaland In N y a s a l a n d (now M a l a w i ) , the 
establishment of reserves was rejected early in 1921 on 
the ostensibly laudable grounds that it would "seriously 
prejudice the welfare of communities who are obliged, 
owing to shortage of water and other local circumstances, 
to l ive in scat tered v i l l ages" . 1 4 However , by ma-
nipulating the concepts of "Crown" ownership and trust 
holding, the colonial government nonetheless excluded 
Africans f rom five per cent (if not more) of the best 
land.15 
Tanzania and Uganda. In Tanganyika (now mainland 
Tanzania) and Uganda where settlement was a secondary 
issue, land expropriation was conducted on the basis of 
the supposed residual proprietary power of the colonial 
sovereign. The separation of the races was achieved 
through legislation prohibiting the sale of land to and by 
Africans.1 6 
In addition to agricultural settlement, the uniform land 
control mechanisms in Eastern and Southern Afr ica , 
controlled mineral resources as well. In all these 
count r ies , such m e c h a n i s m s were bu t t r e s sed by 
legislation that gave the colonial power control over all 
minerals. Reserving land for the Afr icans or, as in 
Tanzania after 1923, prohibiting alienation of freehold or 
absolute title to land, did not detract f rom colonial 
appropria t ion of mineral resources. Therefore , no 
ind igenous communi t i e s were ever i m m u n e f r o m 
expropriation, relocation or physical destabilisation in 
colonial Africa. French, Belgian and Portuguese land 
policies in Africa were similar to those of the British in 
this respect.1 7 
Second to land, the need to secure a continuous supply 
of cheap and dependable labour was central to the 
dynamics of colonial capital. This was of particular 
import in the settler economies of Kenya and Zimbabwe 
where the colonizers generally lacked the technical 
capability and financial resources to make agriculture 
profitable. In Zambia and South Africa, African labour 
was clearly indispensable to the success of the mineral 
industry. Complex legis la t ive and adminis t ra t ive 
controls were therefore developed to faci l i ta te the 
extraction of sufficient labour. These controls included: 
• a series of "humane pressures", such as employment 
registration through the Kipande or native passes, 
progressive taxes levied on adult males, their huts, 
windows or even wives, and vagrancy laws 
• administrative coercion of able-bodied males of the 
"apparent" age of sixteen or over onto the farms or 
mines 
• resident (or kaffir) labour contracts involving heavily 
exploitative share-tenancy arrangements 
• progressive reduction of available land within the 
reserves so as to marginalise indigenous agriculture 
and hence speed up emigration.18 
The legal organization of these mechanisms was usually 
designed to keep the labourer constantly on the farm or 
mine. Wages were generally fixed below the tax rate, 
thus the reserves gained nothing.1 9 
The links between this history and the agrarian crisis is 
clear. In all cases examined, the areas reserved for the 
i nd igenous p e o p l e w e r e u n p r o d u c t i v e , h o s t i l e 
environments , whi le those for the colonizers were 
productive and ecologically endowed. The more suitable 
the zone, the larger the share allocated to the colonizers 
(or the Crown).2 0 
The notion, as expressed in the reserves or "bantustans" 
policy, that Af r ican popula t ions were expec ted to 
conform to "ethnic control maps" ran counter to the 
economic and production forces in the reserved areas. 
Eventually, this policy destroyed the arrangement as 
population increased and technologies of production 
stagnated. This happened because Africans, as a group, 
were excluded f rom Crown lands, and individuals were 
excluded from lands reserved for other communities.21 
The labour policies and mechanisms outlined above, 
ensured such serious depletion of productive forces in the 
reserves, that their food production was often lower than 
the subs is tence d e m a n d . As a resul t , shor tages 
interspersed with severe famines were commonplace . 2 2 
Comments one researcher of South Africa and Zimbabwe, 
by making relentless demands for labour, it was 
the mineral revolution [in South Africa] which 
ultimately led to the impoverishment of the African 
peasantry . . . paradoxically, it was the absence of 
such a revolution [in Zimbabwe] which had much 
the same effect.2-' 
The d i smant l ing , especial ly in South Af r i ca , of 
indigenous polit ical and social insti tutions severely 
affected the stability of production relations. Attempts to 
replace these through imposing arrangements founded on 
the theory that the African was not sophisticated enough 
to plan his own economy, only aggravated the situation. 
As this analysis shows, the agrarian crisis in Africa has 
more than just an intimate link with the past. The 
policies, institutions, and practices that precipitated that 
crisis and facilitated its perpetuation remain in most of 
Sub-Saharan Africa. It is a crisis born of a long history 
of social s tagnat ion, resource plunder , and service 
deprivation, compounded, as we shall see, by more 
contemporary factors. 
The Victim as Culprit 
An overwhelming majority of scholars will readily 
admit that the colonial experience is a relevant factor in 
Africa's current predicament, but a significant number 
will still deny that it is the fundamental , or even major, 
cause. These scholars direct their attention primarily at 
the victim and argue that the very nature and constitution 
of A f r i c a n agra r i an o r g a n i z a t i o n s c a u s e d the i r 
predicament. They typically assume that there must be a 
single normative or institutional problematique wh ich 
must be isolated, diagnosed, and cured if Afr ica is to 
extricate itself f rom underdevelopment. Quite often, that 
p rob lemat ique is identified a priori, and its pathology 
conducted within a broad spectrum of the epistemology to 
which the researcher subscribes. A number of such 
positions are examined briefly here. 
The first draws together scholars or policy advisers who 
believe that the crisis is but a historically determined 
epoch. They see it as a stage in the evolution of social 
institutions from a pre-modern, pre-capitalist and "status" 
bound stratum to a fully individualized and contractarian 
one. Seldom are concessions made in this analysis to 
discrete social or cultural settings. 
Colonial an thropolog is t s—some of the earliest to 
propagate this argument—drew their inspiration f rom 
theories developed by a number of nineteenth century 
Western European scholars, such as Sir Henry Main, 
Paul Vinogradoff and Max Weber, who thought such 
progression was inevitable.24 Having slotted Africans at 
the pre-modern end of the continuum, they concluded that 
Africans were not expected to be good agriculturalists. A 
report issued in the 1920s in Zimbabwe commented: 
It cannot be said that the native of Mashonaland is 
a good agriculturalist, his methods are wasteful and 
in a way ruinous to the future interests of the 
country . . . As a rule bush country is selected for 
gardens, generally in the granite formation where 
the soil is easy to dig and cultivate . . . No attempt 
is made to manure the ground, except with wood, 
ash and weeds which are dug in . . . It takes about 
ten to fifteen years for gardens to recover and be 
again fit for cultivation.25 
A mere decade or so earlier, the Shona had produced the 
cereals which the colonizers were expropriat ing for 
s p e c u l a t i v e r e s a l e to S o u t h A f r i c a n m i n i n g 
populations.2 6 
Although this assessment of Af r ican agr icul tural 
behaviour was sometimes explained by a lack of "modern 
technology", its cultural dimensions were, and remain, 
distinct. Yudelman reports that this dimension was often 
based on "divergent atti tudes [between Afr icans and 
Europeans] towards increasing productivity." Drawing on 
the theory of J.H. Boeke who studied economic policy in 
Indonesia in the 1950s, Yudelman argued, as many still 
do, that since the indigenous economy was either pre-
capitalist or non-capitalist, 
its patterns of behaviour, attitudes and value 
systems are the antithesis of the capitalist ethnic. 
Typically, the non-capitalist sector is rural; 
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producers are not materialistic; incentives to in-
crease production such as higher prices have little 
effect; the indigenous population is not interested in 
production for profit but is concerned only with 
satisfying a limited range of wants that is almost 
static in character.27 
In short, the crisis in Africa is often reduced to the per-
sistence of innate forces or a total absence of economic or 
environmental rationality. 
The second position is in the same vein, but more 
specific. The crisis is believed to be firmly rooted in 
defective tenure arrangements which have no place in 
twentieth century agriculture. Tenure systems were often 
painted in terms that not only set them apart from other 
social organizations but that gave them a mistique of 
collectivism and inflexibility that was not always easy to 
decipher. These systems were considered a major 
drawback to agriculture. A recent analysis of land tenure 
in Lesotho notes, 
a succession of overseas economic missions . . . 
have without exception stated categorically that the 
traditional system of land tenure is quite unsuited to 
modern economic development and that it was a 
man-made obstacle whose removal was a pre-
condition to economic growth 2 8 
The author notes that these missions were merely 
echoing a large body of literature "invariably written by 
expatriates generally addressed to the British colonial 
administrat ion, and [which] almost always found 
traditional tenure practices to be an impediment."29 
Two important contr ibut ions in Brit ish colonial 
l i tera ture , and ones which have gained much 
prominence—or notoriety—in African reform circles, are 
Kenya's Plan to intensify African Agriculture (1954), and 
Southern Rhodesia's What the Native Land Husbandly 
Act means to the Rural African in Southern Rhodesia: A 
Five Year Plan which will Revolutionize African 
Agriculture (1955).30 
The defective elements in African land tenure were 
normally identified in the following manner. It was 
argued that the primary defect was that these tenure 
systems were "communal" , meaning that all the 
attributes of "ownership" were thought to reside in the 
"tribe", the "lineage", the "clan", or similar units. Thus 
African tenure systems were seen to be inherently: 
• incapable of providing security for land development 
since title could not be marketed or otherwise 
negotiated 
• generators of land fragmentation and eventually 
subdivision into sub-economic parcels due to every 
adult member of a given unit always being entitled 
to s o m e l a n d — c o n d i t i o n s wh ich lead to 
diseconomies of time, labour utilization, and scale 
• the source of incessant disputes due to diffuse rights 
and lack of clear title and thus lack of incentives to 
long-term investment 
• so fraught with externalities that land deterioration 
was inevitable31 
One study of matrilineal societies of Central Africa 
notes that colonial agricultural experts sometimes added 
another inherent problem: that a man would have no 
incentive to improve land over which he had tenuous and 
transitory tenure and had no prospect of handing it on to 
his son.3 2 
These posi t ions are only a small sample of the 
argument that the causes of the African agrarian crisis are 
fundamentally internal to, and inherent in, Afr ican 
agrarian systems. The basic point to remember , 
however , is that since this argument refutes the 
"dangerous heresies" of the earlier one—that the crisis is 
externally induced—it was, and still is, the official 
explanation of the crisis. Since international agencies 
and multi-national corporations have entered into African 
decision-making, this has become the only explanation. 
Laments Nyerere, 
The Third world is now blamed for its own 
poverty. Each country is analysed separately [by 
the agencies]. Its problems are then explained in 
terms of its socialism, its corruption, the laziness of 
its people and such-like alleged national at-
tributes.33 
Agrarian Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa 
State Responses to the Crisis 
I have argued elsewhere that the basic symptoms of the 
current cr is is—populat ion pressure, s tagnat ion in 
agriculture, food shortages—were in evidence long before 
decolonization started in the late 1950s.3 4 But when 
colonial authorities diagnosed the problem, they did so in 
terms that suggested that their own policies and 
exploitation mechanisms had nothing, whatsoever, to do 
with it. They settled instead for the view, described 
above, that African agrarian systems were themselves 
responsible for the deteriorating condition of agriculture. 
They then formulated reform policies and devised plans 
and programmes which were not only diversionary but 
which also tended to underestimate the extent and severity 
of the problem. 
Colonial responses to the crisis 
The timing of colonial responses to the deteriorating 
agrarian condition in the African areas throughout Eastern 
and Southern Africa is revealing. In most cases, concern 
turned to these areas either when demand for migrant 
labour was low—as in the depression years of the 1920s 
and 1930s—or when it became clear that immigrant 
agriculture alone could not sustain the empire—as was 
suddenly discovered during and after the trauma of the 
Second Imperialist War (1939-44).3 5 It was always in 
these circumstances that colonial authorities thought that 
improving the agrarian condition in the African areas 
might complement colonial agriculture and thus help to 
perpetuate colonial relations of production. The specific 
approaches taken were, however, extremely fragmentary. 
Excessive population in the African areas was one of 
the first of the vast number of ills identified. In 1946, 
Philip Mitchell, then Governor of Kenya, sent a dispatch 
to the colonial office on the general agrarian situation as 
it affected the African population in Kenya. In the 
dispatch he argued that the primary cause of deterioration 
of the physical environment was over-populat ion, 
compounded by bad management pract ices . 3 6 As a 
solution, a policy paper issued the previous year 
prescribed land settlement schemes and re-development 
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programmes. This involved a s cheme to m o v e 
population into "empty" spaces within the reserves, and 
terracing, bush clearing, strip-cropping, water-furrow and 
stock reduction programmes in the settled reserve areas.37 
Chambers, who has studied sett lement schemes in 
tropical Africa, observes that "it was not until the decade 
following the Second World War that set t lement 
schemes in ang lophone Af r i ca en joyed their f irst 
h e y d a y . " 3 8 He notes that three types of sett lement 
schemes were implemented during this period. The first 
was based on attitudes of conservation and was seen "as 
one means of attack on the combined problems of erosion 
and over-population."3 9 The Sukumaland Development 
Scheme in Tanganyika , the Shendam Reset t lement 
Scheme in Northern Nigeria, the Kigezi Resettlements in 
Uganda, the resettlement schemes of the Eastern Province 
of Northern Rhodes ia and the Makueni Set t lement 
Scheme in Kenya were of this type. 
Similar schemes were also mounted in Swazi land 
following the promulgation of the Swazi Settlements Act 
of 1945.40 Attempts to organize schemes along similar 
lines in Southern Rhodesia, however, led to violence and 
had to be abandoned. 4 1 The purpose of the second and 
third types of post-war settlement was to introduce new 
systems and technologies of resource use. Chambers at-
tributes this approach to experiences outside Afr ica , 
ideology, vision, interests, faith, and capital, rather than 
an attempt to solve the population or land utilization 
problem. 
These land r e c o n d i t i o n i n g and r e d e v e l o p m e n t 
programmes which followed the collapse of settlement 
schemes infused a modes t amount of capi tal and 
introduced government-controlled landuse structures. The 
capital was obtained from the colonial Development and 
Welfare Of f ice which, in 1945, increased the United 
Kingdom contribution to such expenditure in the colonies 
to £120 million for a ten-year period.4 2 The utilization 
of that capital was usually entrusted to new institutions 
directly supervised by the government. 
In Kenya, a share of that m o n e y — a m o u n t i n g to 
approximately £4 million over the ten-year period—was 
entrusted to a non-statutory body called the Development 
and Recons t ruc t ion Author i ty , working through an 
African Land Utilisation and Settlement Board (later 
African Land Development Board or ALDEV) . In 
Southern Rhodes ia this was entrusted to a Natural 
Resources Board set up by legislative instrument in 
1941 4 3 In both cases, the administration was given wide 
powers over the African population, including those of 
compulsory removal, relocation, and stock reduction 4 4 
That these programmes failed, like the settlement and 
resett lement schemes be fo re them, greatly puzzled 
colonial administrators. Complained ALDEV in 1956, 
The question of how best to enlist the full and 
continuing energy and co-operation of African 
peasants in the betterment of their own lands has 
yet to be conclusively answered.45 
Two years earlier, the Natural Resources Board had 
strongly warned the Southern Rhodesia government: 
The time for plain speaking has now arrived, and it 
is no exaggeration to say that at the moment we are 
heading for disaster. We have on the one hand a 
rapid increase taking place in the African 
population and on the other a rapid deterioration of 
the very land on which these people depend for 
their existence and upon which so much of the 
future prosperity of the country depends 4 6 
All schemes and programmes meant to resolve the 
population and land deterioration problems were designed 
to opera te within the f r amework of exis t ing land 
relations. The fai lure of these schemes led colonial 
au thor i t ies to the a l te rnat ive pos i t ion that those 
relations—and in particular tenure arrangements—were, 
in fact, the problem. 
Only Kenya received a full dress-rehearsal of the tenure 
reform alternative. Experimentation was carried out in 
U g a n d a 4 7 and Southern Rhodes i a . 4 8 In Swaziland, 
colonial authorities were unable to progress beyond the 
settlement phase. A movement to expand Swazi Nation 
Land by buying back expropriated land had started almost 
immediately after the 1907 partition. Swazi suspicion of 
colonial intentions regarding land was, and remains, quite 
strong. Hence, rather than accept further experiments 
with Swazi Nation Land, the Ngwenyama ( t radi t ional 
ruler) set up an organization called Tibiyo Taka Ngwane 
to speed up repurchase of expropriated land. 
Experimentat ion with tenure reform in Uganda was 
limited to a few pilot schemes, mainly in Kigezi, Ankole 
and Bugisu Districts. According to a publication issued 
in 1955 by the government, the objectives of reform 
were, inter alia, to: 
encourage individual land ownership in such a 
manner as not to annihilate the goodwill of 
traditional authorities; nor to prejudice good 
husbandry; nor to abandon such safeguards as are 
essential for future progress of the people.49 
In this respect, the Uganda government had accepted the 
essence of the recommendat ions of the East Afr ican 
Royal Commission (1953-1955) as did Kenya. These 
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s were v i g o r o u s l y o p p o s e d in 
Tanganyika.5 0 
Exper imenta t ion was rather d i f ferent in Southern 
Rhodesia since their system of property law was rooted in 
Roman-Dutch precepts and it was not easy to shift to the 
Torrents systems of registration required by tenure reform 
accord ing to the East Af r i ca Royal Commis s ion . 
Consequently, the colonial government came up with 
(Native Land Husbandry Act 1948) a "land centralization" 
p r o g r a m m e . Th is p r o g r a m m e invo lved res i t ing 
homes teads , s tandardiz ing land ho ld ings , l imi t ing 
l ives tock , and increas ing cont ro l of h u s b a n d r y . 
Homestead resiting and standardizing holdings involved 
granting farming rights to individuals, and grazing rights 
to specif ied communit ies . The Southern Rhodesian 
programme was not based on land area, but on a rated 
carrying capacity basis and the imposit ion of good 
husbandry practices. Unlike the Kenya and Uganda 
e x p e r i m e n t s , the Southern R h o d e s i a p r o g r a m m e 
"continued much of the 'conservation bias of the Natural 
Resources Act [but also] in one fell swoop . . . proposed 
to replace the tribal-communistic system of allocating 
land according to need with a hybrid tribal-capitalistic 
system of individual holdings and communal grazing."51 
Yudelman ' s assessment of the impact of Southern 
Rhodesia 's p rogramme sums up better than any the 
impact of tenure reform attempted under colonialism: 
The implementation of [the Native Land Husbandry 
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Act] . . . had high human costs. Alien concepts 
[were] introduced but not understood; traditional 
authority over land rights . . . usurped by the 
marketplace. The whole basis of society . . . 
threatened, and security . . . undermined rather 
than enhanced . . . Perhaps more importantly, 
implementation . . . [did] not produce tangible 
benefits. It . . . [took] away something which, 
though intangible [was] important, and [did not] 
replace it with anything meaningful to most 
producers.52 
This may seem severe , but s ince tenure r e fo rm 
programmes survived decolonisation in several countries, 
a further look at Yudelman's assessment is reserved. 
The various reform policies and programmes described 
above offered only partial solutions to the problem. 
They were pursued in a half-hearted manner and, most 
u n f o r t u n a t e l y , we re based on a grea t dea l of 
misconception about African agrarian systems. Virtually 
all of the settlements were sited in areas most unsuitable 
for human habitation, and the land development and 
recondit ioning programmes often led to the physical 
reduction of cultivable land, rather than to its expansion. 
The tenure reform programmes were apparently seen as 
capable of inducing broad-spectrum agricultural change. 
The normative constraints of tenure arrangements were 
expected to be removed. Production structures were ex-
pected to change because new production units were being 
in t roduced th rough land concen t ra t ion (Southern 
Rhodesia) or consolidation (Kenya and Uganda) and 
support serv ices—such as credit , co-operat ives and 
marketing—were facilitated through improved security of 
tenure and better farm planning. 
It was evident that as long as production relations 
be tween the immigrant and Afr ican sectors of the 
economy remained basically exploitative, the African 
sector would remain under-developed. Despite this, no 
attempts were made to remove the underlying inequalities 
between them. Even less effort went into integrating the 
Afr ican economy into the wider context in which 
agriculture operated, except perhaps by way of capital 
penetration. The legacy on the eve of independence for 
most countries may have been an even deeper crisis than 
before the Second Imperialist War. 
Contemporary responses to the crisis 
The transition f rom colonialism to independence was 
relatively smooth and constitutional for most of Sub-
S a h a r a n A f r i c a excep t for in Gu inea , A n g o l a , 
Mozambique and, to some extent, Zimbabwe. In these 
last countries, independence was preceded by protracted 
wars of liberation, leading, in a number of them, to a 
chaotic transfer of power. In Angola, for example, power 
was transferred to the people as a whole. The political 
parties and their liberation armies were left to fight it out 
amongst themselves. 
F rom this s impl i f ied poli t ical background , it is 
tempt ing to posi t a broad typology of normat ive 
institutional change. In the case of English and French-
speaking Afr ica (other than Zimbabwe) , the change 
incorporated general continuity and re-entrenchment of 
colonial structures and relations of production. On the 
other hand, Portuguese-speaking Africa and Zimbabwe 
saw radical discontinuity and reconstruction. 
Such a dichotomy, however, would distort the rather 
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complex process of change that occurred during and after 
the transit ion f r o m colonial rule, particularly in the 
agrarian sector. Independence did not shake the normative 
institutional foundations laid by colonialism, regardless 
of the politics preceding it. The political environment of 
state power and the rhetoric in which the political eco-
nomic enterprise was being managed had both changed. 
In T a n z a n i a , Gu inea , M o z a m b i q u e and A n g o l a , 
ideological and political consolidation was even given 
priority by independence elites. Nonetheless, continuity 
was the rule rather than the exception. 
The implications of this continuity for development 
policy and programming in independent Afr ica varied 
from country to country, and f rom sector to sector. In 
the agrarian sector of some countries colonial policies and 
programmes were consolidated and expanded. In others, 
there was exper imentat ion within the f r amework of 
inherited structures with new—but not altogether novel— 
strategies and programmes. 
Consolidation and expansion of colonial responses. 
Perhaps the best k n o w n , and most sy s t ema t i c , 
consolidation and expansion of colonial policies and 
programmes was—and still is—in Kenya. Despite the 
change in the political environment of power, the inde-
pendent government in Kenya perpetuated, with even 
greater zeal, both the tenure reform and set t lement 
schemes initiated in the colonial era and for much the 
same reasons. 
The tenure reform programme continued to draw its 
economic and political rationale f rom the 1954 Plan 
referred to earlier. It is currently est imated to have 
brought over ninety per cent of all registrable land in 
Nyanza , Wes te rn , Ri f t Val ley, Centra l and Coast 
Provinces onto a Torrens register. Despite misgivings 
by scholars and some administrators, both during the 
colonial era and after independence, the p rogramme 
remains a priority in the government's land policy. 
An interesting variation in tenure re form—but one 
which is inspired by colonial theories about Afr ican 
tenure systems—is in progress in Malawi. There, the 
process of ind iv idua l i sa t ion is coupled with the 
adjudication and registration, in appropriate cases, of 
"customary rights qua customary rights." As in Kenya 
and Zimbabwe, the programme was conceived in the early 
1950s and initially took the form of land improvement or 
village reorganization schemes. Says a recent study: 
[t]he project basically involved the reorganization 
of the land-holding pattern of an area in such a way 
that each household ended up with one consolidated 
plot equal in size and quality to the total area of its 
former collection of pieces and fragments. The 
entire village was then geared to an overall land 
utilization plan . . . 5 3 
Although village re-organization schemes had collapsed 
by 1960, the independent Malawi government revived and 
s t rengthened their tenure reform aspects by vesting 
absolute proprietorships in consolidated holdings in 
individuals rather than villages. The only di f ference 
between this version and that in force in Kenya is that 
community rights over villages, burial grounds, and 
grazing lands were reserved and registered as such in 
Malawi. 
The expected broad-spectrum effect of tenure reform 
notwi ths tanding, the Kenya government could not 
entirely avoid land redistr ibution programmes af ter 
independence. But when such programmes came, they 
w e r e — a s far as the peasantry was concerned—mounted 
essentially on the settlement principles of the colonial 
e r a . In that respect they mainly attempted, firstly, to re-
duce pressure on the reserves and, secondly, to resolve the 
problem of chaotic tenure arrangements in the large 
squatter settlements in the highlands. In the first case, a 
series of settlements in the Million-Acre Scheme 5 4 were 
hived off the highlands and assigned to ethnic groups in 
specified reserves. In the second, a number of similar 
schemes were organized for the settlement of registered 
squatters mainly f r o m the Central and Rif t Valley 
province highlands. 
Security of tenure was available to settlers of the first 
scheme only, upon ful l d ischarge of their loan and 
husbandry o b l i g a t i o n s . N o n e w h a t s o e v e r was 
contemplated for settlers of the second scheme. In either 
case, the argument against immediately granting tenure 
security was basically colonial: careful tutelage was 
necessary before the Afr ican could be entrusted with 
absolute property rights. Consequently, tenure relations 
were based in the first case on conditional freeholds, and 
in the second on temporary occupation licences (TOLS). 
Thus the organization of the second settlement took the 
form of the pos t -1945 schemes , which were also 
maintained and extended by the Kenya government. 
Malawi, Z i m b a b w e and Swazi land also found it 
necessary to build on colonial settlement principles as a 
basis, ostensibly, of at tacking the problem of land 
dis tr ibut ion. In M a l a w i , the s c h e m e s — w h e t h e r 
established on public or private l and—were declared 
government property upon completion. Settlers on such 
schemes were then granted T O L S to enable them to 
cultivate the land, initially for five years.5 5 
Although colonial set t lements did not take off in 
Southern Rhodesia, the Zimbabwe government was quick 
to set up similar schemes to accommodate "refugees, the 
destitute . . . and people without land in the over-crowded 
Tribal Trust Lands . " 5 6 These, however, were ad hoc 
measures awaiting the formulation of a comprehensive 
land policy. In Swaziland, the settlements originated in a 
land purchase programme very similar to Kenya's Million 
Acre Scheme. The adminis t rat ive organizat ion was 
similarly ad hoc and the schemes remained without clear 
tenure principles 5 7 
Colonial set t lement pr inciples were not, however , 
restricted only to conven t iona l ( red is t r ibu t ive or 
conservation) programmes. In Kenya and Swaziland they 
were extended to permanent or experimental irrigation 
schemes. In Kenya, for example, tenure relations based 
on TOLS which had been used in colonial schemes in 
Mwea-Tebere and Yatta, were extended to Ahero Pilot and 
Bura Irrigation Schemes. Despite the clear contradiction 
in the colonial mind about the curative properties of 
mdividual title and tenure practice in settlement schemes, 
the TOL was vigorously defended by those independent 
African governments who relied on it. 
Alternative policy and programme. Although continuity 
has generally been the rule in Sub-Saharan Africa, several 
countries have tried more radical reform options. Some 
°f these were of the classic Latin Amer ican land-
distribution variety while others were directed mainly at 
changes in p roduc t ion s t ructures . E th iop ia and 
Mozambique opted for the land-distribution type, while 
Tanzania and Benin aimed at changing product ion 
structures. A number of pilot programmes to change 
production structures were also carried out in Kenya, 
Nigeria, Cote d'lvoire, and Cameroun. 
The Eth iopian r e fo rms are the most recent and 
revolutionary in Sub-Saharan Africa. They have their 
or igins in his tor ical c i rcumstances not essent ia l ly 
different f rom many Latin American countries or Egypt 
(before the Land Reform Law of 1952).58 The agrarian 
structure which existed when Emperor Haile Selassie I 
was overthrown in 1974 was virtually identical with that 
in Egypt, except that it was more backward and wholly 
feudal. The reforms introduced in a 1975 proclamation 
argued that: 
In order to increase agricultural production and to 
make the tiller the owner of the fruits of his labour; 
it [was] necessary to release the productive forces 
of the rural economy by liquidating the feudal 
system under which the nobility, aristocracy and a 
small number of other persons with adequate means 
of livelihood have prospered by the toil and sweat 
of the masses.59 
The proclamat ion then declared all rural land the 
collective property of the Ethiopian people; distributed to 
any person "willing to personally cultivate . . . rural land 
sufficient for his maintenance and that of his family;" 
prohibited alienation of land (other than use rights) by 
way of succession only; and set up peasant associations 
for its implementation. The proclamation may have had 
its greatest impact by establishing peasant associations. 
These were not merely new production units in the 
agrarian structure; they were in every respect vehicles for 
repol i t ic izing the Ethiopian masses a long the new 
socialist line. The public educat ion campaign that 
followed—called Zemecha—used these associations. 
Whereas it was necessary to na t ional ize land to 
distribute it to the peasantry in Ethiopia, in Mozambique 
such steps were unnecessary since many large estates 
owned by Portuguese settlers were largely abandoned at 
independence. The most developed land therefore came 
under state ownership "not by virtue of nationalization, 
but through abandonment and rescue."6 0 The choice fac-
ing the independent Mozambican government was not 
whether to nationalize the large farms, but whether to 
denationalize them. 
The government chose to preserve the large estates as 
state fa rms and consolidate smal l -holdings into co-
operative enterprises to be worked by the peasants living 
on them. The new property structure established by the 
Land Law of 1979 was decidedly collective. However, 
limited private property rights, in the form of registered 
licences, were reserved to enable a certain amount of 
semi-capitalist investments to come in. It was made 
clear that such rights were subject to the overriding 
power of the state and the social interest of the 
Mozambican people. Irrespective of ownership, the law 
subjected all agricultural land to an overall use plan 
sanctioned and administered by the state. 
Re fo rms in Ethiopia and Mozambique have been 
concerned mainly with changes in land tenure structures. 
In these countries, tenure and distribution were the most 
problematic elements in the agrarian system. In Tanzania 
and Benin, re form has been mainly in reorganizing 
production structures. 
In Tanzania, the land had been vested in the state, even 
under colonial ism. Thus any tenure reforms found 
necessary after independence were relatively easy to 
accompl i sh . These were mainly concerned with 
removing residual forms of English property regimes 
such as leaseholds and a limited number of freeholds 
granted before 1921—the date the British assumed 
ju r i sd i c t i on—and their convers ion into r ights of 
occupancy, the basis of property relations after that date. 
Further, the new government sought to abolish a number 
of feudal customary tenures existing in parts of the 
country. Hence tenure reform per se, in Tanzania, was 
over by 1969. 
In the 1970s attention turned to an attack on production 
structures. The Tanzania government sought to radicalize 
these through introducing collective farming based on 
Ujamaa or socialist villages. The primary objectives of 
Ujamaa villages were: equitable distribution of resources 
to rural communit ies ; democratizat ion of community 
leadership; self-rel iant and endogenous ly propelled 
development; achievement of higher levels of productiv-
ity of land per unit factor input; and more efficient service 
distribution to village communities. The villages were 
therefore seen not only as production units but also as 
foci for distribution and management of basic services 
such as water, electricity, education, and health care. 
Although the political phase of the Ujamaa programme 
preceded—and in most respects ove r shadowed—it s 
primary legal organs, they were firmly in place by 1975. 
The Villages and Ujamaa Villages legislation61 provided 
for registration of vil lages as corporate entities. In 
addi t ion, the machinery was put in place for the 
Commissioner of Lands to issue the villages with rights 
of occupancy in the same way as for individuals desiring 
to use agricultural land. The villages were then expected 
to use and manage the land as a collective asset along 
socialist principles. By 1982, over eighty per cent of 
Tanzania's population had been resettled in such villages. 
The collective farms established in Benin in the 1960s 
was in no way as comprehens ive as the U j a m a a 
programme in Tanzania. "Supervised" collectives were 
established in which each participant was expected to 
contribute a certain amount of land in exchange for a 
proportionate share in the enterprise. The collectives 
were administered by an elected board in which the 
government had representation. The government also 
provided supporting services to facilitate the operations of 
the collectives.6 2 
Observers have pointed out that the countries which 
chose to try alternatives not based on colonial formulae 
were also experimenting with new ideologies. Latin 
American experiences have demonstrated that extremely 
conservative regimes have also been able to push through 
equally radical p rogrammes . It is not surpr is ing, 
therefore, that independent regimes as conservative as 
those in Kenya, Nigeria, Cote d ' lvoire and Cameroun 
were also able, at some point, to exper iment with 
collective farms, plantation co-operatives, and rural land 
banking institutions. A more important explanation is 
that the political exigencies of the time in those countries 
were clearly conducive to such reforms. 
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Implications for Agricultural Development 
Some conceptual issues 
The main intellectual and policy perspectives in the 
current discourse on the African agrarian crisis have been 
examined, as well as the responses from governments in 
Eastern and Southern Africa. This section evaluates the 
impl i ca t ions of those responses for agr icu l tu ra l 
development. 
It was earlier indicated that one of the more important 
reasons for reform programmes was, in the words of the 
E th iop ian p r o c l a m a t i o n , to increase agr icu l tu ra l 
productivity by releasing "the productive forces of the 
rural economy." It may be useful to first inquire into 
how that end was to be achieved. This issue, although 
primarily conceptual, clearly has important planning and 
programming implications. One would have expected 
policy-makers and planners to have at least some idea of 
how particular reform packages would trigger off the 
changes capable of generating increased productivity. 
Agronomic experts and planners expected structural 
adjustments along one or more of the fol lowing lines. 
First, it was expected that agrarian relations would be 
restructured in such a way as to afford the tiller greater 
control over the land. In the context of the tenure reform 
programmes of Kenya and Malawi, that control was seen 
as conditional upon the emergence (or imposition) of the 
pr inciple of absolu te propr ie torsh ip by individual 
cultivators. 
In Ethiopia and Tanzania, that control was thought to 
lie in soc ia l so l idar i ty and bas ic p r inc ip les of 
egalitarianism which kept indigenous social relations 
stable. In other words, appeal was being made to some 
concept of security in both cases, even though the tenure 
arrangements necessary for obtaining it were clearly 
different . Control , however obtained, was seen as 
fundamental to agricultural development. Only in this 
way could access to land resources be guarantied. 
Second, it was expected that with appropriate changes 
in land tenure, production units—the decision-making 
spheres def ined by social cohesion, certain property 
rights, and a defined area of land6 3—would operate more 
rationally and efficiently. Both reform strategies thought 
this would be an inevitable development. The one argued 
that their particular form of tenure reform would have 
removed a number of important externalities, while the 
other argued that equilibrium would have been restored in 
the agricultural enterprise. Consequently, the production 
process was expected to function in a manner which 
would ensure continuity of output and development of 
external m a n a g e m e n t l inks with the larger socio-
economic network of which the individual or community 
was a part. 
The basis on which the latter argument rests should be 
clarified. Before colonial intrusion, production cycles in 
African agrarian systems were highly developed. A recent 
study of the e f f ec t s of apar theid on pover ty and 
malnutr i t ion in South Afr ica forcefu l ly makes the 
point .6 4 It explains, for example, that apart from simply 
enabling agrarian communities to produce enough food 
on a se l f - sus ta inab le bas is , p roduc t ion s t ruc tures 
performed extremely important social functions: 
As in almost all societies whose economy is based 
on subsistence grain-farming, social organization is 
dominated by the family farming system. In order 
to ensure the continuity of an activity of a seasonal 
nature, which requires, in particular the 
transmission of food resources over a period of 
time, the organic and functional reproduction of the 
production units is regulated by careful 
management of the grain reserves, the redistribution 
of food supplies and the strict control of reproduc-
tion relations particularly through marriage and 
filiation.65 
The agrarian reforms in Tanzania and the movement back 
to traditional control of land in Swazi land were 
essentially f i red by the need to recapture this 
complementarity between social needs, production 
efficiency, and tenure arrangements. 
Third, it was expected that the support service 
infrastructure necessary for a healthy agricultural industry 
would develop. The components of this infrastructure 
would include credit facilities, marketing arrangements 
and new (appropriate) technologies of production. The 
tenure reforms were based on the assumption that these 
infrastructural facilities would be automatically attracted 
to agriculture. However, whether they were necessary or 
capable of increasing production under any reform 
programme was never in doubt. 
Technology always particularly interested policy-
makers, planners, and programme administrators. Some 
saw it as an antecedent process, possible only if structural 
reorganization had already paved the way.6 6 Others saw 
technological absorption as the variable assisting the 
state in restructuring agrarian relations. In many 
countries, infrastructural services were set up in anticipa-
tion of changes in land relations, either through tenure 
reform or land redistribution programmes. As an 
infrastructural service, the availability and absorption of 
new farming technologies were always seen as an 
important part of the agrarian reform package. 
An assessment of development implications 
To what extent have the expectations of agrarian reform 
been realized? Those who have studied agrarian 
transformation programmes throughout Africa are not 
optimistic. An assessment of Kenya's own tenure reform 
programme suggests that it has not progressed beyond the 
situation observed by Yudelman regarding Southern 
Rhodesia.67 Our own assessment notes that no evidence 
exists that agricultural production has increased due to the 
programme. To the contrary, plenty of data indicate that 
inequalities, both structural and political economic, have 
resulted within the agrarian sector. A relatively rich 
middle peasantry has emerged which enjoys many useful 
links with central bureaucracies. This elite is able to 
draw substantial social and production advantages from 
the state.68 
Landlessness, especially in areas of high land pressure, 
has been the corollary. In a country which does not have 
a dynamic agro-industrial sector, the "liberated" peasant 
has little alternative but to drift into the cities. In the 
Pastoral/nomadic areas where tenure reform took the form 
of "group" registration, the problem became not one of 
landlessness, but of the imminent collapse of the pastoral 
economy itself. Finally, the expected broad-spectrum 
effect of tenure reform, especially in the area of credit, did 
not material ize. Far f rom generat ing credit for 
a g r i c u l t u r e , the r e f o r m s led ma in ly to the 
impoverishment of the sector and the capitalization of 
industry and other service sectors at its expense. 
An assessment of the Tanzanian and recent Ethiopian 
reforms are not encouraging either.6 9 The problem in 
both these countries seems to have been their excessive 
reliance on political rather than socio-economic tools, 
where conventional wisdom would have dictated a more 
comprehensive attack on rural underdevelopment. Failure 
to integrate what is politically desirable with what is 
economically feasible seems to run through agrarian 
reform programmes in these two countries. Ethiopia, in 
particular, might well find itself in the company of 
Egypt. 
The Egyptian land distribution programme succeeded in 
removing the very large land owners, but, due to 
relatively high land area ceilings, consolidated the middle 
elites. These were able to regroup and frustrate more 
radical reforms. In addition, the co-operatives which were 
expected to help the lower peasantry by redirecting re-
source transfers to them did little of the kind. Many of 
these institutions were hijacked by the middle elites for 
their own purposes . Last ly, whatever absolu te 
production increases the reform generated were wiped out 
by runaway population growth. Thus, Egypt relapsed 
into the classic food deficiency syndrome of Sub-Saharan 
countries.70 
A more obvious fault is that the engines, i.e., the 
institutions that were being relied on to drive reform 
efforts, were themselves fundamentally inappropriate. 
Somehow, it was always assumed that agrar ian 
bureaucracies—particularly those inherited at indepen-
dence—were fully equipped at all times to handle any 
programme, whatever its complexities and ideology. 
This may be the clue to the apparent failure of most of 
these programmes. 
C o n c l u s i o n 
While the African agrarian crisis continues to deepen, 
the agrarian reform policies and programmes now being 
pursued in Sub-Saharan Africa are unlikely to provide the 
turn-around for which the region is desperate. Re-
assessing the wisdom of investing such staggering 
amounts of resources in these p rogrammes and 
investigating more productive alternatives is necessary. 
This is particularly urgent in the case of tenure reforms, 
per se, rather than reforms of the agrarian structures and 
conditions under which production relations operate. 
Dramatic increases in production have been recorded in a 
number of countries where these reforms are in process. 
The yeoman farmers of Kenya and Malawi, and more 
recently the community peasants of Zimbabwe, produce 
s ignif icant surpluses . This essay ques t ions the 
sustainability and replicability of these experiences and 
their long-term social and political costs. 
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Chapter 3 
THE ROLE OF LAW IN 
COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL 
EXPANSION 
The Case of Botswana, Lesotho, and 
Swaziland 
P . N . TAKIRAMBUDDE 
Introduct ion 
The purpose of this study is to examine the role of law 
in the expansion of the commercial and industrial sectors 
of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (hereinafter referred 
lo as the BLS countries). Botswana and Lesotho obtained 
formal independence in 1966, and Swaziland in 1968, all 
having been British colonies since the turn of this cen-
tury. Colonization of the BLS countries had the 
immediate consequence of incorporating them into the 
international capitalist system. 
Law has had a role in designing and creating the neces-
sary infrastructure for capitalist enterprise, particularly 
regarding entrepreneurial activity. This study presents the 
contemporary legal framework with emphasis on aspects 
designed to accommodate international capital. The 
growth and development of commerce and industry in the 
BLS countries is also discussed. 
Commercial and industrial expansion in the BLS coun-
tries is evaluated, regarding three points in particular. 
First, operation of commercial and industrial concerns 
within the current legal framework, based on the free 
market, generates consequences beyond the control of the 
state. The "liberal" legal system creates a framework of 
decision-making and management without specifying 
priorities within some set of ends. For example, capital-
intensive investments in the BLS states, have had certain 
consequences for employment. 
Secondly, commercial and industrial activity involves 
actors endowed with differing capacities. This results in a 
disparity between local participants and the multinational 
firms. A rigid structure forms over time with two levels 
of access to organizational ability, capital and technol-
ogy: low status and low technological capacity, and high 
status leading to favourable technological, organizational 
and capital opportunities. 
The final point is that the legal regimes in the BLS 
countries fail to measure up even to the minimal regula-
tory tasks set for them. This can result in substantial 
erosion of the public interest. 
Colonization and the Creation 
of a Market Economy 
The colonization of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland 
heralded a new legal order to replace the traditional struc-
tures and ideologies. The principal concern of the British 
colonial power was to establish a capitalist market econ-
°my. The market system is based on the desirability of 
growth characterized by a rising material output of goods. 
In contrast to what Hyden calls the "economy of affec-
tion",1 the mode of life under capitalism is what Bell has 
called the "economizing mode".2 
The pre-colonial systems in the BLS countries were 
based upon customary allocation and management of 
resources. For example, customary land right was the 
right of access to communal land.3 Each community 
member had the right to certain uses of land but did not 
own the land itself, and as such could not dispose of it. 
Such a concept of property was antithetical to capitalist 
enterprise. The economizing mode dictates that the mar-
ket, on the basis of productivity, should be the arbiter and 
allocator of labour and resources among alternative uses. 
One of the central institutions in the operation of a 
market economy is the legal system. In Weberian terms, 
the market economy is based upon legal domination 
wherein the key characteristics are a relative degree of 
calculability and the capacity to develop substantive legal 
provisions such as legal contractual freedom.4 Thus, at 
the time of colonization, the preoccupation of the colo-
nial state was to impose a new legal system to facilitate 
the operation of a market economy in which land, labour 
and capital would be allocated through free contractual 
exchanges.5 
The colonial state used Orders-in-Council to impose le-
gal security. The Roman-Dutch common law and 
statutes were in force in the Transvaal (regarding Swazi-
land) and in the Cape (regarding Botswana and Lesotho). 
Thus Roman-Dutch commercial and corporate law (some 
of it reproducing English and American law) was applied 
in the BLS countries. This law has, over time, been 
subjected to reforms and revisions. Currently, the law is 
a mixture of common law and statutes, with the latter 
being more significant. 
With the introduction of the legal and institutional 
framework for capitalist enterprise, regional and interna-
tional capital began to penetrate the BLS countries. 
When the three states achieved formal independence, addi-
tional legal measures were enacted to encourage further 
involvement of international capital and technology. 
Legal and Institutional Infrastructures 
Some of the main legal and institutional aspects of 
capitalist enterprise in the BLS countries include forms of 
doing business, investment rules, international trade, 
foreign exchange, and tax law.6 
Overview 
Law has key a role in the expansion of industrial and 
commercial activities by creating new forms of business 
organization to channel and aggregate capital. Business 
in the BLS countries may be organised in two forms: 
incorporated or unincorporated. 
Incorporated forms of business include public compa-
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nies, private companies, and foreign companies operating 
through branch facilities. Any two or more persons may 
form an incorporated private company and any seven or 
more persons may form a publicly held company. Any 
company, association, syndicate or partnership consisting 
of more than twenty persons must be registered as a 
company. The main legal instruments that apply are the 
Companies Acts. Thses acts have limited application to 
banking and insurance companies, and do not apply to 
building societies, friendly societies, trade unions or co-
operative agricultural societies. Special sections of the 
Companies Acts apply to foreign companies which are, 
in general, free to create branches in the BLS countries 
and to engage agents. 
The most widely used unincorporated forms are "sole 
proprietorship" and "partnership". These are principally 
used in petty business in such sectors as transport and 
retail trade, and by professionals, such as in law and 
accounting. The main laws that apply are the Registra-
tion of Business Names Acts and the Trading Licenses 
Acts. Registration requirements are minimal. 
With the exception of Lesotho, there are no minimum 
requirements as to issued capital for unincorporated busi-
nesses. Any invitation to the public to apply or sub-
scribe for shares in a company must take place through 
publication of a prospectus complying with the disclo-
sure and publication requirements of the Acts. Allotment 
of shares cannot take place unless the minimum amount, 
as stated in the prospectus, has been subscribed and the 
sum payable on application is received by the company. 
Companies are required to have professional auditors to 
examine the accounts and to make a report in accordance 
with the Act. Every company is required to produce nar-
rative accounting statements of its activities, the require-
ments in Botswana and Lesotho being more demanding 
than in Swaziland. 
There is no legal requirement for companies to have 
certain minimum reserves. However directors may set 
aside out of the profits such sums as they think proper as 
a reserve. They may also carry forward any profits which 
they think prudent not to distribute. 
Dividends may only be paid out of profits, and are de-
clared by the general meet ing within the maximum 
amount recommended by the directors. There are no 
legally fixed workers' or directors' shares in annual prof-
its. 
In general, foreign companies are treated in the same 
manner as local companies. They therefore have the 
same obligations regarding reporting as described above 
for local companies. However a few additional obliga-
tions are imposed upon them in connection with capital-




Botswana has an open door policy towards private 
investment whether from local or foreign sources. The 
state plays a minimal role in the economy and private 
investment is encouraged through three development 
agencies. The National Development Bank (established 
in 1963) is a development agency which mainly assists 
t radit ional agriculture. The Botswana Enterprises 
Deve lopment Unit (established in 1974) encourages 
Botswana-owned and managed industries. The Botswana 
Development Corporation identifies viable investment 
opportunities and develops them either on its own or in 
partnership with local or foreign investors. 
There is no specific investment law which provides for 
protection and incentives but relevant rules exist in vari-
ous laws and programmes. The Industrial Development 
Act (1968) provides for a general system of industrial 
licensing and the Income Tax Act (1973) provides for 
incentives in the form of generous al lowances. The 
"Financial Assistance Policy" (1982) provides financial 
assistance to productive activities. 
Restrictions and priority areas 
Until recently there were no restrictions on foreign 
investment in Botswana nor was there government con-
trol of certain relevant economic sectors. The major 
instruments of government influence are still the three 
development agencies cited above. 
A restriction on foreign contractors existed in the form 
of a 12.5 per cent price preference for local businesses 
provide that the local product had at least 25 per cent 
value added in Botswana. Thus local contractors were 
preferred even if their price was up to 12.5 per cent higher 
than that of the foreign contractors. 
The government now reserves certain economic activi-
ties for local investment. The reserved areas include 
commercial activities (such as butcheries, petrol stations, 
general trading), some small-scale industrial activities 
(such as sorghum milling, baking, ordinary cement and 
brick manufacturing) and certain categories of road and 
minor construction. Investment priorities are: 
• exploiting demand originating from major sectors of 
the economy (i.e., government, parastatals, mining 
and agriculture) processing their products and by-
products 
• utilizing those raw materials in which Botswana is 
relatively well endowed. 
Application and approval procedures 
Although foreign investors do not need approval from 
the Central Bank of Botswana, it is wise for them to 
notify the Bank of investments in order to ensure that 
capital and dividends can be repatriated. In mining, all 
licenses for reconnaissance and prospecting for minerals 
are processed by the Minister for Mining. Mineral con-
cessions can be acquired from the Minister but only by 
citizens of Botswana or persons ordinarily resident in 
Botswana for at least four years, and by companies estab-
lished and incorporated in Botswana. All applications 
must include extensive information on the project and the 
applicant in accordance with the Mines and Minerals Act 
(1976). 
For industry, a system of licensing was instituted by 
the Indus t r i a l D e v e l o p m e n t Act (1968) . Any 
manufacturing enterprise employing more than ten per-
sons or using machinery above 25 horse power must 
apply to the Minister for Commerce and Industry for a 
manufacturing license. The license must be renewed 
annually. 
y\ license may be refused if the minister deems the 
nital, technical skill or raw materials available to be 
nadequate for successfully establishing the enterprise or 
if he deems the location to be inadequate. The minister 
may also refuse a license if he considers it not to be in 
the economic interest of the country or the sector con-
cerned, or if an exclusive manufacturing license has been 
granted previously to another manufacturer. On refusal of 
a license the applicant may appeal to the Botswana presi-
dent. 
There is also a general system of licensing for trading 
and many professions in the tertiary sector. Licenses are 
issued under the Trading Act. Exclusive l icenses to 
manufacture may be granted by the president. Any man-
ufacturer may, under the Industrial Development Act 
(1968), apply to the minister for an exclusive license to 
manufacture a certain product in a certain area. The min-
ister may conduct an inquiry into the application or into 
any representations made by third parties regarding the 
application. 
The exclusive license is granted if the president is 
satisfied that it is in the interest of the public and the 
efficient development of the industry concerned. The 
license may be granted conditionally and for a maximum 
period of four years. Af ter expiration of this period 
renewal is possible. If a manufacturer fails to implement 
the project or ceases to manufac ture the product the 
president may cancel the license. 
Development Approval Order applications are processed 
by the Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Finance. 
The application must be accompanied by extensive 
information concerning the applicant and the project. 
For small-scale projects, applications for assistance are 
made under the Financial Assistance Policy. These are 
submitted to Rural Industries Officers in the Districts and 
to Town Council Planning Officers in towns. Evalua-
tions are made by Production Development Committees. 
For medium and large-scale projects applications should 
be submitted to the relevant ministries where evaluations 
are made by inter-ministerial committees and permanent 
secretaries. Applicat ions must be made as early as 
possible before project implementation. 
Investors eligible for incentives 
As mentioned in the previous section, investors may 
apply for an exclusive manufacturing license if they can 
convince the president that it is in the interest of the 
public and of the sector concerned. Extra tax relief may be 
granted—under a Development Approval Order—to any 
project which is beneficial to the development of the 
Botswana economy or to the economic advancement of 
its citizens. The application will be evaluated according 
to: 
• amount and type of training of Botswana citizens by 
the project 
• participation of citizens in the management of the 
business 
• investment of capital by citizens 
• the area of the proposed development 
• the anticipated effect on stimulating development of 
other economic, industrial or commercial activities 
• reducing prices of consumer goods or services 
Botswana. 
Under the Financial Assis tance Policy "product ive 
activities" (activities that produce goods for export or to 
replace imports) are eligible for f inancial assistance. 
Specifically excluded are the cattle industry and large-scale 
mining. Both citizens and non-citizens are favoured but 
aid for small scale projects (below 10,000 P.)7 is only 
available to citizens. 
Investment incentives 
Investment incentives in Botswana take three forms: 
fiscal incentives, competitive incentives, and investment 
assistance. Fiscal incentives include generous allowances 
for new buildings, plant and machinery, for employees ' 
housing and training programmes. They are granted 
under the Income Tax Act. Extra tax relief can be granted 
under a Development Approval Order, specifying the 
types and rates of relief. Relief is provide to any project 
which is shown to be beneficial to the development of 
the Botswana economy or the advancement of its citizens. 
As mentioned earlier, it is also possible to obtain an 
exclusive manufacturing license for a specif ic project 
under Industrial Development Act (1968). This restricts 
competition from other producers, and is renewable for a 
period of four years 
Investment assistance is granted under the government's 
Financial Assistance Policy (1982). A number of incen-
tives are available to businesses involved in manufactur-
ing, small and medium-scale mining, and agriculture 
(other than livestock farming). Such incentives include 
income tax holidays, grants towards training to create 
jobs and boost sales, and direct financial aid. 
The Financial Assistance Policy makes a distinction 
between small-scale projects (investment of less than 
10,000 P.), medium-scale projects (investment between 
10,000 P. and 750,000 P.) and large-scale projects 
( investment over 750,000 P.) Small-scale industries 
which have a reasonable expectation of being financially 
viable can obtain grants based on a percentage of total 
investment up to 2,000 P. per job created. Female 
entrepreneurs and projects in rural areas have priority. 
Medium-sca le projects and large-scale projects are 
divided into new manufacturing industries on one hand, 
and the expansion of existing industries and new invest-
ments in sectors other than manufacturing on the other. 
New manufacturing industries receive a number of incen-
tives automatically. They are granted a f ive-year tax 
holiday for 100 per cent in the first two years and 75, 50 
and 25 per cent in the subsequent three years. Instead of 
the tax holiday, an investor may opt for a capital grant 
and a sales augmentation grant of maximum 8 per cent of 
sales revenue in the first two years, and 6, 4 and 2 percent 
in the subsequent three years. Reimbursement of un-
skilled labour costs of 80 per cent is automatical ly 
received in the first two years and 60, 40 and 20 per cent 
in the subsequent three years. In addition, a training grant 
is given of 50 per cent of off- the-job training costs for 
the first five years. 
Financial ass is tance to investments other than in 
manufac tu r ing , mining, or agr icul ture industr ies is 
examined on a case-by-case basis. There also, incentives 
may be awarded. Incentives may include a capital grant of 
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1,000 P. per job in non-agricultural sectors and 500 P. 
per job in agriculture, up to 40 to 70 per cent of the 
capital investment, depending on the location. A sales 
augmentation grant to a maximum of 8 per cent of sales 
revenue in the first two years and 6, 4 and 2 per cent in 
the subsequent three years may be received. In addition, 
re imbursement of unskilled labour costs and training 
grants may be awarded, as outlined above. Large-scale 
projects may deviate to adapt the incentives to the spe-
cific nature of the project. Other forms of assistance are 
available on the request of the prospective investor. 
Investment protection, expropriation 
and dispute settlement 
The 1966 Botswana Constitution (Section 8) prohibits 
the compulsory acquisition of property unless in the 
public interest and against the prompt payment of full 
compensation. Every person having a right over property 
which has been so acquired, has direct access to the High 
Court for determination of the legality of the expropria-
tion and the amount of compensation. The compensation 
is freely remittable within a "reasonable" time. Excep-
tions to these rules exist, for example where property is 
expropriated to satisfy taxes due, or as penalty or execu-
tion of a judgement. 
In terms of international provisions, Botswana has 
signed and ratified the 1965 World Bank convention on 
sett lement of investment disputes between states and 
nationals of other states. The convention entered into 
force for Botswana on 14 February 1970, enacted by the 
1970 Settlement of Investment Disputes (Convention) 
Act. 
International trade and foreign exchange 
The 1976 Exchange Control Regulations are adminis-
tered by the Central Bank under powers delegated to it by 
the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning. 
Authorized dealers are appointed by the Central Bank and 
are empowered to provide exchange for current transac-
tions. There are three types of banking accounts: Resi-
dent Account, Temporary Resident Account and Non-
Resident Account. 
Botswana is a member of the Southern Africa Customs 
Union (SACU) with Lesotho, South Africa and Swazi-
land. No licenses are required for imports f rom the 
S A C U countries. For most other imports, however, a 
license is necessary in order to obtain the necessary for-
eign exchange. This can be done easily by producing 
evidence from the Department of Customs and Excise, 
with no delays in payment. 
Outward capital transfers are approved on a case-by-case 
basis but are generally allowed without problems. Prof-
its and dividends up to 10,000 P. per year can be remitted 
freely to foreign shareholders provided that income tax 
has been paid. Dividends and profits due to non-residents 
up to 25,000 P. per annum per organization may be 
approved by authorized dealers if proper documentation is 
provided. 
There is a 15 per cent withholding tax on dividends, 
which is deducted before the remittance is effected. 
Authorized personnel can apply for remittance abroad of 
half their annual salaries or 6 ,000 P., whichever is 
higher. No information is available on the remittance of 
royalties and fees. Export proceeds must be received in 
foreign currency or from a non-resident Pula account. 
There are no internal barriers to trade within the SACU 
area. Licenses are required for most other imports but are 
easily obtained. Only a few export items, such as pre-
cious stones, are subject to licensing for revenue reasons. 
Botswana is party to a number of international agree-
ments regarding trade. For the SACU area a common 
external tariff is determined by South Africa in consulta-
tion with the other members. 
Bo t swana is also a member of the 1980 Lome 
Convention between the European Economic Commu-
nity and more than sixty African, Caribbean, and Pacific 
(ACP) states. Under the trade chapter of the convention, 
industrial exports from ACP countries can enter the EEC 
duty-free and a preferential import regime is applied to 
most agricultural exports from Botswana. In addition, 
loans and grants are provided to ACP countries in order to 
stabilize export receipts from certain agricultural goods 
(Stabex) and to stabilize production of certain minerals 
(Minex). 
Botswana participates in the Southern African Devel-
opment Co-ordination Council (SADCC) together with 
Angola, Lesotho, Malawi , Mozambique , Swazi land, 
Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Aspects of trade and 
finance are discussed at annual summits and solutions 
worked out. There is political co-operation between the 
members and co-ordination of national policies regarding 
external debts. 
Botswana is considering accession to the Preferential 
Trade Area (PTA) which groups fourteen states of Central 
and East Africa.8 Member states were to apply reductions 
in customs duties or dismantle such tar iffs between 
themselves from 1 July 1984. Moreover, the participants 
use local currency or barter in reciprocal trade in an 
attempt to save foreign exchange reserves. In addition, 
Botswana has concluded individual trade agreements with 
Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
Botswana has entered into international tax agreements 
with three of its major trading partners—South Africa, 
United Kingdom and Sweden—in order to avoid double 
taxation. 
A 15 per cent relief on dividends, interest, and royalties 
is granted under the agreement between Botswana and the 
United Kingdom and South Africa. Between Botswana 
and Sweden there is only a 10 per cent relief on dividends. 
Swaziland 
Investment rules 
Swazi land has a posi t ive atti tude towards private 
investment whether from local or foreign sources. The 
government participates in the economy through the 
National Industrial Development Corporation of Swazi-
land (NIDCS), an autonomous statutory body with both 
government and private shareholders. As with Botswana, 
there is no single investment law providing for protection 
and incentives but relevant rules are scattered over various 
legal instruments. 
Restrictions and priority areas 
There are still no restrictions on foreign investment in 
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the Swazi economy nor is there government control of 
any economic sectors. Government influence is primar-
ily through the NIDCS. The NIDCS considers giving 
assistance to all investment which contributes to the 
growth of the Swazi economy. However priority is 
given to projects which will contribute to increasing 
employment, training citizens, and increasing the use of 
raw materials. 
Priority projects should also contribute to improving 
the country's balance of trade, whether through import 
substitution or promoting exports (especially to outside 
Southern Africa). In addition, increasing linkages with 
other local enterprises, locating projects outside the 
Mbabane-Manzini area, and contributing to rural and 
mineral development are NIDCS priorities. 
Application and approval procedures 
In contrast to Botswana, foreign investors require 
approval from the Central Bank to facilitate the repatria-
tion of capital and dividends under the Exchange Control 
Regulat ions (1975). In mining, all appl icat ions for 
prospecting licenses or mining rights must be filed with 
Commissioner of Mines in the Department of Geological 
Survey and Mines, to be transmitted to the Minerals 
Committee. Special exclusive prospecting licenses may 
be granted by the king. 
For industry, there is no general system of licensing, 
and training licenses are generally not required by manu-
factur ing conce rns unless they sell retail goods . 
Applicat ions for NIDCS ass is tance in es tabl ishing 
industrial projects are handled by its managing director. 
To enable NIDCS to make a proper evaluation of the 
project, extensive information on the project and the 
applicant should be submitted with the application. 
Applications for special incentives for regional devel-
opment under the Income Tax (Consolidation) Order 
(1975) are processed by the Permanent Secretary of the 
Ministry of Finance. 
Applications for external tariff protection are made to 
the Swaziland Ministry of Commerce, Industry, Mines, 
and Tourism, which in turn makes representations to the 
South African government. For the Swazi government to 
impose protective duties against imports from within the 
SAvJU area is more complicated because all the govern-
ments involved must be consulted. 
Investors eligible for incentives 
All investors are eligible for fiscal incentives available 
under the income tax law. All industries locating in 
specially designated development areas are also eligible 
for special incentives for regional development. In these 
areas certain industries may be granted "pioneer" status 
and may thus qualify for additional concessions. Pioneer 
status, however, has yet to granted to any industry. 
All new or expanding investors are eligible for assis-
tance from NIDCS but priority is given to those con-
tributing to the six objectives described above. NIDCS 
will not normally invest in any project with a capital 
cost of less than E.50,000.9 
Industries that have the capacity to supply at least 60 
per cent of the quantity required f rom the whole SACU 
area for a particular project are eligible for tariff protec-
tion against non-SACU imports. Industry that qualifies 
as an "infant industry" under the Customs Union Agree-
ment is also eligible for tariff protection against SACU 
imports. However, in practice it is very difficult to qual-
ify and the protection had not been granted up to 1984. 
Investment incentives 
As in Botswana, there are fiscal and competitive incen-
tives and investment assistance. Fiscal incentives include 
depreciation, training, investment and initial allowances, 
and regional and pioneer incentives. Investment assis-
tance by NIDCS is available for feasibility research, local 
co-ordination, factory construction, and finance. In order 
to assist the investor in preparing a project proposal 
NIDCS undertakes background research concerning mar-
kets, labour supply, and procurement of raw materials. 
Also specific investment opportunities are identified and 
feasibility studies prepared. Copies of these studies are 
then made available to prospective investors. 
As local liaison, the NIDCS assists in speeding up 
procedures for registration, import licenses and resident 
licenses, in procuring local consultants and in making 
special arrangements with the government to provide 
infrastructure. In order to lower initial investment costs, 
NIDCS is prepared to invest in the construction of fac-
tory premises and to lease the premises to the investor. 
An option is usually granted to the investor to purchase 
the property. 
NIDCS also provides financial assistance to projects. 
The maximum financial involvement by NIDCS in any 
one project whether it is through loan, equity, construc-
tion or guarantees is limited to 60 per cent of the pro-
ject 's total capital cost (including buildings and perma-
nent working capital). 
Customs incentives include rebates and drawbacks of 
import duties and increased duties to protect local produc-
ers against foreign competitors. Rebates of import duty 
are available for over 1,500 tariff items for 146 separately 
specified industries. With few exceptions, the rebates 
granted are 100 per cent of the common external tariff of 
the Customs Union. Drawbacks or refunds of import 
duty are avai lable for certain mater ia ls which are 
imported, processed in the Cus toms Union and re-
exported. Tariff protection by increase import duties on 
similar products is granted on a case-by-case basis. 
Investment protection, expropriation 
and dispute settlement 
As in Botswana, the 1968 Swaziland Constitution pro-
hibits the expropriation of property except in the public 
interest and against the prompt payment of full compen-
sation. Direct access to the High Court for determination 
of the legality of the compulsory acquisition and the 
amount of compensation is also assured. Compensation 
is freely remittable within a "reasonable" time. Like in 
Botswana, exceptions to these rules exist where property 
is expropriated to satisfy taxes due or as penalty or 
execution of a judgment. 
Regarding international provisions for investment pro-
tection, Swaziland has also signed and ratified the 1965 
World Bank convention on disputes. The convention 
entered into force for Swaziland on 14 July 1971. 
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International trade and foreign exchange 
Swaziland is a member of the Rand Monetary Area 
(RMA), together with Lesotho and South Africa, within 
which there is no exchange control on the transfer of 
funds. Exchange control for transactions outside the 
RMA is administered by the Central Bank of Swaziland 
in co-operation with authorized dealers.1 0 People who 
reside outside the RMA may open non-resident accounts, 
financial rand accounts or blocked accounts. Special ac-
counts exist for residents of Botswana and Zimbabwe. 
Non-resident accounts may be credited with all autho-
rized payments from RMA residents, with proceeds of 
sales to authorized dealers and with payments from other 
non-residents accounts. They may be debited with all 
payments to residents, to other non-resident accounts, to 
accounts in any country outside the RMA and for pur-
chases of foreign exchange. 
Financial rand accounts are maintained with authorized 
banks and are used for transactions where exchange con-
trol restrictions apply. They are credited with investment 
proceeds and may be used for reinvestment in private or 
government securities or, upon agreement, for the pur-
chase of other assets. Blocked accounts are used by emi-
grants from the RMA. They are credited with all cash 
and proceeds from sale of assets held at the time of depar-
ture. The use of these non-transferable funds is restricted. 
Imports from Botswana, Lesotho and South Africa do 
not require licenses. Imports from outside the SACU 
Area are licensed in accordance with South African import 
regulations. Import licenses entitle the holder to buy the 
required foreign exchange. Foreign exchange control not 
only exists for imports but also applies to the repatria-
tion of capital, profits, interest, royalties, fees and 
income of expatriate personnel. All these transactions 
require prior approval from the Central Bank of Swaziland 
but in most cases approval is granted automatically. 
There are no limits on remittance except for the remit-
tance of income of expatriates. They may remit up to 
one third of their gross income or up to one half of gross 
income if they are supporting dependants abroad. An 
additional one third may be remitted at the end of their 
stay in Swaziland. 
Swaziland has more or less the same import-export 
regulations as Botswana. In terms of international 
agreements, Swaziland is a member of SACU. This 
membership carries benefits and obligations similar to 
those for Botswana. 
Swaziland also participates in SADCC. The participa-
tion is similar to Botswana. Swaziland is a member of 
the PTA, being one of its founding members in 1983. 
Swaziland has also concluded bilateral trade agreements 
with Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Malta, Mozam-
bique, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. It has 
concluded international tax agreements with its principal 
trading partners, the United Kingdom and South Africa, 
to avoid double taxation. A 15 per cent relief is provided 
for dividends, 10 per cent for interest, and royalties and 
fees are exempt if taxed in the other country. 
Lesotho 
Investment rules 
Lesotho, in concert with the other two states, has 
adopted a positive attitude towards commercial and indus-
trial expansion through private investment. To this end 
several rules and instruments have been adopted to facili-
tate private investment in commerce and industry. One 
example is the Industrial Licensing Act under which the 
Lesotho National Development Corporation (LNDC) is 
empowered to issue exclusive manufacturing licenses. 
The Pioneer Industries Act of 1969 (as amended in 1972 
and 1978) is another example, in which fiscal incentives 
are granted for new industries. The Casino Act, the 
Liquor Act, the Lesotho National Development Act and 
the Deeds Registry Act, also facilitate and support private 
investment. 
Investment incentives 
Both fiscal and investment assistance incentives are 
available under Lesotho law. In addition to incentives 
granted to companies under the Income Tax Act 
(deductions and allowances), further tax incentives are 
provided under the Pioneer Industries Act of 1967 for 
approved manufacturers, hotel keepers, casino operators 
and building companies.1 1 Investment assistance is pro-
vided in the form of free land for industrial development. 
International trade and foreign 
exchange rules 
Since Lesotho is a member of the Rand Monetary Area, 
the foreign exchange procedures and rules in Lesotho are 
similar to those applied in Swaziland. Foreign exchange 
control is administered by the Central Bank of Lesotho. 
The applicable import-export rules are similar to those 
adopted by Botswana and Swaziland. 
Lesotho participates in three major international agree-
ments. It is a member of SACU, with the same terms of 
membership as Botswana and Swaziland. Lesotho is also 
a member of SADCC and a member of the PTA. 
Commercial and Industrial Expansion 
Though the industrial sectors of Botswana, Lesotho and 
Swaziland are still relatively small, they have undergone 
significant expansion in the last several decades, espe-
cially since independence. The accelerated development 
has, to a large extent, been aided by a significant inflow 
of international and regional capital which has been 
attracted by the generous legal and institutional frame-
work. Recent trends are illustrated by the proportionate 
contribution of the manufacturing sector to the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) from the years 1980 to 1984 
(see Table 1). 
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TABLE 1 
Contribution of the Manufacturing Sector to the GDP 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984a 
Botswana MVAb (mill. P.) 49.3 71.2 81.7 91.6 108.5 
share of MVA in GDP(%) 4.1 3.7 9.0 7.7 7.3 
MVA (mill. US$) 63.5 85.5 80.0 83.5 84.5 
Lesotho MVA (mill. M.)c 11.9 14.7 17.9 21.1 na 
share of MVA in GDP (%) 4.5 4.6 5.1 5.5 na 
MVA (mill. US$) 15.3 16.9 16.5 18.9 na 
Swaziland MVA (mill. E.)d 79.6 88.4 92.6 94.0 na 
share of MVA in GDP(%) 21.8 22.3 22.8 23.5 na 
MVA (mill. US$) 102.3 101.6 89.3 84.5 na 
a. Figures for 1984 are provisional; na = figures not available. 
b. MVA = manufacturing value added. 
c. The currency of Lesotho is the Metot (M.). 
d. 1980 prices. 
Sources: Botswana Sixth National Development Plan 1985\ Statistical Bulletin 1984, 
Lesotho; Annual Statistical Bulletin 1983, Swaziland. 
Botswana 
Until the 1970s, the economy of Botswana was largely 
made up of cattle-farming and associated activities. 
Commercial and industrial activity was minimal. Since 
1980 there has been a significant expansion of manufac-
turing capacity as shown by the establishment of manu-
facturing units between 1966 and 1984 (see Table 2). 
Orapa and Jwaneng diamond mines. The Selebi-Phikwe 
copper/nickel mine is operated by the Bamangwato Con-
cessions Limited (BCL). The Botswana Government 
owns 15 per cent of the equity in BCL. Botswana Roan 
Selection Trust (BRST) owns 85 per cent. American 
Metal Climax (AMAX) and Anglo-American Corpora-
tion/Charter Consolidated Group—London (AAC) each 
own 30 per cent of equity in BRST.1 2 
TABLE 2 
Development of the Formal Manufacturing Sector, 1966-84 
Subsector 1966-80 1981 1982 1983 1984 Total 
Meat and Dairy 1 1 2 1 5 
Dairy and Agro-based Products 2 — 1 6 3 12 
Beverages 5 1 3 3 4 16 
Textiles 15 7 13 9 7 51 
Tanning and Leather Products 4 — 2 1 1 8 
Chemical and Rubber Products 7 1 3 5 7 23 
Wood and Wooden Products 5 — 1 3 5 14 
Paper and Paper Products 3 1 1 2 1 8 
Metal Products 19 3 7 2 6 37 
Building Materials 13 2 7 7 3 32 
Plastics 1 — 3 4 4 12 
Electrical Products 3 2 5 1 5 16 
Handicrafts 1 — 2 2 — 5 
Total 87 17 51 51 53 259 
Source: Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Gaborone, Botswana. 
The relatively low level of pre-independence industrial 
and commercial expansion is further illustrated by statis-
tics on company registration. As of 1982, there was a 
total of 3,884 registered companies in Botswana. Prior 
to independence in 1966, there were only 270 (8 per cent 
of the current total). The overwhelming majority of the 
post-independence registrations have occurred in the last 
ten years. 
The last decade has been characterized by major interna-
tional capital participation in the mineral sector, for 
example the Selebi-Phikwe copper/nickel mine, and the 
The diamond mines at Orapa and Jwaneng are operated 
De Beers Botswana Mining Company (Debswana) which 
was incorporated in 1969. The shareholding was again 
15 per cent Government of Botswana and 85 per cent De 
Beers. In 1975 a new shareholding agreement was signed 
whereby the Government's shareholding was increased 
from 15 to 50 per cent , 1 3 
The above three mining operation have contributed to 
formal employment in Botswana as shown below, and 
this trend is projected to continue. 
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TABLE 3 
Employment and Localization in Mining, 1984-87 
1984 1985 1986 1987 
B E B E B E B E 
Jwaneng 1,674 246 1,705 215 1,734 186 1,764 156 
Orapa/Letlhakane 2,421 229 2,437 213 2,463 187 2,499 151 
BCL 4,320 292 4,333 279 4,339 273 4,372 240 
Total 8,415 767 8,475 707 8,536 646 8,635 547 
Percentage 91.6 8.4 92.3 7.7 93.0 7.0 94.0 6.0 
Note: B = Batswana; E = Expatriate. 
Source: Department of Mines, Botswana. 
Until the 1980s manufacturing activity was synony-
mous with, and limited to, the Botswana Meat Commis-
sion (BMC) and Kgalagadi Breweries Ltd. However, the 
country's manufacturing capacity has recently undergone 
an expansion and in consequence has become an impor-
tant source of formal employment. 
Thus the share of formal employment in the manufac-
turing sector has risen from 64 per cent in 1979 to 82 per 
cent in 1984, as indicated below: 
TABLE 4 
Employment in the Formal Manufacturing Sector, 1979-1984 
1979 1984 % Change 
Number % Number % Per Annum 
BMC 1,652 36 1,970 18 3.6 
Other 3,073 64 8,926 82 23.8 
Total Jobs 4,625 100 10,896 100 18.7 
Number of Companies 88 — 276 
Jobs per Company 
including BMC 53 — 40 
Jobs per Company 
excluding BMC 35 — 33 
Note: The above data are based on data reported on manufacturing license 
applications held by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. These statistics do 
not compare directly with data collected by the Central Statistics Office due to 
different reference periods and differences in industry classification. 
Source: Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Botswana. 
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TABLE 5 
Investment in Manufacturing, 1984 
Average Investment 
Subsector Number of Investment Per Company 
Companies (P' 000) (P '000) 
Meat and Meat Products 2 19,151 9,576 
Dairy and Agro-based Products 8 7,327 916 
Beverages 13 16,357 1,258 
Bakery Products 13 2,104 162 
Textiles 48 21,541 449 
Tanning and Leather Products 7 3,793 542 
Chemical and Rubber Products 16 15,702 981 
Wood and Wooden Products 12 1,934 161 
Paper and Paper Products 6 2,022 337 
Metal Products 37 10,932 295 
Building Materials 26 6,803 262 
Plastics 8 4,623 578 
Electrical Products 10 2,444 244 
Handicrafts 3 399 133 
Total 209 115,132 551 
Note: Investment includes capital outlay in both fixed and current assets. 
Source: Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Gaborone, Botswana. 
Investment in manufacturing has been relatively high 
reaching a value of 511.3 million P. The highest levels 
of per company investment have been in the meat, 
beverages and chemical sectors. In terms of total 
investment the textile sector showed the highest invest-
ment level (see Table 5). 
Investment in manufacturing is likely to expand with 
further international capital f lowing in to exploit the 
"favourable investment climate". Foreign capital will be 
supplemented by the Botswana Development Corporation 
(BDC) which is projected to invest a total of 110 million 
P. between 1985 and 1990 (see Table 6). 
TABLE 6 
Company Projected BDC Investment (million P.) 
Sector 1985/86 1986/87 1987/89 1988/89 1989/90 Total 
Agriculture3 2.4 2.3 2.8 3.0 3.7 14.2 
Major Industries 3.8 2.6 3.2 4.6 5.8 20.0 
Other Industries 1.3 2.1 2.9 4.6 5.8 16.7 
Hotels, Tourism, Transport^ 1.0 2.9 3.5 1.9 2.4 11.7 
Industrial Property 4.7 5.8 6.4 8.5 9.6 35.0 
Commercial and Residential 
Property 1.3 1.8 2.4 3.1 3.7 12.3 
Notes: a. Excludes large-scale irrigation. 
b. Excludes purchase of new aircraft. 
Source: Botswana Development Corporation. 
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TABLE 7 
Profile of Formal Manufacturing Sector 
Establishments Operating Location Labour Force 
A B C D E F G H 
Meat, Meat Prod. 1 1 2 1 1 1,956 41 
Dairy, Agro-based Prod. 1 4 3 8 6 2 46 9 
Beverages 1 7 5 13 9 4 579 27 
Bakery Products 3 3 7 13 10 3 377 20 
Textiles 8 8 32 48 43 5 2,432 87 
Tanning, Leather Prod. — 4 3 7 6 1 419 23 
Chemical, Rubber Prod. — 2 14 16 16 393 32 
Wood, Wooden Prod. 1 6 5 12 9 3 448 22 
Paper, Paper Prod. — 2 4 6 5 1 238 22 
Metal Products 9 7 21 37 33 4 1,490 79 
Building Materials 7 4 15 26 19 7 1,063 38 
Plastics 1 3 4 8 8 262 16 
Electrical Products 1 3 6 10 9 1 318 33 
Handicrafts — 1 2 3 3 — 52 4 
Total 32 55 122 209 177 32 10,073 453 
Notes: Establishments Operating: A = Botswana-owned, B = Mixed ownership, C = 
Foreign-owned, D = Total; Location: E = Urban, F = Rural; Labour Force: 
G = Local, H = Foreign. 
The above data are based on data reported on manufacturing license applications held by 
the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. These statistics do not compare directly with 
data collected by the Central Statistics Office due to different reference periods and 
differences in industry classification. 
Source: Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Gaborone, Botswana 
The location and ownership patterns of manufacturing 
activity for 1984 indicate that foreign capital is dominant 
and that most manufacturing activities are in urban areas 
(see Tables 7 and 8). Between 1979 and 1984 the per-
centage share of local capital has dropped slightly while 
that of international capital has expanded. 
The above data are based on data reported on manu-
facturing license applications held by the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry. These statistics do not compare 
directly with data collected by the Central Statistics 
Office due to different reference periods and differences in 
industry classification. 
In commerce there has been a noticeable expansion in 
the establishment of retail and wholesale businesses. In 
1984 alone a total of 2,616 establishments were licensed 
under the Trading Act and 749 establishments were initi-
ated under the Liquor Act. In contrast to ownership pat-
terns in the manufacturing sector, 85 per cent of the retail 
and wholesale business and 96 per cent of liquor estab-
lishments were controlled by local capital. 
TABLE 8 







Batswana 15 17.0 32 15.3 
Joint Venture 26 29.5 55 26.3 
Foreign 47 53.4 122 58.4 
Total 88 100.0 209 100.0 
Note: The above data are based on data reported on 
manufacturing license applications held by the Ministry 
of Commerce and Industry. These statistics do not compare 
directly with data collected by the Central Statistics Office 
due to different reference periods and differences in industry 
classification. 
Source: Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Botswana. 
TABLE 9 
Ownership in Botswana Commerce 
License Type Foreign- Batswana- Total % 
owned owned Batswana 
General Trading 190 478 668 72 
Small General 7 751 758 99 
Fresh Produce 27 340 367 93 
Restaurant 18 403 421 96 
Specialty 87 103 190 54 
Petrol Station 26 56 82 68 
Wholesale 47 70 117 60 
Chemist 3 10 13 77 
Total 405 2,211 2,616 85 
Source: Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Botswana. 
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TABLE 10 
Company Registration in Lesotho 
Period Total Private Public Companies 
Number Companies Companies Struck Off 
Registered Number % Number % Number % 
1967-71 230 170 74 60 2 6 63 27 
1972-76 306 268 88 38 12 5 2 
1977-81 665 638 96 27 4 8 1 
Total 1 ,201 1,076 90 125 10 76 6 
Source: Companies Registry, Lesotho Law Office. 
Lesotho 
The industrial sector in Lesotho expanded significantly 
during the 1970s. This was due to generous investment 
incentives, increased diamond exports, external and flows, 
customs union receipts and migrant workers' remittances. 
At the t ime of independence, manufac tur ing activity 
accounted for less than 1 per cent of the GDP. 
However, by 1984 the manufacturing value added was 
5.5 per cent of the gross domestic product as a result of 
the drive to industrialize aided by investment incentives 
and instruments. The bulk of investment was accounted 
for by international capital in manufacturing industries, 
p rospec t ing and mining, banking , insurance , retail 
wholesale and tourism.14 The post-independence expan-
sion is illustrated by company registration figures (see 
Table 10). 
Swaziland 
The Swazi economy as a whole has been more diversi-
fied than the economies of Botswana or Lesotho. Until 
the recent expansion of commercial and industrial activity 
in Botswana, Swaziland had experienced a faster pace of 
development . Statistics on company registration date 
from 1922. The total number of companies registered in 
Swaziland between 1922 and 1980 was 3,525, of which 
32 per cent were registered before independence in 1968. 
This was a much higher rate of pre-independence registra-
tion than in Botswana or Lesotho. 
In the 45-year period before independence 1,131 compa-
nies had been registered. However the 12-year post-inde-
pendence period saw 2,394 companies registered. New 
company floatation has thus more than doubled since 
independence (see Table 11). 
TABLE 11 
Company Registration in Swaziland 
Period Total Private Public Companies 
Number Companies Companies Struck Off 
Registered Number % Number % Number % 
1922-67 1,131 606 54 525 46 532 47 
1968-80 2 ,394 2 ,047 86 347 14 497 21 
Total 3 , 5 2 5 2 , 6 5 3 76 872 24 1 ,029 29 
Source: Swaziland Registrar General's Office. 
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Of the companies registered during the period under dis-
cussion, 236 were foreign companies.1 5 The majority of 
these were controlled by local and foreign European capi-
tal (South African and British). 
Of the companies on the register 76 per cent were pri-
vate companies. An examination of the capital structure 
of the companies on the register revealed that approxi-
mately 60 per cent of the registered companies had nomi-
nal capital ranging between 100 E. to 2,000 E., and the 
issued share capital was mostly foreign-owned. There 
were also less than twenty companies with a share capital 
of more than 1.0 million E. The biggest company in 
terms of nominal capital was Swaziland Collieries Ltd. 
This company had an authorized share capital of 12.63 
million E. Most of the shareholders and the directors in 
the large companies were foreign-based. 
Although there are only a few large companies within 
the Kingdom, their economic role is relatively signifi-
cant. According to the Third National Development 
Plan, ten major companies contributed approximately 15 
per cent of the GNP and employed 6,160 people within 
the manufactur ing and processing sector. This is 
approximately 12 per cent of the resident population. The 
manufacturing and processing turnover accounted for by 
the ten largest enterprises was approximately 108 million 
E. during 1976. This amounted to roughly 80 per cent of 
the national turnover. 
In 1976, the largest company in the manufacturing and 
processing sector of the economy was the Usutu Pulp 
Company. This company employed 2,500 people in 
1976, making a pre-tax profit of 2.9 million E. How-
ever, with the completion of the Third Sugar Mill, the 
Royal Swaziland Sugar Corporation has emerged as the 
largest and economically perhaps the most significant 
corporate entity. At 1977 prices, the Third Sugar Mill 
was estimated to be capable of creating export revenue in 
1982 of about 29 million E. and able to employ 3-4,000 
people. 
The sectors which have experienced relatively fast 
growth include footwear, textile and clothing. However, 
the rapid expansion in manufactur ing capacity has 
recently been arrested leading to a decrease in the manu-
facturing value added as a percentage of the gross domes-
tic product. The recent decline was caused in part by the 
closure of the fertilizer industry and a drop in productivity 
in the meat, wood, and cotton sectors due to drought. 
Furthermore, the industrial capacity has been negatively 
affected by the drastic fall in world sugar prices coupled 
with damage to the agricultural sector by drought and 
cyclones. The economic recession in South Africa, a 
principal trading partner, can only have made matters 
worse. For these reasons, in 1982 the manufacturing 
valued added began to fall (although increasing marginally 
in 1984) in sharp contrast to the growth rate of 7.9 per 
cent per annum during the boom years of 1977-81. 
Evaluation of Commercial and Industr ia l 
E x p a n s i o n 
Both colonial and post-colonial states in the BLS 
countries have adopted the strategy of commercial and 
industrial growth and diversification through investment 
by private enterprise with occasional state participation. 
Policy instruments utilized have included the corporate 
form (both public and private), financial institutions and 
legislation granting generous investment incentives. 
In terms of conventional measurement of economic 
growth, one could conclude that the BLS countries have 
succeeded in their development efforts. Conventional 
measurement under the economizing system concerns 
itself with profitability and productivity. The indices of 
profitability and productivity measure the extent to which 
the demands of the marketplace and the efficient alloca-
tion of resources have been satisfied. 
Economic indicators from the three states point to a 
substantial expansion of their industrial capacity. Com-
pared to the other SADCC countries, the BLS countries 
have recorded some of the fastest rates of industrialization 
and commercialization. 
However when the developments of the past decade are 
viewed in broader perspective one can recognize problems 
and shortcomings which have been generated by the 
strategies adopted by the BLS countries. 
First, in responding to the incentives provided by the 
investment and corporate regimes private investment has 
tended to concentrate on technologies which save labour. 
As a result such investment has had minimal impact on 
the huge unemployment problem of the BLS countries. 
This is in part due to the limited possibilities for making 
existing techniques more labour intensive. In Botswana 
additional formal employment was created by the mining, 
manufacturing and commercial sectors. However, the 
early 1980s the economy's capacity to provide jobs to 
match the expanding labour force worsened.16 
In Swaziland, the situation does not appear any more 
optimistic despite having a more diversified industrial 
base, thriving tourist industry and a smaller population. 
The investment which Swaziland has attracted has not 
made it possible to absorb more than one quarter of the 
country's domestic labour in the formal employment sec-
tor.17 
In Lesotho the employment situation is even more 
bleak. Among the three states, Lesotho is most depen-
dent upon the South African labour migrant system. 
Lesotho had, through its investment regime, hoped to 
significantly reduce such dependence. Employment in 
South Africa was more than six times the amount of 
formal employment inside Lesotho and receipts from 
such employment provided about half of the value of the 
GNP. 1 8 Though the industrial sector had recorded a high 
rate of growth, the outcome in terms of formal sector 
employment was predictable in light of the country's 
unemployment problem. 
Overall, the performance of the manufacturing sectors 
in response to the investment regimes in the BLS coun-
tries has not been surprising. The legal regimes may 
have secured greater capital inflows by providing incen-
tives, protection and certainty and thereby benefiting in-
vestors—but this not sufficient. In addition to furthering 
the goals of economic growth and large national incomes, 
the legal order is also supposed to guarantee that the host 
populations, apart from the individual investors, benefit 
from investment. 
Given the nature of liberal theory upon which the legal 
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regimes are founded, one is sceptical of the extent to 
which the scope of achievements could have been broader. 
Investment regimes have been designed which use the 
market as a device for making investment and other 
choices. Given the availability of the requisite informa-
tion, resources will be diverted into those areas where 
demand is brisk and diverted from sectors where demand is 
slack. 
Under these conditions the function of law is facilitative 
and enabling, leaving the economic actors free to design 
such procedures and structures they deem necessary for the 
pursuit of their goals. The state adopts a non-interven-
tionist attitude and private management is allowed maxi-
mum freedom of operation. The legal system, and the 
BLS investment regimes are no exception, seeks to fix 
specific rules within which economic operators may act. 
It abstains from laying down criteria for decision-making. 
The inability of the BLS states to deal with their 
unemployment problems is only one symptom of the 
failure of the legal order to declare criteria for decision-
making and incorporate ideals of substantive justice. A 
further symptom is that of disproportionate foreign con-
trol of the economy. The Governments of the three 
states appear to be concerned about this problem and have 
made public statements which have been critical of this 
state of affairs. In Botswana, a Presidential Commission 
on Economic Opportunities was appointed to study the 
problem and devise strategies for overcoming it. The 
Commission identified insufficient credit as one of the 
principal causes of the poor per formance by local 
entrepreneurs. 
In Swaziland, despite the rapid increase in the estab-
lishment of industrial and commercial enterprises, the 
Third National Development Plan estimated that only 39 
per cent of the existing enterprises were locally owned. 
The balance were foreign-owned enterprises (33 per cent) 
and joint ventures (28 per cent). Even in regard to the 
locally-owned enterprises, local entrepreneurship was 
restricted mainly to service industries, small and medium-
size manufacturing, and trading operations. Against that 
background the Government of Swaziland committed 
itself to an accelerated development of local entrepreneur-
ship. 
The Swazi government perceived the development of 
local entrepreneurship as being crucial to underpinning its 
own legitimacy. However, the government itself and 
members of Parliament identified under-capitalization in 
general, and lack of access to risk capital in particular, as 
the key p rob lems impeding the local iza t ion of 
entrepreneurship. As a result, it has been suggested that 
legislation should be enacted to provide closer control 
over commercial bank lending to ensure sufficient lending 
to Swazi entrepreneurs. Should government decide to do 
so, it would mark a major departure from the current 
conceptualization of the role of law whereby law merely 
facilitates the operation of economic actors through con-
tractual arrangements.19 
As stated earlier, under the legal order of capitalist 
enterprise the legal system creates a framework of deci-
sion-making without specifying the criteria. The bank-
ing industry operates within such a framework and is 
largely an area of self-regulation. If a more intervention-
ist approach was adopted, success would depend upon 
legal changes facilitating the articulation of state regula-
tions and the requirements of profit-seeking bankers. 
A recent s tudy on the p rob lems of A f r i c a n 
entrepreneurship2 0 elaborated the view that in seeking to 
improve access to credit by disadvantaged groups, the 
legislator has to internalize the incentive factor. The 
legislator thereby mediates between the needs of the dis-
advantaged citizens and those of the bankers. 
Finally, an argument can be advanced that even the 
minimal regulatory goal of the current investment and 
corporate regime is no longer appropriate to the circum-
stances of the BLS countries. This has particularly been 
highlighted by the events surrounding the insolvency of 
BENCO International's subsidiaries in Botswana and 
Lesotho (the holding company is based in Luxembourg), 
and Swaziland Chemical Industries Ltd. 
When the Botswana Engineering and Construction 
Company (BENCO's subsidiary in Botswana) collapsed 
in 1981 it was indebted to the tune of 3 million P. and it 
left 430 employees jobless and without terminal benefits. 
As regards the subsidiary in Lesotho, the company was 
operated with minimal accounts and collapsed into a state 
of insolvency because of a shortage of working capital, 
inadequate management and lack of progress on contracts. 
The liquidator of the Botswana subsidiary found evi-
dence of massive mismanagement. The company had not 
published accounts for two years and the last audited bal-
ance sheet was for 1979. There were reports of large 
scale misuse of the company's financial and material 
resources by its directors including the construction of 
luxurious residences in South Africa and Botswana. 
A study on the effectiveness of corporate regulation in 
Bo t swana 2 1 observed that it might not be necessary to 
have complicated corporate and investment regimes. 
However, it suggests that with the arrival of multina-
tional companies which operate in strategic sectors (as 
they do in the BLS states) there is a need for greater safe-
guards. 
The BENCO crash in Lesotho and Botswana and that of 
Swaziland Chemical Industries may be a mere tip of the 
iceberg, thus indicating the need to adopt corrective mea-
sures to protect the public interest more effectively. 
While it is difficult to state the precise nature of the 
required changes, the minimum content of a reform pack-
age should include the recognition that the traditional 
open-ended fiduciary duties of directors are insufficient to 
adequately police entrepreneurial activity. 
C o n c l u s i o n 
Law can be said to have made a major contribution to 
the expansion of the industrial and commercial sectors in 
Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland in terms of laissez faire 
accounting. The legal regimes in the BLS countries have 
included legislation which has sought to internalize the 
incentive factor, thereby servicing the interest of local and 
international capital. There has been a significant 
response to such incentives schemes. 
Over the last decade, commercial and industrial activity 
has expanded appreciably. This expansion has, however, 
left the unemployment problem largely untouched. 
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Commercial and industrial expansion might have raised 
national incomes but the same cannot be said about per-
sonal incomes. This consequence underlines the inade-
quacy of corporate law and its lack of concern with the 
externalities created by entrepreneurial activity. Public 
interest therefore dictates that criteria for decision-making 
and setting goals within which entrepreneurial activity 
should be conducted should be considered. 
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Chapter 2 
NATURAL RESOURCES, RENT 
AND TAXATION 
An Indonesian Case Study 
S. MUNADJAT DANUSAPUTRO 
Introduct ion 
This paper examines the role of law in environmental 
and natural resource management in Indonesia. It will 
show that the current legislation and regulations on 
environment and natural resources are based on the 1945 
constitution. 
This paper is divided into four sections. The first sec-
tion will provide the institutional setting within which 
environmental legislation and policies operate. The sec-
ond part will present an overview of the state of the envi-
ronment in Indonesia. The third section will outline the 
natural resource policies and legislation applied in 
Indonesia and the last section will review the rent and 
taxation laws and regulations applied to natural resource 
utilization. 
The Inst i tut ional Sett ing 
The principles guiding the Indonesian state are embod-
ied in the constitution proclaimed in 1945 on the basis of 
the "nation's spirit and outlook on life." The sovereignty 
of the state is vested in the people and is exercised 
through the People's Consultative Assembly, or the 
Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR). The MPR 
comes into session every five years to promulgate the 
Broad Outlines of the State Policy (BOSP) for purposes 
of implementing the constitution. 
In order to execute the BOSP, the MPR elects the 
president of the state who also serves concurrently as the 
chief executive of the government for a five-year term. 
The president is advised by the Supreme Advisory Coun-
cil, and he appoints ministers to run the various min-
istries. In addition, there is the state comptrolling body or 
supreme audit board which controls the government's 
budget and finances. The Supreme Court in Indonesia is 
independent of the executive and legislative arms of the 
state. 
The country is divided into 27 provinces each headed by 
a governor who works in co-operation with the Regional 
House of Representatives. Each province is subdivided 
into a number of districts, with heads who work closely 
with the Local House of Representatives. There are 298 
districts in Indonesia. The districts are further divided into 
local administrative units which co-ordinate administra-
tion of the 62,898 villages in the country. 
Matters pertaining to environment and natural resources 
are dealt with by the Ministry of Population and Envi-
ronment. The minister is supported in his activities by a 
team of experts and a secretary general who manages an 
administrative unit of thirty-seven people. There are four 
assistant ministers who are in charge of the natural envi-
ronment, man-made environment, integration of popula-
tion and environment, and population issues. There are 
about one hundred professionals under the four assistant 
ministers. 
Environmental matters are dealt with by another eigh-
teen ministries, agencies and inter-agency committees. 
These include the Ministries of Agriculture; Forestry; 
Mining and Energy; Industry; Public Works; Transport 
and Communication; Telecommunication and Tourism; 
Manpower; Transmigration; Commerce; Research and 
Technology; Education and Culture; Justice; and Interior. 
The National Atomic Agency as well as the Centres for 
Environmental Studies at thirty-two universities and high 
schools throughout the country also deal with environ-
mental issues. In addition, there is the Environmental 
Legislation and Institution Inter-agency Committee, and 
the Pollution Inter-agency Committees. 
The legislative basis of the country's environmental 
policy is provided for in the 1945 constitution which 
stipulates that "each law must be ratified by the House of 
People's Representatives" and that "[l]and and water and 
the natural resources therein shall be controlled by the 
State and utilized for the greatest welfare of the people." 
A 1973 decree on the BOSP elucidated the environmen-
tal policy thus: "In the execution of the national devel-
opment, the natural resources of Indonesia must be used 
in a rational way. The exploitation of natural resources 
must be so executed as not to harm the eco-system. It 
must be implemented on the strength of an overall pol-
icy, paying due consideration to the needs of the coming 
generation." 
These broad policies have since then guided Indonesian 
environmental law, especially as reflected in previous 
five-year development plans. Act No. 4 of 1982 con-
cerning Basic Provisions for the Management of the 
Environment was promulgated to take into consideration 
the advancement of the welfare of the Indonesian people, 
the need to protect and develop the living environment, 
and the natural characteristics of the Indonesian environ-
ment. 
This act is simple and yet it includes possibilities for 
future development. It was designed with the specific 
needs of Indonesia, especially in view of the fact that the 
country is an archipelago. The act contains basic provi-
sions for further regulations on its implementation and 
covers all aspects of the environment. 
The State of the Environment 
The environment is conceived in Indonesia as "the spa-
tial entity with all objects, potentials, conditions, and 
living organisms including man and his behaviour, which 
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influence the continuance of the life and welfare of man 
and other living organisms." The management of the 
environment is thus understood as "an integrated effort in 
the utilization, regulation, conservation, supervision, 
control, restoration, and development of the environ-
ment."1 
Since the utilization of natural resources affects the 
integrity of ecosystems, development planning in 
Indonesia must be interrelated to and integrated with the 
concerned ecosystem. The ecosystem approach to devel-
opment is therefore conditio sine qua non in order to 
prevent the rise of detrimental side-effects, a burden that is 
usually carried by the local communities. It is this 
ecosystem-approach (or ecodevelopment) that guides 
Indonesia's development activities and policies as well as 
legislation pertaining to natural resource management. 
Indonesia's environmental problems result largely from 
underdevelopment and the development process itself. 
Basically, environmental problems can be classified into 
four broad categories: poverty, population, pollution, and 
politics (the four Ps), which are closely linked to each 
other. 
High population density is one of the problems associ-
ated with underdevelopment. In Java, for example, high 
population density has resulted in excessive pressure on 
living resources, which has further worsened the envi-
ronmental situation. The high population density in Java 
has forced the people to over-exploit the forests. This has 
resulted in land degradation, followed by the danger of 
recurrent floods. The nomadic people have also caused 
damage to the forests, especially through slash and burn 
agricultural practices. 
And in the urban areas, the high population density is 
associated with poor housing, inadequate supply of clean 
drinking water, insufficient health care, uncontrolled 
growth of slums and lack of public transportation. These 
problems can easily degenerate into political unrest.2 On 
the other hand, the development process has also resulted 
in a number of environmental problems related to 
agriculture, irrigation, river development , f isheries, 
industry and mining. The use of agricultural chemicals 
such as pesticides and fertilizers has led to various health 
problems and damage to fisheries resources. 
Indonesia faces a number of environmental problems 
whose solutions will lie in an overall policy that ensures 
that natural resources are utilized without undermining the 
needs of future generations. Some of these concerns have 
been reflected in the government 's Third Five-Year 
Development Plan of 1978/79-1983/84 (REPELITA III). 
T h e p lan o p e r a t e s on the p r i n c i p l e tha t 
"[environmental development is part of an integral strat-
egy of development to improve the welfare and quality of 
life of the people. For this reason the policies and steps 
in various fields and sectors of development should reflect 
the considerations and efforts connected with the man-
agement of the natural resources and environment." 
The broad themes contained in the policy and pro-
grammes for the management of natural resources and 
envi ronment included popula t ion and set t lement , 
developing infrastructure, utilizing coastal regions and the 
seas, environmental development cost control, education, 
science and technology, and developing legal apparatus for 
natural resource and environmental management. 
Natural Resource Management 
Environmental policy is emerging in Indonesia, but not 
along the lines pursued by the western countries. There 
are strong pressures from both the executive and legisla-
tive arms of the government to include the environmental 
impact statement (EIS) as part of the standing project 
evaluation procedures (PEP). These pressures are accom-
panied by the growing realization that the development 
process needs to be re-assessed so as to incorporate 
notions such as ecodevelopment. 
Other features that need to be incorporated into devel-
opment planning include the need to help local popula-
tions to educate and assist themselves in developing the 
specific natural resources of each ecosystem to meet their 
basic needs. This includes indigenous, demand-oriented 
and self-reliant development strategies, awareness of the 
local ecological dimensions, and the need to achieve 
"symbiosis" between man and nature. 
Actual environmental decision-making in Indonesia is 
closely linked to budget planning and approval inter-
changes between the executing ministry and the National 
Planning Board (NPB). The NPB is not a single agency 
for decision-making and it does not require a formal EIS 
before it can intervene in development projects. However, 
for most vital projects, an EIS would be required. The 
government is currently working out ways of providing 
technical support for EIS preparation for those smaller 
groups or firms whose activities are likely to affect the 
environment. 
Land-use Planning 
Another area of environmental concern is land-use plan-
ning which is currently controlled by legislation and 
regulations dealing with agrarian issues, town building, 
regional administration, village administration, forestry, 
mining, public works, and defence and security. The most 
important piece of legislation is Act No. 5 of 1960 con-
cerning the Fundamentals of Agrarian Law which brought 
into force uniform legislation based on Indonesian cus-
tomary law principles.3 This law replaced the dual land 
system (Indonesian and Western) introduced by the 
Dutch.4 
Indonesian customary land law reduces the prevalence of 
absentee landlords. Under the West Sumatra land law {hat 
ulayat), for example, it is the right of the communal or 
village groups to dispose of the land to individuals. This 
includes forests, ponds, uncleared land and commons. 
When an individual cultivates previously uncleared land, 
the community relinquishes the land to him. But if he 
misuses the land, the community repossesses it. 
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Under hat ulayat, land can only be transferred to out-
siders with the consent of the whole community and has 
to be preceded by payment, which acknowledges the 
community 's right to the land. This right expires af ter 
one planting season and the outsider cannot acquire any 
permanent right to the land. This customary law ensures 
that absentee landlordism does not take hold. 
It should be noted that Act No. 5 was promulgated on 
the basis of the 1945 constitutional provisions governing 
natural resources. The right of the state to control land-
use includes the right to determine the various rights 
relating to land and also to the power to regulate the legal 
relationship between individuals and their transactions 
involving land, water and air. Although the state itself 
does not own land, it has the right to determine every-
thing of importance regarding land. This ensures that 
land-use is always under state control. 
Water Quality 
The legal instruments for water quality management are 
deposited in the Act No. 11 of 1974 concerning Water 
Resource Development . The act covers water uses for 
drinking, domestic application, religious purposes, agri-
culture, horticulture, stock-raising, power generation, 
industry, mining, transport, and recreation. It is also sup-
plemented by other regulations and pieces of legislation 
pertaining to water-related issues. 
A number of problems related to water use have arisen 
in areas such as Jakarta, Samarang and Surabaya. In these 
areas, the water pumped into the treatment plant for 
human consumption is drawn and discharged downstream 
while water for industrial and agricultural uses is drawn 
and discharged from upstream. This means that the dis-
charge f rom industry and agriculture will f low to areas 
where it will be used for human consumption. 
In this case it is difficult to determine criteria for the 
economic use of the water and effluent standards. This is 
because on the one hand, the drinking water supply needs 
fresh water of high quality, while on the other hand it 
would not be economical to cleanse the waste water 
upstream well enough to meet the criteria for fresh drink-
ing water downstream. 
Similar problems prevail in the rural areas where the 
farmers rely on water from wells and canals. In the north-
ern part of Java, for example, rivers and irrigation canals 
are major sources of water during the dry season. Most of 
the water in this region is used for agriculture, which does 
not require high quality standards. In such areas, it is dif-
ficult to determine the permissible load of pollutants that 
can be discharged into the canals although people use the 
water without treatment or boiling. The water is usually 
intended for agriculture. 
Water quality criteria in Indonesia are regulated on the 
basis of the principles and stipulations contained in the 
Act No. 11 of 1974 which have been drafted into the 
Regulations for Water Pollution Control. The draft regu-
lations provide four water quality categories based on end-
use. 
Category A covers water which can be used as potable 
water without any prior treatment while category B covers 
water which can be treated for domestic and other pur-
poses, except for uses described under category A. Water 
suitable for fish and cattle and o th . r uses except those de-
scribed under categories A and B is covered by category C. 
Category D covers water which can be used for agricul-
tural purposes and for municipal services, industries, 
electricity generat ion, waterways and other purposes 
except those described in all the previous categories. 
Marine Pollution and Coastal Zone 
Management 
Marine pollution in Indonesia is controlled under vari-
ous specific laws and others ratifying international laws. 
The most important laws governing marine pollution are 
the Act No. 4/Prd. of 1960 concerning the Indonesian 
Waters, Act No. 1 of 1973 concerning the Indonesian 
Continental Shelf, and Act No. 5 of 1983 concerning the 
Indones ian Exc lus ive Economic Zone. The actual 
implementation of these laws and other related legisla-
tion, takes into consideration the source of the pollution. 
For example, for the control of land-based sources of 
pollution, Act No. 11 is implemented in conjunct ion 
with the appropriate pieces of legislation dealing with 
land-based sources of pollution. This kind of pollution is 
dealt with through the Ministry of Public Works in co-
operation with the Ministries of Industry, Agriculture, 
and Forestry. Marine pollution arising f rom sea-borne 
sources is dealt with by the Ministries of Communica-
tion, and Mining and Energy. The Ministry of Commu-
nication has established a permanent task force to control 
and combat pollution. 
Marine pollution caused by offshore operations is con-
trolled by the Ministry of Mining and Energy which has 
issued a number of regulations dealing with the subject. 
The implementation of these regulations is entrusted in 
the hands of the State Enterprise for Oil and Natural Gas 
Mining ( P E R T A M I N A ) . In turn, P E R T A M I N A has 
issued its own regulations and set up a pollution control 
task force, in addition to other institutional arrangements 
made to ensure that the act is implemented. 
Being an "archipelagic state" consisting of over 13,667 
islands, Indonesia has a number of laws dealing with 
coastal zone management. There are four specific regula-
tions dealing with of f -shore re fuse dumping , oil and 
natural gas refuse dumping, offshore mineral develop-
ment, and fishing and aquaculture. In addition, the envi-
ronmental management law has provided for policies 
which aim at ensuring that the coastal resources of the 
country are used on a sustainable basis. 
In recent years, resource management programmes have 
been launched to protect the mangrove ecosystem. Not 
only is the mangrove a source of wood, but it also pro-
vides a suitable habitat for the prawn, crab, shrimp, fish 
and other marine fauna. Other products of mangrove 
include tannin which is used in the leather industry. The 
mangrove ecosystems also sustain the yield of fish which 
is caught under the tamak system, a brackish-water fish 
pond aquaculture method. 
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North Sumatra 60,000 
Riau 95,000 
Jambi — 
South Sumatra 195,000 
Lampung 17,000 
West Java 20,400 
Central Java 14,041 
East Java 6,000 
West Kalmantan 40,000 
Central Kalmantan 10,000 
South Kalmantan 75,000 
East Kalmantan 150,000 
South Sulawesi 24,000 
Southeast Sulawesi 29,000 
Nusa Tenggara 3,678 
Maluku 100,000 
Irian Jaya 2,934,000 
Total: 3,823,119 
Source: Wiroatmodjo and Judi, 1979; Bur-
bridge and Koesoebiono, 1980-
In order to control fishing, the government has zoned 
the coastal region for different sizes of powered vehicles. 
The Ministry of Agriculture controls the fishing area, 
gear, and season. Methods such as explosives and poisons 
are prohibited. In addition to the laws issued by the cen-
tral government, there are other regulations released by 
the provincial and local administrations which control the 
exploitation of resources such as sand, algae, turtle, fish, 
and turtle eggs, and provide for the protection of man-
grove ecosystems. 
Air Quality and Noise Pollution Control 
Indonesia does not have any specific legislation dealing 
with air quality. The regulatory requirements are covered 
by other pieces of legislation dealing with issues such as 
nuisance, occupational health, mining, radiation, atomic 
energy, and pesticides. The most extensive and stringent 
regulations are embodied in the legislation dealing with 
nuisance, which is implemented through regulations 
issued by the Ministries of Industry and Commerce. 
One of the most prominent examples of air quality 
control was the decision of the Governor of Jakarta (No. 
587 of 1980) concerning the Ambient Criteria of Air 
Quality and Noise Within the Jakarta Region. The deci-
sion was an improvement on previous attempts to raise 
air quality in the city and reduce noise pollution. Other 
cities in the country have followed suit in issuing similar 
orders. Tree planting campaigns have been undertaken in 
urban areas to improve air quality. 
Like in the control of air pollution, Indonesia has no 
specific laws which control noise pollution. The legisla-
tive mechanisms used to control noise pollution are 
similar to those used for air quality. The level of noise in 
Indonesia is not high enough to warrant new legislation. 
The most effective legislation has been the Nuisance Or-
dinance of 1926. The nuisance ordinance, in conjunction 
with the regulations governing factory and enterprise 
construction, has been effective in reducing noise pollu-
tion. This has also been helped by tree-planting cam-
paigns in towns and near industrial complexes and air-
ports. 
Solid Wastes and Specified Substances 
Although Indonesia does not have any specific legisla-
tion dealing with solid wastes, the matter is handled 
through the nuisance ordinance in conjunction with other 
pieces of legislation covering regional and village admin-
istration, and environmental management. Disposal is 
generally in sanitary landfill sites operated by local and 
municipal governments. This solid waste is usually dis-
charged at remote dumping areas. However, due to lack of 
transport facilities, the disposal of solid waste meets 
many obstacles. In cities the removal and disposal is or-
ganised by the municipality supported by the municipal 
Health Services. 
Only in a few densely populated areas, such as large 
towns, have volume-reducing processes been practiced. 
The responsibility for industrial waste in Jakarta lies with 
the enterprise releasing it. The enterprise is required to try 
to decrease the amount by regeneration or re-using the 
waste. Households have similar requirements. Since 
1973, inhabitants are expected to provide waste disposal 
facilities for their houses. 
Specific substances such as pesticides, fertilizer, toxic 
substances, and radioactive materials are covered by spe-
cific legislation. There are at least 12 pieces of legislation 
and regulations dealing specifically with such substances. 
Most of these laws address the control, storage, use, 
packaging and labelling, distribution and registration of 
pesticides. 
Mineral Development 
Indonesia has an advanced mining industry and has 
therefore developed a sophisticated legal framework for 
controlling the industry. There are at least 14 pieces of 
legislation and regulations that relate directly to mining 
of which Act No. 11 of 1967, concerning Basic 
Provisions on Mining, is the most important. The other 
laws deal inter alia with natural gas and oil, the 
continental shelf and other aspects of mining. These laws 
are complemented by provincial and local implementation 
regulations as well as implementation regulations in 
other sectors. 
The body of laws applied to the control of marine 
pollution caused by offshore operations are representative 
of those found in every sector of activities relating to 
mining. 
Conservation of Nature and Culture 
The conservation of nature (including forests, soil, 
parks and wildlife) is covered by legislation and regula-
tions dealing with land-use planning, water quality, and 
marine pollution. This is complemented by over 40 
diverse pieces of legislation and regulations which have a 
bearing on the conservation of nature. The range of 
legislation covering this sphere of conservation illustrates 
how extensively and intensively the government 
approaches the subject. 
The various pieces of legislation and regulations cover 
wildlife protection, hunting, nature protection, forest 
exploitation and restriction, forest planning, export of 
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seeds and seedlings, internal movement of seeds and 
seedlings, export of protected wildlife, assignment of for-
est areas to production, export of fish species, conserva-
tion of fisheries resources, soil conservation, protection 
of coral reefs, and environmental cleanliness. 
In order to protect the cultural heritage of the country, 
Indonesia has introduce a number of legal instruments. 
The most important of these is the Monument Ordinance 
of 1931 which is complemented by six ministerial orders. 
The orders deal with ministerial co-operation in protecting 
the monuments , safeguarding and protecting cultural 
reserves, and controlling and combating trade and export 
of protected cultural goods. 
In addition to these regulations and pieces of legislation, 
the government has introduced other measure which help 
to protect the cultural objects resulting from excavations. 
Such items are usually kept in museums. In order to 
control trade in such items, the Police Department and the 
Ministries of Commerce and Finance have also issued 
separate regulations. 
These regulations conform with the recommendations of 
the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Implicit 
Export, Import, and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural 
Property Endangered by Public or Private Works which 
was adopted by the General Conference of the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO) in 1964. They are also in conformity with 
the recommendations of the Preservation of Cultural 
Property Endangered by Public or Private Works adopted 
by the General Conference of UNESCO in 1968. 
Rent and Taxation 
The government's efforts to reduce the deterioration of 
the welfare of the people are reflected in development 
plans. The development plans provide the instruments 
require to control and manage society's economic life. The 
main tools of the government for this purpose are fiscal 
instruments which consist of taxation and other govern-
ment revenue-yielding measures, government spending, 
and the balance between government revenue and spend-
ing. 
With these instruments the government can influence 
society's economic life for purposes of its development 
and improvement, especially through the implementation 
of the development plan. This process also includes the 
measures provided for the exploi tat ion of natural 
resources. 
Taxation is one of the measure applied by the govern-
ment to meet its development objectives, especially in 
mobilizing financial resources for government spending. 
The term "tax" has been variously defined but we shall 
use the definition provided by Seligman in which "a tax 
is a compulsory contribution from the person to the gov-
ernment to defray the expenses incurred in the common 
interest of all, without reference to special benefits con-
ferred."5 A tax is distinguished from a special assessment 
on the grounds that the latter is paid once and for all to 
defray the costs of of a special improvement to property 
and is levied according to the particular benefits accruing 
to each property owner. 
In defining the development plan, the government and 
the Indonesian people decided that the financial resources 
required must be sourced locally. This means that domes-
tic sources of financing must be mobilized to the maxi-
mum and foreign resources are only r eant to fill the gap 
between requirements and domestic sources. It must, 
however, be recognised that the deterioration of financial 
conditions inherited from the past has resulted in a very 
limited saving potential in the country. This has meant 
that in the initial stages part of the investment must be 
financed by foreign capital. 
The government intends to maintain proper balance 
between government savings through taxation and the 
fiscal system on the one hand, and increased voluntary 
savings through financial institutions on the other. This 
balance is necessary in order to achieve maximum poten-
tial growth in total domestic savings. 
This is largely because the financial sources of the gov-
ernment's development budget include public savings, 
counter-value of programme aid, project aid and technical 
assistance. Public savings are usually drawn from the 
surplus resulting from government recurrent expenditure. 
Thus, this amount depends on efforts to increase revenues 
and to minimize government recurrent expenditure. Over 
the years, the government has introduced new taxation 
guidelines and incentives to enable the country to attract 
foreign investment while at the same time earning rev-
enue from taxation. 
For example, the Instruction of the President No. 18 of 
1968 on Tax Relief to Foreign Investment in Mining laid 
down new taxation guidelines for the sector. The central 
and provincial governments earned revenue from mining 
enterprises through corporate, dividend, sales, stamp, and 
motor vehicle and vessel registration taxes. Import, excise 
and export duties were also imposed in addition to levies 
relating to mining rights. 
Table 2: Corporate Tax Rate 











Nickel Cobalt 37.5% 45.0% 
Bauxite 
Total 40.0% 48.0% 
Note: Mining firms are not exempted from corporate tax 
referred to in Article 15 (a), paragraph 1 and 3, of Law No. 
1, 1967. Interests and/or dividends received by and from 
bodies which are affiliated to the firm are exempted from 
corporate tax. Additional tax concessions may be granted to 
the firm in cases of large investments with significant 
influences upon the economic development and growth of the 
region. 
The policy of developing and improving rent and tax to 
increase national revenue is implemented through the 
provisions of Law No. 1 of 1967 concerning Foreign 
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Investment. The aim of the law was to attract foreign 
investors and bring the incentives in line with those of 
other Asian countries. The specific incentives granted 
The policy of developing and improving rent and tax to 
increase national revenue is implemented through the 
provisions of Law No. 1 of 1967 concerning Foreign 
Investment. The aim of the law was to attract foreign 
investors and bring the incentives in line with those of 
other Asian countries. The specific incentives granted 
included full authority to select management and to hire 
or use foreign experts for positions which Indonesians are 
not capable of filling, offer of land at advantageous terms 
(with rights of building and exploitation formerly denied 
to foreigners), exemption from import duties on equip-
ment, machinery, tools and initial plant supplies, and 
exemption from the capital stamp tax on the introduction 
of foreign capital for investment. 
The investment law introduced in Indonesia made 
changes in the land rights, especially as they related to 
foreign investors. For foreign investors, four categories of 
land rights became relevant: ownership, exploitation, 
building, and use. The right of exploitation was valid for 
25 to 35 years, depending on the type of enterprise and 
could be extended for another 25 years if deemed neces-
sary. The right of building was granted for 30 years and 
could be renewed for a maximum of 20 years, and the 
right of use could either cover a fixed period or be granted 
according to requirements. The first two categories could 
be mortgaged. 
Foreign investors who obtain mining rights from the 
Minister of Mining, or forestry exploitation rights from 
the Minister of Agriculture, also automatically obtain the 
land within their concession borders, if the land is used 
for purposes directly related to the operations of the firm. 
If the uses are different from the operations of the firm, 
then a special application must be made. The government 
also ensures that Indonesian citizens do not sell off their 
land to foreigners. Before the sale is made, the property 
must first revert to state land. 
C o n c l u s i o n s 
The policies fo r , the utilization and management of 
natural resources in the country have their basis in the 
1945 constitution, which stipulates that the land, water 
and natural resources shall be controlled by the state and 
utilized for the public welfare. The constitutional provi-
sions are further elucidated in state policy (BOSP). On the 
basis of these two instruments, the government has pro-
mulgated Law No. 4 concerning Basic Provisions for the 
Management of the Environment. 
The law emphasizes the "interlocking relationships 
between man, his community and his living environ-
ment.. .which must continue to be in harmonious and 
dynamic balance." It has been used to formulate specific 
policy measures which are contained in the five-year 
development plans. The implementation of the plans will 
require a willingness on the part of everyone to reduce 
consumption in order to increase savings, to permit the 
accumulation of capital and to pay taxes. 
The government primarily relies on taxation to mobilize 
the financial resources needed to implement the develop-
ment plans, and has instituted a number of taxation mea-
sures. These measures also affect the utilization of natural 
resources, especially mining and land. In addition to 
taxes, the government earns revenue from rent on land and 
other natural resources. Since the country has limited 
capacity to provide working capital, the government has 
opened channels for foreign investment on favourable 
terms. To this end, laws have been promulgated to utilize 
foreign credits and investments to the maximum. 
N o t e s 
1. See: Act No. 4. of 1982 Concerning Basic Provisions for the 
Management of the Environment, Article 1, para 1 and 2. 
2. See: Second Five Year Development Plan, 1973/74-
1978/79, book I, pp. 107-9. 
3. The Act provides for the right of fee simple ownership, 
building, expropriation, use, lodging, water, and air space. 
4. By implementing Act No. 5, in conjunction with the Ordi-
nance No. 168 of 1948, every province and city is expected to 
have a planning pattern. 
5. Seligman, Essay on Taxation, p. 432. 
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Chapter 2 
FISCAL ASPECTS OF 
PETROLEUM EXPLORATION AND 
PRODUCTION AGREEMENTS 
West and Central Africa 
E . T . HUNT TALMAGE I I I 
Introduct ion 
Exploration and development of hydrocarbon resources 
requires an effective fiscal regime. Such a regime should 
be flexible, sensitive to a variety of economic factors and 
should provide the investor with a rate of return com-
mensurate with the investment risk. Also, it should 
ensure that the host country receives a proper share of 
revenues and other benefits from the depletion of its non-
renewable natural resources. 
An insensitive fiscal regime may either preclude the 
economic development of economical ly marginal 
petroleum fields, or result in a very high economic return 
to the investor—to the host government 's financial 
detriment—in the event of a very profitable discovery. 
An inflexible system may lead to circumstances under 
which one party demands re-negotiation of the terms of 
an agreement, thus impairing the stability of the contract. 
The increase in crude oil prices in the 1970s led to 
substantial revision of contract terms due to what many 
governments perceived as windfal l prof i ts to the 
petroleum companies. The recent steep decline in 
petroleum prices may lead to another revision. Alterna-
tively, investors may refuse to explore or develop fields 
where they consider the economic return inadequate. 
This paper discusses issues of importance to the 
investor and the host country, petroleum agreements and 
their fiscal regimes, and, finally, contrasts the fiscal 
regimes of petroleum agreements in several West and 
Central African countries. 
Investor and Host Country Viewpoints 
Investor Viewpoint 
Investors view each potential exploration commitment 
from a world-wide perspective; balancing geographical 
diversity of resources, existing production needs, and 
development of reserves. They know the contractual 
terms available in different countries and that govern-
ments compete to attract investors. Investors analyze 
each potential investment on its economic rate of return, 
speculating on projected costs and revenues and discount-
ing for the time value of money and likely inflation. The 
rate of return acceptable to an investor depends on: 
• geological knowledge of the area 
• perceptions of contractual and political stability 
• how quickly the investment is repaid 
• security of petroleum supply, once discovered 
Government Viewpoint 
Governments seek to attract financially and technologi-
cally qualif ied investors to develop their petroleum 
resources. They must offer attractive financial terms to 
investors, while ensuring they receive an adequate portion 
of revenues from the project. The government then must 
formulate a flexible fiscal regime, sufficiently sensitive 
to cost, revenue, and profit to be applied in different eco-
nomic situations. 
In addition to fiscal matters, the government will also 
be concerned with a number of other important items, not 
discussed in this paper. These are: 
• prompt and efficient exploration, development, and 
production 
• relinquishing unproductive explored areas 
• access to a portion of the petroleum produced 
• transfer of technology 
• training and employment of nationals 
• using local goods and services 
• access to technical data and a voice in the technical 
and administrative management of the project 
Fiscal Regimes of Petroleum Agreements 
Types of Petroleum Agreements 
Historically, exploration and production have been done^ 
under a variety of contractual structures. The earliest 
agreements were referred to as concessions, pursuant to 
which the investor took title to the natural resources and 
paid royalties, rents and taxes to the government. Recent 
petroleum agreements have been production sharing con-
tracts, under which the government retains title to the 
hydrocarbons, and the investor receives a portion of the 
production as reimbursement of costs and as profit. 
Most recently, service or work contracts under which 
the investor is granted a fee have been used. The fee is 
of ten through an enti t lement to a portion of the 
petroleum produced for the services rendered. An alterna-
tive is the government participting in the investor's con-
tract rights, thereby granting itself a portion of the 
project's "equity" revenues, in addition to fiscal levies. In 
almost all the contractual arrangements, the investor 
bears the financial risk. 
Despite the contractual framework used, the economic 
return to the investor and the potential revenues to the 
government must be examined. All fiscal levies to be 
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imposed, the basis and timing of their imposition, and 
the extent of government participation should be consid-
ered. Usually, an investor prefers levies sensitive to 
costs and revenues to fixed levies. The government may, 
however, wish to receive at least a minimum fixed rev-
enue, regardless of the project's profitability. 
Fiscal Levies 
Fiscal levies insensitive to project profitability include 
surface rents, licensing fees, signature and production 
bonuses and royalties. Income taxes, surtaxes, produc-
tion sharing and government participation may be par-
tially sensitive to project profitability, particularly if they 
are determined on the basis of economic rate of return. 
The most accurate way to determine overall project prof-
itability is to compute an investor's net total cash f low 
and hence, the rate of return (including discounting for 
inflation and time values). 
Rents and licensing fees. Surface rents are often calcu-
lated as a fixed amount per area, increasing during the 
explorat ion production per iods—hence serving as an 
inducement to relinquish unneeded area. Licensing fees 
are nominal and partly reflect administrative charges; they 
have diminished or have been eliminated under the more 
recent contracts. Neither of these levies substantially 
deter the investor, nor are they a major revenue source for 
the government. 
Bonuses. A bonus payable upon the signature of a 
petroleum agreement is completely insensitive to project 
profitability. It may either be a nominal charge which 
reflects reimbursement to the government for developing 
geological data, or it may be a higher amount by which 
the government seeks a substantial one-time payment. A 
very high signature bonus would be deterrent to a poten-
tial investor. Production bonuses are fixed payments 
which may be imposed upon the discovery of petroleum 
or upon production at certain specified levels. They are 
likewise generally insensitive to project profitability, and 
unless very high, do not deter investment. 
Royalties. Royalties are payments or petroleum entitle-
ments based on a percentage of petroleum production. 
They may be fixed or may vary with the level of produc-
tion, offshore water depth or otherwise. If fixed, they are 
insensitive to project profitability. Even when they are 
variable, they are not entirely sensitive to project costs or 
petroleum prices, and thus are unrelated to profitability. 
While a high royalty assures a substantial f ixed revenue 
to the government, it can also be a significant deterrent to 
project development, particularly in developing marginal 
fields which are highly cost sensitive. 
The basis on which the royalty is imposed may also be 
a deterrent. This will occur if, for example, the price 
used for valuation of petroleum is above the actual real-
ized price. Other contractual provisions—such as the 
mandatory supply of a certain percentage of production at 
a discounted price to the government for its national or 
domestic needs—may also result in a de facto royalty. 
Income taxes. Tax on net income is slightly sensitive to 
project profitability, and both the rate of the tax and its 
basis of imposit ion will affect the investor 's rate of 
return. The tax rate is usually fixed, but may vary with 
offshore water depth. Accounting provisions regarding 
treatment of expenses, depreciation and credits also affect 
the investor's return. For example, depreciation of capital 
costs on an accelerated basis will assure a faster invest-
ment payback, but will diminish the government 's tax 
revenues during the early years of the project. 
A very high tax rate may result in a rate of return which 
would discourage marginal field development or invest-
ment in secondary recovery. A low tax rate will deprive 
the government of revenues, and indeed may serve as a 
subsidy to the investor's home country to the extent that 
the investor's tax rate exceeds that of the host country. A 
government needs to be informed about the fiscal pro-
visions of the investor's home country, such as tax cred-
its. 
Income surtax. A supplementary or additional profits , 
windfall profits , or resource rent tax may also be 
imposed. This income surtax is usually levied where 
the investor has achieved a specified threshold rate(s) of 
return on the investment and thus, is highly sensitive to 
project profitability. However, if it is based on another 
factor, such as production levels or price, it is less sensi-
tive. 
While investors are reluctant to relinquish the potential 
high side return which may be realized with a substantial 
discovery, they generally recognize that the government 
should also benefit. If the threshold rate of return is ade-
quate, an income surtax, either at f ixed or progressive 
rates which increase proportionally with higher rates of 
return, need not be a major disincentive to the investor. 
Production sharing. Under production sharing agree-
ments, the investor maintains an account of the project 
costs; which are then reimbursed from petroleum produc-
tion, often with an annual limit on the percentage of total 
production which can be so recovered. After deduction of 
this cost oil from total production, the balance, or profit 
oil, is shared between the investor and the government. 
The percentage of total production allowed as cost oil 
will determine the speed at which the investment is 
repaid. No limit on cost oil would assure fast repayment, 
although it would defer the government's revenues from 
its production share until all project costs were recovered. 
Alternat ively, if the cost oil percentage is low, the 
investor may never recover all his costs. Such a provi-
sion may d iscourage investment , par t icular ly with 
marginal fields. 
The percentage of profit oil allocated to the investor and 
government may be fixed, or may vary depending upon 
production rates, offshore water depths or the investor's 
rate of return. A fixed percentage is the least flexible, as 
it does not take cost or revenue factors into account. If 
the government 's share of profit oil is determined by 
production levels or the investor's rate of return, the effect 
is essentially the same as with the income surtax already 
discussed. Percentages which vary according to water 
depth or production levels are somewhat economically 
sensitive, since certain assumptions regarding costs and 
oil prices (and thus revenues) may be made in determin-
ing the allocable split. Such a determination is, how-
ever, sensitive in cases where these assumptions prove 
incorrect. An allocation based on the investor's rate of 
return is most sensitive to economic factors. 
The investor's profit oil entitlement may also be deter-
mined before or after tax. If before tax, the investor is 
subject to income tax on net profit, taking into account 
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all revenues from cost and profit oil. In such cases, 
depreciation and loss carry-forward provisions will affect 
the timing and amount of government tax revenues. If 
the investor's profit oil share is after income tax, the 
government receives its income tax revenues from its 
profit oil share at the time of receipt. While this 
arrangement may simplify revenue allocation, it may 
complicate the calculation of the tax deemed paid and 
impair the investor's ability to obtain a foreign tax credit 
in his home country. 
Participation. The government may increase its revenues 
by participating in the investor's contract interest. Either 
the government or its parastatal may participate as a 
member of the petroleum consortium, or as an equity 
participant in the joint venture company developing the 
petroleum rights. The government's participation would 
also give it access to information and permit it to 
participate in decision-making regarding petroleum oper-
ations, although both of these might be achieved by other 
means. 
Government participation may either be f ixed or 
proportional, depending on levels of production, offshore 
water depth or otherwise. It may also be either on a pro-
ducing field-by-field basis, or may apply to the entire 
contract area interest. Government participation may also 
be from the beginning of operations or at the time of a 
discovery. If the participation is without cost to the 
government, it effectively constitutes a production shar-
ing arrangement. If the interest is carried, the extent of 
the carry (whether through exploration or development), 
and the interest imposed thereon, may vary and will affect 
the investor's economic return. The method of eventual 
payment (whether out of production or in cash, with or 
without annual or other limitations) may also vary. 
Consolidation. Whether the application of fiscal provi-
sions is limited to a producing field, the entire contract 
area, the exploration and production activity, or the entire 
country it will have an impact on the investor's economic 
return. An investor limited by field would not be allowed 
to offset exploration expenses incurred outside the 
producing deposit against revenues from that deposit. 
This would be a deterrent to further exploration. 
In contrast, fiscal consolidation limited to the contract 
area would allow subsequent exploration expenses to be 
offset against production revenues from within the con-
tract area, thus encouraging exploration. Broader fiscal 
consolidation covering other contract areas or activities 
would allow the contractor, in effect, to offset all explo-
ration or other costs in the country against all production 
or other revenues (for example, from refining or pipeline 
activities). This would be even more economically 
attractive to the investor, but could cause the government 
to lose revenues. 
Pricing. The price of petroleum used to determine roy-
alty, tax, and sales to or on behalf of the government 
may also have a substantial impact on economic return. 
Pricing may be on realized, reference, posted or preferen-
tial basis. Realized or actual prices are often used when 
the government is assured that sales are on an arm's-
length basis. Otherwise, a reference price based on an 
international market rate, perhaps adjusted for transporta-
tion and other costs, may be used. 
Alternatively, a posted price determined by the govern-
ment or jointly with the investor may apply. If a posted 
price exceeds the price received by the investor, the gov-
ernment's revenues may be inflated and the investor's 
return reduced. A preferential or discounted price may 
also apply, for example, regarding petroleum supplied by 
the investor to meet domestic needs of the country. The 
discount constitutes a de facto royalty, since it would 
otherwise be received by the investor. 
Currency. The currency used for accounting, cost recov-
ery, tax and other purposes may also vary widely. The 
reference currency of the international petroleum industry 
is US dollars. All crude oil sales other than those to the 
host country are likely to be made in that currency. A 
large percentage of expenses will also probably be 
incurred in dollars. Thus, if another currency is specified 
in the petroleum agreement, substantial anomalies may 
arise due to exchange rate fluctuations between the two 
currencies. This is particularly true in production sharing 
contracts. 
If the exchange rate between the contract currency and 
the dollar changes between the dates that costs are 
incurred and recovered, these amounts may be either 
inflated or deflated, a risk that neither of the contracting 
parties foresaw, nor would wish to bear. The only way 
to minimize this risk would be to designate US dollars as 
the currency of the agreement. However, this may lead to 
accounting and tax complications which may be unac-
ceptable to the government. This problem may be 
aggravated if the host country currency is not freely con-
vertible at a rate which represents actual market value. 
Work Obligations. Minimum work obligations, often 
coupled with minimum expenditure requirements, may be 
imposed for each part of the exploration period. These 
may influence the investor's economic return, particularly 
if substantial drilling obligations are imposed. No fixed 
similar obligations are imposed regarding development, 
production or secondary recovery. However, investors 
analyze their return in light of potential f inancial 
commitments required to develop or prolong field life. 
Miscellaneous levies. A variety of other levies exist, 
although their impact on the economic feasibility of a 
project is usually nominal. These include interest, 
import and export customs duties and taxes, registration 
and real estate taxes, withholding taxes on dividends, 
royalties and technical services, personal income and 
payroll taxes and social security contributions. The gov-
ernment often grants exemptions or reduces some of 
these, particularly import and export levies. Export levies 
are of special concern to the investor who will wish to be 
assured that the right to export his allocable share of 
production is unrestricted. 
Selected Individual Fiscal Reg imes 
A variety of contractual and fiscal regimes are used by 
West and Central African countries. Very few now use 
the traditional concession, although some combine it 
with government participation. Many countries use a 
production sharing contract, some including royalty and 
government participation. Several countries also impose 
an income surtax or determine production sharing on the 
basis of the investor's rate of return. 
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The fiscal terms summarized below have been taken 
f r o m var ious sources , including legislat ion, mode l 
agreements and actual contracts with investors. They in-
dicate the range of terms offered rather than the exact rates 
and other conditions currently granted by the countries 
surveyed. The terms refer only to petroleum and exclude 
any reference to natural gas, as its economics are differ-
ent, and such projects are usually subject to case-by-case 
agreement. 
Angola. Angola has a pre-tax production sharing—par-
ticipation regime, and a negotiable signature bonus of 
around one million dollars with no production bonuses. 
Surface rents of a few hundred US dollars per square 
kilometre are imposed. No royalties are imposed, and 
income is the general rate of 50 per cent. There is an 
income surtax in the form of a 100 per cent excise tax for 
all petroleum revenues exceeding an inflation-indexed per 
barrel amount , currently around thirteen US dollars. 
There is a 50 per cent cost oil limit, and the government 
share of profit oil varies from 40 to 90 per cent, based on 
production levels. 
A recent government decree provides for a minimum of 
51 per cent government participation. Consolidation is 
by f ield, and pricing is on a realized basis . Some 
investor relief is given through a 25 per cent depreciation 
provision with a 33.3 per cent capital cost uplift. Peri-
odic revision of production sharing terms is provided. 
The contract currencies are the US dollar and the local 
currency, the kwanza. 
Cameroun. Cameroun has a product ion shar ing— 
participation regime, called an association contract. 
Signature and production bonuses and surface rents are 
provided pursuant to the Mining Code. Surface rents 
vary, but are around one hundred CFA francs per square 
kilometre (288.8 CFA francs = 1 US dollar). A royalty 
of 12.5 per cent is imposed, and the income tax is 57.5 
per cent. There is no income surtax. The cost oil is 
apparently computed based on 25.31 per cent of a mining 
rent equal to annual gross revenues less operating costs, 
interest and double depreciation. The government share 
of profit oil varies f rom 60 to 70 per cent, based on pro-
duction. Government participation is 50 per cent. Con-
solidation is by field, and prices are posted by the gov-
ernment by reference to export sales. Contract terms may 
be re-negotiated ten years after production. 
Congo. The Congo has a concession—part icipat ion 
regime. There are no signature or production bonuses nor 
any surface rents. Royalties and income tax rates are 
negotiable. Royalties are usually from 14 to 16 per cent, 
and the tax rate between 50 and 55 per cent, although 
reductions may be granted for deep offshore waters. There 
is neither income surtax nor production sharing. Gov-
ernment participation is negotiated and is usually between 
45 and 55 per cent. Consolidation is usually by contract 
area, and pricing is on a realized or a reference basis. The 
contract currency is usually the CFA franc. 
Equatorial Guinea. Equatorial Guinea has a production 
sharing regime. Signature and production bonuses and 
surface rents are negotiable. Royalties are negotiable 
with a minimum rate of 10 per cent, and income tax is 
imposed at the general rate imposed by the Tax Code. 
There is no income surtax, but production sharing is 
based on rate of return. There is no limit on cost oil. 
After the investor has achieved a 30 per cent before-tax 
rate of return, the government profit oil share is 40 per 
cent. This share increases to 60 per cent of the profit oil 
above a 40 per cent return, and 80 per cent of profit oil 
above a 50 per cent return. There is no government par-
ticipation. As in Congo, consolidation is by contract 
area, and pricing is on a realized or a reference basis. 
However, the contract currency is US dollars. 
Gabon. Gabon has a production sharing—participation 
regime. Signature and production bonuses and surface 
rents are negotiable, although a 1974 law provides for 
production bonuses ranging between two hundred and 
eight hundred million CFA francs depending upon pro-
duction levels. Surface rents during exploration are 
between one hundred and fifty and fifteen hundred CFA 
francs per square kilometre, rising progressively by con-
tract year. These are reduced by four-fifths if water depth 
exceeds two hundred meters. Sur face rents during 
production are seven hundred CFA francs per hectare. 
Royalty in some proposed contracts is 20 per cent, while 
it varies in the 1974 law between 12 and 16.7 per ceht. 
The tax rate in the 1974 law is 56.25 per cent, but 
production sharing in some proposed contracts is deemed 
to be after income tax. No income surtax is imposed. 
There is a 50 per cent cost oil limit, and the government 
has a 10 per cent participation option, which may be 
exercised upon product ion. Fiscal consol idat ion is 
apparently by contract area, and prices are posted by the 
government. The contract currency is CFA francs, but 
bonuses are paid in US dollars. 
Guinea Bissau. Guinea Bissau also has a production 
sharing—participation regime. Signature and production 
bonuses are negotiable, although there are no surface 
rents. Royalties are negotiable between 12.5 and 20 per 
cent, based on production levels. The tax rate is 50 per 
cent. There is an income surtax, essentially a negotiated 
production sharing split based on a three-tiered investor 
rate of return. There is no limit on cost oil. Govern-
ment participation is 51 per cent, carried until discovery. 
Repayment of carried costs is limited to 40 per cent of 
annual government revenues from production. Consoli-
dation is by contract area, and prices are on a realized 
basis. The contract currencies are US dollars and the 
local currency, the peso. 
Cote d'lvoire. Cote d'lvoire too has a production shar-
ing—participation regime. Signature bonuses are usually 
between five and ten million US dollars, and production 
bonuses may vary from eight to one hundred million US 
dollars. There are no surface rents or royalties, although 
sale of petroleum for national needs is at an 85 per cent 
discount, thus constituting a royalty. The income tax 
rate is 50 per cent, but production sharing is deemed to be 
after tax. There is no income surtax. There is a 40 per 
cent cost oil limit. The government profit oil share is 
between 75 and 85 per cent, based on production levels 
and water depth. 
Participation is negotiable, but is between 10 and 15 
per cent initially with an option of up to 60 per cent of 
each field. Consolidation is uncertain, and prices are 
posted by mutual agreement between the government and 
the investor. The contract currency is the CFA franc, 
although some relief regarding cost recovery has been 
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given due to fluctuations in the exchange rate with US 
dollars. 
Liberia. Liberia has a production sharing—participation 
regime. Signature bonuses and surface rents vary, the 
latter from ten to thirty US dollars per square kilometre, 
increasing progressively during the contract term. The 
royalty varies but is usually 12.5 per cent and the income 
tax rate is 50 per cent; although the government's profit 
oil may be deemed to be after tax. There is neither 
income surtax nor cost oil limit, but profit oil is split on 
a rate of return basis. After the investor achieves a 30 per 
cent before tax or 15 per cent after tax rate of return, the 
government profit oil share is 40 per cent. This share 
increases up to 65 and 80 per cent after the investor 
achieves a 50 per cent before-tax or 25 per cent after-tax 
rate of return, respectively. Participation is up to 30 per 
cent. Consolidation is by contract area, and prices are on 
a realized basis. The contract currency is US dollars. 
Nigeria. Nigeria has a concession—participation regime. 
Signature bonuses are negotiable, and surface rents are 
nominal. Royalty is 12.5 per cent, and the income tax 
rate is 85 per cent. There is no income surtax, or 
production sharing. Participation is generally 60 per 
cent, and consolidation is by field. In the past, prices 
were on a posted basis which exceeded the realized price. 
Prices are now being fixed on a net back basis, based on 
the value of the products produced from the petroleum. A 
tax credit for new capital investment may also be 
allowed, ranging from 5 to 20 per cent depending on the 
investment. The contract currency is the US dollar and 
the local currency, the naira. 
Zaire. Zaire has a concession—participation regime. 
There are generally no bonuses or surface rents, although 
a signature bonus may be negotiable. The Mining and 
Petroleum Code provides, in principle, for a surface rent 
payable to vil lages, al though none has ever been 
imposed. Royalties are negotiable, usually at a rate of 
12.5 per cent, but are omitted under some agreements. 
The income tax rate is negotiable and varies between 45 
to 50 per cent. There is no income surtax and generally, 
no production sharing. Government participation is usu-
ally 20 per cent and is carried, with reimbursement from 
the government's share of production. Consolidation is 
by contract area, and prices are generally on a realized or a 
reference basis. The contract currency is normally US 
dollars. 
O v e r v i e w 
In general, the countries with developed geological 
knowledge, substantial production, and contractual and 
political stability have fiscal terms which result in a high 
percentage of government revenues from petroleum pro-
jects. Nigeria and Angola's fiscal regimes are somewhat 
insensitive to costs and revenues, although Angola gives 
some investor relief by depreciation and the capital cost 
uplift. Nigeria also provides some relief with the tax 
credit and net-back pricing arrangements. 
The fiscal provisions of Gabon and Congo are also 
somewhat inflexible. The Gabonese royalty, production 
sharing, and posted price terms are less attractive than the 
Congolese royalty, participation and pricing arrange-
ments. The fiscal terms of Cameroun are also favourable 
to the government with regard to the tax, pricing, and 
participation, although its lower royalty would be more 
attractive to investors. 
Among the countries with less production and some 
history of contractual dealings, Zaire has attractive roy-
alty, income tax, participation and pricing terms. How-
ever, the Cote d'lvoire terms—with very high bonuses 
and low cost recovery, high government production share 
and potentially high participation—are a substantial de-
terrent to investors. The fiscal provisions of both 
countries are relatively insensitive to economic variables. 
Countries with little if any production, and a short his-
tory of contractual dealings offer the most attractive and 
most sensitive economic terms. The production sharing 
regimes of Equatorial Guinea, Guinea Bissau and Liberia 
guarantee the investor a minimum rate of return. In 
addition, their royalties, bonuses, taxes, participation and 
pricing terms are favourable to the investor. 
C o n c l u s i o n 
All the fiscal provisions of a petroleum agreement must 
be taken as whole to determine the timing and extent of 
revenues to the government and the investor's rate of 
return. The government must make policy choices 
regarding the elements for the fiscal regime. The result, 
regardless of the components, should assure a sufficient 
rate of return to attract the investor while protecting the 
host country. It should also be sufficiently sensitive to 
cost and revenue to permit the economic development of 
the broadest range of fields possible. 
The above comparative survey of petroleum fiscal 
regimes shows that an investor is usually willing to 
accept a less sensitive fiscal structure which provides 
high revenues to the government in areas where geologi-
cal prospects are relatively known and favourable, at least 
in an era of high petroleum prices. Conversely, countries 
with less developed geological information or prospects 
must offer investors a more secure and often greater rate 
of return based on a generally more sensitive fiscal 
regime. Whether investors will continue accepting the 
relative insensitivity of certain fiscal regimes utilized by 
the established petroleum producing countries when 






The United Kingdom 
RICHARD MACRORY 
In troduct ion 
The relationship between agricultural production sys-
tems and natural resource management is an environmen-
tal issue high on the political agenda in the United King-
dom. This issue has raised complex legal, administrative, 
and economic questions. The debate is by no means over, 
and this paper explores, from a legal perspective, some 
mechanisms that have been proposed or adopted to 
provide an acceptable policy base. Alhough about the 
United Kingdom, many of the issues will have wider ap-
plication. 
The debate has shaped government policies and inte-
grated environmental perspectives into all areas of admin-
istration. It has also resulted in regulatory decision-
making—somet imes evoking emotive and irrational 
issues—and using economic incentives for environmental 
management. In this context, two fundamental legal 
questions arise. Is law an effective or appropriate in-
strument for achieving the policy objectives? If so, how 
should the legislation be designed? 
The Context 
The United Kingdom is densely populated. It has an 
average of 358 persons per square kilometre with about 
seventy-five per cent of the land used for agriculture and 
nine per cent for forestry. Less than two per cent of the 
working population is employed in agriculture and 
forestry. About two-thirds of agricultural holdings are 
wholly or mainly owner-occupied. 
Since World War II, food self-sufficiency has been been 
considered strategically important, and government poli-
cies have succeeded in increasing productivity.1 The 
proportion of national food requirements grown domesti-
cally rose from about half in 1960 to two-thirds at pre-
sent. Between 1972 and 1982, the average yield per 
hectare of wheat increased by around forty-six per cent.2 
Membership of the European Economic Community 
(EEC), which Britain joined in 1973, and participation in 
the EEC's Common Agricultural Policy has reinforced 
the increases in production. 
Environmental issues in Britain are often associated 
with problems of urban growth and industrialization (e.g., 
water sanitation, urban sprawl, and smogs caused by 
domestic coal burning). Various legal forms have at -
tempted to control this. The system of controls over new 
developments introduced by the Town and Country Plan-
ning Acts (1971) has been used to regulate removal of 
agricultural land for non-agricultural developments. The 
amount of land removed from agricultural production has 
been reduced to around nine thousand hectares per year 
since 1975, almost one half of the amount removed in the 
previous decade. Protecting agricultural land from in-
dustrial development remains a dominant environmental 
issue affecting rural areas.3 
Agricultural Practice and Landscape Changes 
The effect of intensive agriculture on the landscape is 
critical to the relationship between agriculture and the en-
vironment. It is difficult to know precisely when the 
changes in landscape patterns due to agricultural develop-
ments became of general concern. Marion Shoard's The 
Theft of the Countryside 4—perhaps mirroring the role of 
Rachel Carson's Silent Spring two decades earl ier— 
played a significant role. Since then, there have been a 
range of inquiries, off ic ia l reports, and intensive 
campaigns by non-governmental organizations. 
The Nature Conservancy Council , a government 
agency, has made some dramatic estimates of losses of 
certain types of landscapes and habitats since 1949, 
mainly as a result of agricultural intensification or af-
forestation. These include, 95% of lowland herb-rich hay 
meadows, 30 to 50% of ancient lowland woods, 50 to 
60% of lowland heaths on acidic soils, and 50% of 
lowland fens, valley and fen mires.5 
From an environmental perspective, the rate of change 
that has occurred is significant in two ways. Species 
preservation is intimately bound to habitat protection. 
For example, significant losses of butterfl ies and 
dragonflies have resulted from habitat changes.6 We are 
familiar with using legislation to define and categorize 
types of species to be protected for their rarity or potential 
rarity. Protecting habitats for sustaining such species is 
often a later development, but again recognizable as ap-
propriate for legal control. However, the preservation of 
landscapes for their own sake potentially has more politi-
cal power. 
This concern over loss or change to "traditional" rural 
landscapes springs from deep-seated aesthetic sensibilities 
traceable to the eighteenth century Romantic movement 
and the style and popularity of English landscape paint-
ing.7 Public perceptions on this issue can be seen as the 
British counter-part to the passions aroused in Germany 
over forest damage caused by air pollution. These pas-
sions reflected the importance of forests in German cul-
tural tradition. 
There are two other important features of agriculture in 
Britain in the current policy debate. Little, if any, totally 
uncultivated "wild" land exists in the country. As a re-
sult, Britain's policy on national parks has not been based 
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on large-scale public ownership or acquisition of wilder-
ness, as in many other countries.8 Ten national parks 
currently cover around 9 per cent of England and Wales. 
Land ownership does not change within a declared 
national park. Existing patterns of landuse continue, 
especially agriculture, subject to more stringent controls 
over new developments and greater financial support for 
recreational facilities. 
Secondly, the visual appeal of national parks and other 
rural landscapes has in fact largely depended on agricul-
tural practices. In 1942 the seminal Scott Report9 con-
cluded that countryside patterns would not radically alter 
as a result of changes in agricultural methods. This con-
clusion was supported by the equally important Dower 
Report on National Parks . 1 0 These assumptions about 
agriculture being the guardian of traditional landscapes 
have dominated policy thinking until recently. 
Thus, the highly valued qualities of rural landscape did 
not result f rom natural phenomena but f rom historical 
agricultural practice. The challenge is to devise a system 
of regulating an industry in order to preserve environ-
mental qualities, themselves a product of that industry, 
which are largely aesthetic and not susceptible to scien-
tific analysis. The activities of the industry perceived to 
put these qualities at risk are not examples of bad profes-
sional practice on the periphery which can be identified 
and isolated, but are integral to modern practice, and in-
deed encouraged by government policy. 
The past few years have seen intense national debate 
over how best to resolve these issues. Rather than at-
tempt to analyse the nature of the problems in detail, or 
suggest solutions, I want to draw attention to certain le-
gal issues in the field of public policy. 
TABLE 1 
Protected Land within the U.K.: 
Primary Legal and Non-Legal Designations 
(area in hectares unless shown otherwise) 
England Wales Scotland Northern 
Ireland 
U.K. 
National Parks (sq.km.) 9,500 4,100 N/A N/A N/A 
% land area 7.2 19.7 — — 
NSAs N/A N/A 10,015 N/A N/A 
% land area — — 12.1 — — 
AONBs (sq.km.)a 13,810 680 — 2,595 17,085 
% land area 10.3 3.3 — 18.4 6.0 
NNRs 29,364 9,955 94,321 3,000 136,640 
number 83 32 56 38 171 
SSSIsb 655,091 136,276 570,037 N/A 1,364,404 
number 2,606 435 836 — 3,877 
Areas of Scientific — 
Interest 74,000 
number — — — 47 
Local nature reserves 5,870 880 1,169 66 7,985 
number 49 9 3 5 66 
County trust reserves 22,009 1,628 8,773 320 32,730 
number 108 928 47 9 1,092 
RSPB nature reserves 7,611 18,370 8,191 312 34,484 
number 6 40 26 5 77 
Nature trails (no.) 153 97 98 21 369 
National Trust: 
owned 133,900 29,500 44,450 2,633 210,483 
covenanted 52,300 23,000 6,700 22,400 200 
Country parks 16,413 2,399 2,484 N/A 21,296 
number 130 17 10 7 164 
Picnic sites 981 67 N/A N/A 1,048 
number 166 28 N/A N/A 194 
Long distance routes (km.) 2,528 200 N/A N/A 2,728 
Water resources: 
navigable canals (km.)c 1,596 16 50 N/A 1,602 
navigable rivers (km.)c 432 N/A N/A N/A 432 
Other navigable 
waterways (km.) N/A 1,783 68 96 1,947 
a. Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty. 
b. Sites of Specific Scientific Interest. 
c. Owned by the British Waterways Board. 
Note: These figures are derived from various sources and are based on the latest 
evidence available. 
Source: Conservation and Development Programme for the U.K. (1983). 
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Shaping Government Pol ic ies 
The post-war government policy of encouraging greater 
agricultural productivity has been seen as important in the 
current landscape and habitat loss. The Ministry of 
Agriculture, Fisheries, and Food, established in 1919, has 
been operating the various schemes for financial support 
to agriculture (such as capital grants for farm drainage) 
with too little concern for the environmental effects of its 
policies. The policy priorities for central government 
have traditionally been established by executive discretion 
rather than legislative design (the executive constitution-
ally has a controlling majority of the legislature). How-
ever, during the passage of the Wildlife and Countryside 
(Amendment) Act of 1985, various attempts were made 
by non-governmental sources to introduce a clause requir-
ing the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food to 
take environmental concerns into account in his depart-
ment's decision-making. 
In regard to those functions of the Minister of 
Agriculture, Fisheries, and Food which may affect 
the physical environment the Minister shall, in so 
far as may be consistent with the proper discharge 
of such functions, further the conservation and the 
enhancement of the natural beauty and amenity of 
the countryside. 
The proposed requirement could be regarded as an exten-
sion of the more general and less onerous duty under the 
Countryside Act (1968) which requires all government 
departments "to have regard to the desirability of conserv-
ing the natural beauty and amenity of the countryside" in 
the exercise of any functions relating to land. In both 
cases, the terms are broad enough to suggest they are not 
enforceable legal duties. Rather, they express policy and 
intention with greater commitment to that policy than if 
they were expressed in a more traditional form, such as in 
a White Paper. 
Such a general duty can be made more precise, e.g., it 
was proposed that the priority areas where the general 
approach should be applied should be specified. The pro-
posed clause provided that, without prejudice to its gener-
ality, the duty was to apply in particular to three func-
tions of the minister: 
• formulating and operating capital grant schemes 
• providing advice to farmers 
• implementing EEC obligations concerning the 
common agricultural policy 
These specifications do not threaten the flexibility 
which the generalized duty allows, although they may 
make the chance of judicial review more likely. They 
originally proposed that the minister make an annual 
report to Parliament on how he had exercised his 
conservation duties, providing some yardstick on policy 
advances made in the area. However, by explicitly 
involving a parliamentary role, it would have encouraged 
a non-interventionist approach by the judiciary in the 
inteipretation of the duty. For example, a recent case held 
that where the exercise of a minister's power required the 
approval of Parliament the courts would not review the 
reasonableness of his actions unless he and parliament had 
misconstrued the statute, or he had deceived parliament.11 
The government opposed the proposed duties partly be-
cause they appeared to be cynical about the government's 
efforts towards further integrating environmental and 
agricultural policies. A modified version of the clause 
requir ing the agricultural minis ter to maintain a 
"reasonable balance" between agricultural productivity and 
environmental conservation was proposed. The govern-
ment opposed this too, arguing that imposing such duties 
on an individual government department would represent 
"a dangerous precedent" and threaten the constitutional 
notion of collective responsibility.12 
Explicit legal duties are seldom required of ministers, as 
opposed to public bodies or local authorities. The dis-
tinction between duties and powers (which are far more 
common) is not necessarily clear ( P a d f i e l d v. Min. of 
Agriculture 1968). The main objection to the clause— 
apart f rom not having been proposed by the gov-
ernment-was its interference with the responsibilities and 
boundaries of two government departments (Agriculture 
and Environment). 
Such a clause explicitly recognizes the overlap in many 
areas of government decision-making and rejects the con-
cept of discrete departmental areas of duties and responsi-
bility. However, this recognition may be self-defeating 
since the conventional techniques of legal control over 
administrative discretion (through the definition of powers 
and duties and the doctrine of ultra-vires) is ill-suited to 
this style of decision-making.1 3 During Parliamentary 
debate on the clause, the Minister for Environment 
scorned the notion of the proposal, stating that "it would 
be a good parlour game to invent the statutory duties that 
should be laid on each Department."14 
Debate on the issue continues. The government has 
now announced its intention to table a clause in the cur-
rent agriculture bill requiring the Minister of Agriculture 
to maintain a balance between agriculture, conservation 
and recreation, and economic and social interests of rural 
areas.15 
This vigorous debate raises questions concerning the 
implications of introducing this legal duty into legisla-
tion. Historically, British drafting style has shied away 
from the exhortatory duties found in some jurisdictions, 
but the formulation of broad and unspecific duties appears 
to be on the increase.16 The ambiguity inherent in such 
clauses, particularly in a controversial area, invites parties 
aggrieved at a political interpretation to seek judicial 
intervention and review. This legislative style might be 
we lcomed by those wishing to encourage more 
"purposive" statutory interpretation,17 but increases the 
problems of clearly delineating fora for policy making and 
judicial intervention. 
Perhaps it should now be considered appropriate for 
legislation to incorporate symbolic political or moral du-
ties which can not be legally enforced. In the proposed 
Electricity Bill of 1978, the non-legal nature of such du-
ties was recognized. The bill applied several general du-
ties on a proposed Electricity Corporation, including "to 
promote economy and efficiency in the use of electricity" 
and "to promote industrial democracy in a strong and or-
ganic form in its undertakings." These duties were then 
qualified by a subsection which declared that "nothing in 
this section shall be construed as imposing on the Cor-
poration, directly or indirectly, any form of duty or 
liability enforceable by proceedings before any court." At 
least, this approach clarifies such general duties, but the 
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wisdom of mingling legal and non-legal duties in legisla-
tion in this manner may need reconsideration. 
Formula t ing Aesthet ic Controls 
Much current concern regards protecting landscapes for 
aesthetic reasons. That the formulation and application of 
legal standards or rules that depend on individual taste is 
particularly difficult is arguable.18 
For example, in the development of the common law of 
private nuisance, British courts have long held that the 
concept of nuisance—despite its great flexibility—should 
not be applied to the protection of views. This recog-
nizes that legal standards are inappropriate in this field.19 
Whether controls over development of land under the 
Town and Country Planning Acts should be used to apply 
aesthetic judgements is debatable. Current government 
policy discourages that role for planning: "Planning au-
thorities should recognize that aesthetics is an extremely 
subjective matter. They should not therefore impose their 
tastes on development simply because they believe them 
to be superior." 2 0 Independent appeal tribunals to make 
aesthetic determinations involved in planning decisions, 
were envisaged in the Town and Country Planning Act 
(1971) but the provision was repealed in 1980. 
These arguments against using planning controls as an 
aesthetic tool have mainly been made in the context of 
urban or industrial development. Legal controls depen-
dent on aesthetic judgements appear to have been less 
closely questioned when applied in nature protection or 
rural areas. For instance, Tree Preservation Orders 
(Town and Country Act) have been applied on grounds of 
"amenity". Similarly, the Countryside Commission has 
designated thirty-three areas of "outstanding natural 
beauty". 
In contrast, agricultural developments have rarely been 
subject to planning controls. The change of landuse for 
agricultural purposes (e.g., from grazing to oil-seed pro-
duction) has been expressly excluded from the statutory 
and broadly based definition of "development" in the 
Town and Country Planning Act. Other forms of 
agricultural development such as drainage schemes and 
constructing buildings have been exempted under current 
secondary legislation. 
Extending current planning controls to a wider class of 
agricultural developments has been advocated. The ar-
guments go beyond the need to tighten controls over new 
agricultural buildings. In 1984, the Department of the 
Environment used statutory powers to require an applica-
tion for planning permission for proposed drainage 
operat ions . In the same year , the Count rys ide 
Commission argued that afforestation schemes for bare 
land should be defined as "development", thus requiring 
planning permission, though exemptions should be made 
for schemes of less than 124 acres.2 1 In a political 
climate that has favoured deregulation and loosening 
planning controls, any major extension of the develop-
ment control system is unlikely to be welcomed. 
One of the difficulties in devising legal instruments 
concerning landscapes is finding accepted criteria on 
which to base decisions. Decisions concerning species 
and habitat protection are more firmly rooted in what are 
apparently scientific judgments, and can be expected to 
command public confidence. The Nature Conservancy 
Council (NCC), for example, has the power (under s. 28 
of the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981) to designate 
areas of land which in its opinion are "of special interest" 
by reason of "flora, fauna, or geological or physiographi-
cal features." The words of the section appear sufficiently 
broad (there is no judicial interpretation yet) to encompass 
areas of aesthetic interest. However, the statutory side-
note in the section uses the term "Areas of Special 
Scientific Interest", and the NCC has confined its atten-
tion to the designation of areas on nature conservation 
grounds. 
The NCC has been viewed as having a scientific role, 
one reason why the legislation provides no grounds of 
appeal to a third party by a landowner whose land is so 
designated: "...the decision to notify is essentially a sci-
entific one which should be protected from external pres-
sure."2 2 It is not clear how many decisions truly rest on 
a scientific judgment even in this narrowly interpreted 
field of nature conservation. The distance from scientific 
decision-making is all the greater when it comes to de-
termining which landscapes should be preserved or subject 
to special legal protection. The government is currently 
considering introducing a new power to make "landscape 
conservation orders" (LCOs). 2 3 Its scope, decision-
making procedure, and implications are not yet known, 
and a consultation paper is expected in 1986. 
If it is not possible to devise scientific or other criteria 
to guide the administrator and gain general consensus, 
then legislation must incorporate other methods to legit-
imize decision-making. Three possible methods which 
may be used in combination are: decision-making proce-
dures, decision-making bodies, and incentives for accep-
tance of decisions. 
In the first method, legislation elaborates the procedure 
for decision-making rather than the criteria that influence 
the decisions. One method is to ensure that decision-
making incorporates some public participation and an ad-
judicatory forum, such as the public inquiry involved in 
the designation of an "area of outstanding natural beauty" 
(AONB). However, the five-week public inquiry held in 
1985 concerning the Countryside Commission's designa-
tion of the North Pennines as an AONB demonstrates the 
administrative costs involved in such an exercise, and the 
difficulties of containing arguments. "Although the in-
quiry's terms of reference were based on the landscape 
merit of the area, most of the objectors introduced eco-
nomic and development arguments against designation."24 
The second method relies upon the nature of the deci-
sion-making institution to secure legitimacy. For exam-
ple, the power to determine may be delegated to locally-
elected authorities. These may rely—where controversial 
decision-making is involved—upon elected representation 
and local accountability to counteract a lack of consensus 
on the principles involved. This is the current position 
with Tree Preservation Orders "in the interests of 
amenity," where the powers rest with local authorities, 
but with a right of appeal to central government. In a 
new area, central government may wish to take initial 
responsibility, delegating to other levels of government 
once familiarity and experience is gained. 
In the final method, incentives—usually financial—are 
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provided to those who might otherwise be aggrieved at or 
resist decision-making. These financial incentives raise a 
number of questions which will be discussed in the next 
section. Such schemes can be readily devised to encour-
age acceptance of a positive determination by owner or 
occupier of land designated for landscape conservation. 
They do not, however, assist those who feel aggrieved at 
a decision not to so designate—who may be a majority. 
Economic Incentives: A Basis for 
Environmenta l M a n a g e m e n t 
Introducing legal measures which inhibit or restrict 
landowners' freedom to exploit their land as they wish 
(such as the proposed Landscape Conservation Order) 
raises the question of the role of the financial incentives. 
A general constitutional right in Britain against the 
taking of property rights without fair compensation does 
not exist. Entitlement to compensation is dependent on 
individual statutory provisions. Thus, the policy-maker 
may pragmatically determine both the merits or otherwise 
of incorporating provisions for financial compensation in 
any particular scheme, and the basis for such compensa-
tion if so introduced. 
The national landuse planning controls introduced by 
the Town and Country Planning Act (1947) incorporated 
the general principle that individual owners or occupiers 
would not be financially compensated by the state for 
planning restrictions on their land. Some exceptions ex-
ist, particularly for restrictions imposed upon existing 
uses of land. The basic philosophy has, however, held 
true, and market values in land have adjusted accordingly. 
The agricultural activities now being debated have largely 
remained unregulated by planning controls. New legisla-
tive control measures to cover previously unregulated 
activities have thus permitted a fresh appraisal of using 
fiscal measures in these areas. 
The measures introduced by the Wildlife and Country-
side Act (1981), which largely concerned National Parks 
and Sites of Special Scientific Interest, rested on the vol-
untary approach to conservation. The Act allowed for 
regulatory agencies (mainly the Nature Conservancy 
Council) to impose temporary restrictions on potentially 
damaging operations. During this time, management 
agreements could be negotiated to compensate the owner 
or occupier of the land for being deprived of potential 
profits. If no such agreement is reached, enforced com-
pensation could be achieved by compulsory purchase of 
the land. 
Compensation arrangements would be incorporated into 
a scheme for environmental management for the follow-
ing reasons: 
• Fairness. Ethical reasons are related to compensa-
tion for removing property rights (largely denied 
under the system for planning restrictions), the 
novelty of the proposed restricted area, or that the 
need for imposing restrictions upon a particular 
landowner is due to the activities of others. The 
penalty for not improving or changing one's land is 
to impose a potential scarcity value on it which is 
not currently reflected in market land values. 
Expectations of equal treatment are also held by 
other land users—for example, industries—who re-
ceive no compensation for restricted development of 
their land. 
• Legitimacy of decision-making. Financial incen-
tives may be a tool to secure legitimacy or accep-
tance of decision-making where its rationale is based 
on criteria not subject to scientific analysis or not 
generally supported. 
• Functional efficiency. Whatever the philosophical 
justifications for compensation, it may be decided 
that fiscal measures will best achieve the policy 
aims of the legislation, rather than regulatory con-
trol. 
• Resource base and extent of application. Available 
public funding and the likely scope of application of 
the controls determines the effectiveness of financial 
incentives. Pre-World War II planning controls in 
the United Kingdom—based on compensat ion 
provisions—were largely paralysed by inadequate 
provis ions . 2 5 The Nature Conservancy Council 's 
budget for negotiating financial agreements concern-
ing Sites of Special Scientific Interest, operating in 
a specialized area, had to be increased four-fold from 
1979 to 1987, to take into account the rising costs 
of such arrangements. Local authorities, who have 
discretionary powers to arrange management agree-
ments with landowners, are reluctant to use them 
because of the resource implications. 
• Effect on discretionary regulation. Where voluntary 
compensatory measures are used, their effect on the 
activities with which the legislation is concerned 
should be considered. Do they encourage farmers to 
propose development schemes in order to receive 
compensation? How far does a limited budget in-
hibit the regulatory agency from establishing satis-
factory control measures? What are the implications 
of the negotiation tactics employed in the process? 
In the last forty years land prices have had to adjust to 
the absence of compensation for planning restrictions 
under the Town and Country Planning Act. Similarly, 
where particular buildings of historical or architectural 
interest receive special protection (further controlling the 
owner's use) because of their scarcity value, market values 
adjust accordingly, without the need for compensation. 
Currently, the environmental qualities of rural landscapes 
are not yet reflected in the marketplace. Until that hap-
pens, some form of fiscal measures are likely to continue 
playing a part in a regulatory system concerned with pre-
serving those qualities. 
It is difficult to formulate a basis for determining com-
pensation seen to be equitable by both the person suffer-
ing restrictions and by the general public (who pay for the 
compensation). Should this be based on the potential 
value of the land as developed? Given that much gov-
ernment support in capital investment (such as land 
drainage and price support for products) has long been 
available, should amounts awarded take this into account? 
This has formed the basis of compensation calculation 
under management agreements under the Wildlife and 
Countryside Act (1981), and given rise to bitter contro-
versy. 
A preferable approach may be to examine and modify 
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the fundamental market mechanisms that determine the 
nature of agricultural development. Such examination is 
emerging in the British and EEC agricultural policies. 
This shift in approach raises complex questions, not least 
because of the supra-national arrangements involved in 
the agricultural market mechanisms. Nevertheless, the 
design and operation of effective legislation in this area 
will increasingly demand analysis of such issues, however 
difficult. 
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Chapter 2 
PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE LAW 
A Case Study of Kenya 
% 
BONDI D . OGOLLA 
Introduct ion 
This paper examines the link between law and public 
health and the legislative framework for public health 
administration in Kenya. The health of the population is 
closely linked to a nation's economic and social develop-
ment.1 Labour is basic for economic transformation, and 
the availability and productivity of labour depends, in 
turn, on the health of the work force. Thus the quality of 
capital goods and the development of a country's natural 
resources all ultimately depend on the health of the pop-
ulation.2 In addition, development of natural resources 
may be impeded due to public health problems, such as 
disease, in areas otherwise suitable for settlement. 
The primary objective of development is to enhance the 
quality of life.3 Ultimately, development denotes suffi-
cient food, basic health care, clean water, shelter and edu-
cation for all. Socio-economic development thus requires 
promoting public health, i.e., providing sanitary condi-
tions and preventing and curing disease.4 
Law and Public Health 
Understanding the sources of health problems is neces-
sary to formulate laws which will promote public health. 
Morbidity and mortality in developing countries result 
f rom poor sanitation and the concomitant communicable 
diseases . 5 These conditions are caused by inadequate 
water supplies (both in quality and quantity), poor or 
non-existent waste disposal systems, abundant insect and 
animal disease vectors, and insufficient health education. 
A secondary source of health hazards is the very process 
of socio-economic transformation, such as the importa-
tion of industrial and agricultural technologies which 
have a negative impact on human health and the envi-
ronment. 
This implies that poor health in the developing coun-
tries arises out of their grinding poverty, a hostile physi-
cal environment and certain social and economic activi-
ties. Measures to improve public health should therefore 
include: 
• eliminating environmental health hazards 
• suppressing, controlling and preventing communi-
cable diseases 
• providing health education 
• providing medical services and adequate health 
facilities for early diagnosis and treatment of disease 
• providing the public with standards of living ade-
quate to maintain good health. 
Some of these measures entail t ransforming and 
regulating social behaviour. For instance, diseases such 
as typhoid, dysentery and cholera which arise from food, 
water and soil contaminated with human and industrial 
waste could be avoided if public health measures were 
strictly adhered to. Proper food sanitation standards 
should be enforced during processing and sale, as should 
water quality and effluent discharge standards. Adequate 
waste disposal facilities should be constructed. 
Law is a coercive instrument for regulating social 
behaviour.6 The compulsion inherent in the legal norm 
enables law to achieve broad social goals. In public 
health, law translates public health objectives into spe-
cific enforceable norms. The state defines to the public 
the standards necessary to maintain and promote health, 
and compels their observance. It also arms public offi-
cials with basic guidelines for promoting public hfealth. 
In this way the law articulates public health policies and 
programs, and defines the necessary standards of social 
behaviour. 
Public health measures may interfere with private 
property and personal liberty. For instance, suppressing 
and controlling communicable diseases may require iso-
lation and quarantine of the infected person. Controlling 
and eliminating environmental health hazards—polluted 
water supplies, improperly planned settlements, inade-
quate waste disposal—may violate certain private prop-
erty rights. The state empowers the police to restrain 
citizens or limit their property rights to maintain public 
safety, morals, health and order. 
Kenya's Constitution provides that qualifying personal 
liberty and private property rights in the interest of public 
health shall not constitute a violation of the constitu-
tional guarantee of those rights.7 Thus, before action in 
the public interest is undertaken, the extent to which per-
sonal liberty and property rights may be compromised in 
the interests of public health must be defined. Subse-
quently, the appropriate health agencies may be given the 
power to act. In this way, the law confers both legiti-
macy and jurisdiction 
The Legislat ive Framework 
There are several statutes in Kenya which provide the 
framework for public health administration. The primary 
statute is the Public Health Act (Cap. 242, The Laws of 
Kenya). Its provisions, rules and regulations form the 
basis of this discussion. Other important statutes also 
examined include the Local Government Act (Cap. 265), 
Food, Drugs and Chemical Substances Act (Cap. 254), 
Land Planning Act (Cap. 303), Water Act (Cap. 372), 
Factories Act (Cap. 514), and Pest Control Products 
Act (Act. no. 4 of 1982). 
Institutional Framework 
The Public Health Act has established two kinds of 
health authorities: Municipal Councils, and the Ministry 
for Health. The ministry covers all areas under section 2 
of the act other than municipalities. Their primary 
duties under the act include taking measures to prevent 
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and contain the outbreak or prevalence of an infectious 
disease, promoting public health, and exercising the 
powers and performing the duties conferred by the act or 
any other law. 
Local authorities have broad powers to deal with mat-
ters affecting public health (although only municipalities 
are health authorities within the meaning of the Public 
Health Act). Under the Public Health Act (ss. 116, 126, 
129 and 135) and the Local Government Act (ss. 160-176 
and 178-180) local authorities are required to prevent and 
suppress statutory nuisances within their districts, ensure 
proper sanitation of food during processing and sale, 
establish and maintain cemeteries, mortuaries and crema-
toria, regulate the conveyance and disposal of dead bodies, 
establish and maintain sanitary services, and establish, 
acquire and maintain works to supply water within their 
areas. They may also make by-laws to enforce public 
health requirements under the Local Government Act. 
The Public Health Act (section 3) also established a 
Central Board of Health and a Medical Department. The 
board consis ts of the director of medical services 
(chairman), a sanitary engineer, a secretary and six other 
persons appointed by the minister, three of whom must 
be medical practitioners. The board advises the minister 
on all matters concerning public health. The medical 
department , under the director of medical services, is 
responsible for preventing the introduction of infectious 
diseases into Kenya, advising and directing local authori-
ties on health matters, and promoting and implementing 
research on preventing and treating human diseases. 
Other public health institutions are the Public Health 
(Standards) Board, established under the Food, Drugs and 
Chemical Substances Act, and the Pest Control Products 
Board, established by the Pest Control Products Act. The 
Food, Drugs and Chemical Substances Act regulates 
importation, manufacture and sale of food, drugs and 
chemicals. Under ss.27 and 28, the board advises the 
minister for health on formulating regulations and stan-
dards for protecting the consumer. The Pest Control 
Products Act controls the importation and use of pesti-
cides, while its board ensures that pesticide importation 
and use does not create an "unacceptable risk or harm to 
public health, plants, animals or the environment'.' 8 
Normative Structure 
Public health administration's normative structure is 
analysed here in the context of communicable diseases, 
environmental sanitation and industrial and agricultural 
technology transfer. 
Communicable diseases 
The high incidence of infectious diseases in Kenya is 
illustrated in Ministry of Health data.9 Infectious and 
parasitic diseases accounted for thirty per cent of reported 
mortality cases in 1977, and sixty-eight per cent of the 
overall diseases incidence in 1980. The five major causes 
of mortality and morbidity are malaria, acute respiratory 
infections, skin diseases, diarrhoea and intestinal worms. 
In 1980, 16.8 million cases were reported for these dis-
eases alone, a case rate of 113,389 per 100,000 popula-
t ion . 1 0 It is clear that appropriate measures should be 
designed to control these diseases. 
Four basic legal mechanisms to control and suppress 
infect ious diseases exist: notif icat ion to the relevant 
health authorit ies when cases are detected; isolation, 
detention and quarantine of infected persons, ships and 
other vessels; entry, inspection and destruction of infected 
premises and property; and legal coercion of infected per-
sons and their relatives to get treatment. 
The Public Health Act declares smal lpox, cholera, 
plague, typhoid, leprosy, anthrax, sleeping sickness and 
tuberculosis to be notifiable infectious diseases. The act 
compels family members and the attending doctor of an 
infected person to notify the relevant health authority of 
the case. The attending doctor must also inform those in 
daily contact with the patient of the nature of the disease 
and the precautions necessary to avoid infection. 
Once notified, health authorities may inspect premises 
and examine persons therein, ensure that the premises are 
cleansed and disinfected, and destroy any infected clothing, 
bedding, building or other article. They may remove 
infected persons to a hospital, and, on the orders of a 
magistrate, isolate and detain any person who has been 
exposed to infection. The act prohibits exposing infected 
persons and articles, leasing infected premises , ' and 
requires that public conveyances which have been used by 
infected persons be disinfected. 
Special provisions to deal with formidable epidemic, 
endemic or infectious diseases exist.1 1 The act provides 
that whenever any part of Kenya is threatened by any 
such disease, the minister may make rules providing for, 
among other things, the speedy interment of the dead, 
sealing off the infected area, compulsory examination, 
disinfection, inoculation and vaccination of persons in-
tending to leave the area, disinfection or destruction of 
buildings, furniture and articles which have been used by 
infected persons, and the establ ishment of hospitals, 
observation camps and stations and placing infected per-
sons therein. Medical health off icers are required to 
promptly notify the director of medical services of any 
outbreaks of such diseases. The director may requisition 
buildings, equipment, drugs, food and any other private 
property where necessary for dealing with the outbreak. 
Smallpox, leprosy and venereal diseases have also re-
ceived special attention, probably because of the social 
s t igma attached to t h e m . 1 2 The Public Health Act 
requires (with penalties for non-compliance) infected per-
sons to submit themselves to treatment and for those in 
charge of such persons to arrange medical treatment for 
them. Health authorities can compel infected persons to 
secure treatment, detain persons in hospitals, forcibly 
examine the inhabitants of an infected area, establish 
leper asylums and intern patients therein, cleanse and dis-
infect residences of infected persons, and vaccinate chil-
dren and threatened populations against smallpox. 
The foregoing provisions deal with communicable dis-
ease occurring within Kenya. It is also imperative to 
guard against such diseases being introduced into Kenya 
f rom foreign territories. In this respect, the Public 
Health Act (Part VI) confers wide powers on health 
authorities regarding admitting vessels into ports, exam-
ining their passengers, isolating and treating infected 
passengers and removing vessels. 
In addition, the minister may regulate, restrict or pro-
hibit entry into Kenya, and restrict importation of ani-
mals and articles. The minister may impose conditions 
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regarding medical examination, detention, quarantine, 
disinfection, vaccination or isolation of persons entering 
the country from foreign territories, if such measures are 
necessary to prevent the introduction of infectious dis-
eases into Kenya. The minister may also negotiate with 
other governments on reciprocal notification of outbreaks 
of formidable epidemics and endemic or infectious dis-
eases. 
Law is not the only critical factor in preventing, sup-
press ing and cont ro l l ing c o m m u n i c a b l e d i seases . 
Effect ive control will ultimately depend on the people's 
standard of living, the adequacy and accessibility of health 
facilities and medical services, and the quality of health 
education. 
En viro n m ental sail itation 
Environmental sanitation measures are designed to 
eliminate any external physical, chemical, biological and 
social influences which affect a people's health. Com-
plete elimination of environmental health hazards ulti-
mately depends on achieving a standard of living adequate 
to maintain health, i.e., eradicating poverty.1 3 In the in-
terim, large-scale preventative measures can be adopted. 
Under the existing legislation, the primary means of 
control is to formulate and enforce appropriate environ-
mental health standards. This part of this paper will fo-
cus on human settlements, water and air pollution and 
food sanitation. 
Human Settlement. Landuse regulation and properly 
planned set t lements are necessary to p romote public 
health. In common law, landuse is unrestricted only so 
long as it does not injure another person or his property. 
If an individual's use of his property threatens or succeeds 
in harming a neighbour, this constitutes a nuisance and 
the law provides an appropriate remedy. 1 4 The Public 
Health Act (sec. 118) defines statutory nuisances to enable 
enforcement of environmental health. 
Owners and occupiers of land and premises have a duty 
to ensure that such land or premises are free from danger-
ous nuisances. Health authorities can enter land or 
premises, remove nuisances and recover expenses from 
authors of the nuisances and owners or occupiers of the 
property. The authorities may apply to the courts for 
orders to close premises, factories, businesses and work-
shops which are sources of danger to health. They may 
also take legal action against the authors, owners and 
occupiers. 
Under section 116 of the act, local authorities have a 
duty to maintain cleanliness and sanitary conditions in 
their districts and prevent nuisances which are health haz-
ards. However, one of the most common complaints by 
personnel of the Medical Depar tment is that local 
authorities are unable to meet the demands of this provi-
s ion . 1 5 This is attributed to lack of personnel and ser-
viceable equipment. One visible result is the refuse and 
waste matter which litters most local authorities' dis-
tricts, posing a serious health hazard. 
T h e min i s t e r of hea l th may m a k e rules for 
environmental sanitation and require local authorities to 
enforce them. Such rules may relate to: inspecting land, 
trade premises and factories; building construction; land, 
building and street drainage; refuse, waste matter and 
offensive liquids disposal,and many other matters. The 
Public Health (Drainage and Latrine) Rules made under 
this provision empower local authorities to provide for 
and regulate drainage and sewerage within their districts.16 
The Development and Use of Land (Planning) Regula-
t ions , 1 7 made under the Land Planning Act, give local 
authorit ies (as interim planning authorit ies) and the 
Department of Physical Planning (the central authority) 
power of town planning in their jurisdictions. All devel-
opments are required to take place within the framework 
of the relevant plans in order to ensure proper planning 
and development of human settlements. 
Local authorities can make by-laws specifying sanita-
tion and building standards to be observed by develop-
ers,1 8 to ensure (at least in the urban areas) a human set-
tlement environment conducive to health. Previously, 
landuse in towns has varied considerably f rom the 
approved town p lans . 1 9 As of 1979, approximately 
thirty-five per cent of all urban households existed in 
squatter settlements and s lums. 2 0 Such settlements are 
characterized by miserable shelter and lack of basic 
infrastructure—clean water, sewerage and drainage sys-
tems and adequate waste disposal facilities. Thus epi-
demics are likely to be frequent. 
People in rural areas are no better off, and the problems 
are even more intractable. Waste disposal systems are 
non-existent, water is scarce and of poor quality, and 
shelter is miserable.2 1 The implications for the health of 
the rural population are obvious. 
Control of water and air pollution. Approximate ly 
eighty-five per cent of Kenya's rural population depends 
exclusively on rivers and lakes for water , 2 2 and is thus 
highly susceptible to water-borne diseases. These water 
sources should therefore be protected f rom pollutants. 
Many industries in the country abstract water from rivers 
and lakes while sewage works and factories discharge their 
effluent into these sources. 
In addition, various agricultural chemicals have been 
imported into Kenya and used to improve agricultural 
yields. Apart from the direct hazard to the user who is 
exposed to the substance, there is the danger of residues 
on food and in water intended for human consumption, 
and the negative impact on the environment. To control 
this pollution, we must formula te ambient (quality) 
standards and constantly monitor the levels of toxic sub-
stances in the nation's waters. 
The Health Authorities and the Water Apportionment 
Board (WAB)—established under the Water Act—share 
the responsibility for preventing and controlling water 
pollution. The Water Act requires an applicant for a 
water abstraction permit to indicate the industrial process 
in which the water is to be used, the characteristics of the 
anticipated water wastes, the proposed waste disposal 
methods, the potential to pollute water and the steps to 
be taken to avoid such pollution.2 3 
In approving the application, the WAB may require that 
additional measures be taken to avoid or remove potential 
pollution. The Water (General) Rules 2 4 specify the con-
ditions, and make provisions for the W A B to formulate 
standards for effluent and waste-water discharge into a 
body of water (Rules 71-80). The W A B formulates 
effluent discharge standards for each industrial undertaking 
and makes them part of the license condit ions when 
abstraction applications are approved. Failure to comply 
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with the relevant conditions may lead the W A B to cancel 
the license (s.49, Water Act), which is rarely done since 
it entails closing down the offending industrial works. 
These provisions are reinforced by the Public Health 
Act which regulates the discharge of waste water and 
noxious matter into water supplies meant for human 
consumpt ion or domest ic use. Local authorit ies are 
enjoined to take all lawful , necessary and reasonably 
practicable measures to prevent the pollution of water 
supplies within their districts, and to purify polluted 
water and prosecute offenders (s.129). However, both the 
W A B and the health authorities have been unable to 
secure adequate control of all pollution sources. 
Although the relevant agencies claim to use the World 
Health Organisation ambient standards, there is very little 
moni tor ing of water resource qua l i ty . 2 5 Pollution 
problems are handled on an ad hoc basis, despite the wide 
powers conferred on enforcement agencies not only to 
enter premises to investigate infringements of the law, 
but also to revoke licenses, close down works and prose-
cute offenders . Thus, the regular outbreaks of water-
borne diseases in areas where people rely on natural 
sources of water for domestic consumption is not sur-
prising. 
Air pollution is supposedly a relatively minor problem 
in developing countries.2 6 Increasing urbanization and 
industr ial izat ion, however , come hand in hand with 
atmospheric degradation. Dust, fumes, gases and partic-
ulates f rom industrial activities and vehicular t raff ic 
characterize the atmosphere of major towns in Kenya. 
This may have a debilitating impact on human health. 
At present, there is very little monitoring of atmospheric 
pollution in these towns. At the regulatory level the 
Public Health Act (s. 118) and the Traffic Act 2 7 lay down 
a statutory machinery that makes no provision for emis-
sion standards,making implementation difficult and in-
effectual. 
The working environment is another area of concern. 
In numerous industries, workers must handle hazardous 
and toxic chemicals and work with processes involving 
chemical reactions in which toxic or hazardous substances 
are created. Major hazards arise from fumes, dusts, mists, 
vapours and solvents. However, the risk to a worker's 
health depends on the magnitude and duration of expo-
sure—there are certain levels of exposure which entail no 
s ignif icant threat to hea l th . 2 8 In this case, the most 
effective method of control and regulation should be to 
defin acceptable levels of contact for each substance 
(e.g., maximum allowable concentration).2 9 
The Factories Act contains the legal f ramework for 
controlling and eliminating occupational health hazards. 
The act does not define permissible levels of toxins in the 
workplace, but requires that employers provide protective 
equipment to workers and install appropriate ventilation 
equipment to prevent the accumulation of dust, fumes, 
gases or smoke in the workroom (s.51). Appropriate 
standards and constant monitoring to determine the extent 
of hazardous mater ia ls present within the working 
environment are urgently needed. 
Food sanitation. In the interest of public health, society 
should exercise some control over production and han-
dling of food. Also, public health officials should have 
some power to monitor food contamination and take 
appropriate measures to protect the health of the popula-
tion. Both the Public Health Act and the Food, Drugs 
and Chemical Substances Act provide a legal regime for 
securing proper and adequate food sanitation. The Public 
Health Act prohibits collection, preparation, manufacture, 
keeping, transmitt ing or exposing for sale any food 
without taking adequate measures to guard against or pre-
vent any infection or contamination (s.131). Health 
authorities can enter, inspect, seize and examine samples 
of food suspected to be unwholesome (ss. 132-133). 
The Minister for Health is empowered to make rules 
regarding the inspection of animals intended for human 
consumption, dairies, milkshops, s laughterhouses and 
other food processing plants, stores and shops. The 
minister may also regulate the taking and examination of 
food samples, seizure, destruction or disposal of food-
stuffs which may endanger health, standards of sanitation 
in relation to the sale or exposure of foodstuffs, prescrib-
ing standards of composition, strength and quality of var-
ious foods, and make rules to prevent adulteration, mis-
branding or misdescription of food intended for sale or 
export (s.134). 
The Food, Drugs and Chemical Substances Act has 
established the Public Health (Standards) Board to advise 
the minister on some of these matters. The minister has 
made three sets of regulations under this act: 
1. The Food, Drugs and Chemical Substances (General) 
Regulations3 0 provide for: 
• proper labeling of foods, drugs and chemical sub-
stances 
• procedures for the taking of samples and their 
analysis 
• control of food, drug and chemical substances 
importation 
2. The Food, Drugs and Chemical Substances (Food 
Hygiene) Regulations31 provide for: 
• licensing of food premises 
• construction, layout and sanitation of food plants 
and facilities 
• health measures to be taken by food handlers 
3. The Food, Drugs and Chemical Substances (Food 
Labeling, Additives and Standards) Regula t ion 3 2 have 
detailed requirements and standards regarding: 
• quality and composition 
• packaging 
• labeling 
The legal regime in Kenya adequately protects the pub-
lic f rom health hazards associated with food supplies. 
Heal th authorit ies regularly inspect food processing 
plants, serving premises and markets. They also take and 
examine food samples to monitor contaminat ion, and 
prosecute those who contravene the relevant regulations. 
However, the shortage of qualified public health officers 
and technicians makes it impossible for health authorities 
to secure control over all foods and foodstuffs offered to 
the consumer. 3 3 The enforcement of the relevant regula-
tions is therefore confined to the urban areas and major 
country markets. 
Transfer of technology. The quest for economic trans-
formation in the Third World has increased the number of 
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development projects and programmes and brought a 
massive infusion of industrial and agricultural technology 
from the industrialized countries. The precise impact of 
these developments on Third World ecosystems and pub-
lic health has not been appreciated by most of the recipi-
ent countries: 
Little concern had ever been given to anticipating 
ecological costs and side-effects, to say nothing of 
having such factors serve as inputs in decision-
making in development projects. In example after 
example, we found that [a wide variety of pro-
grams] were being promoted throughout the world 
with little or no attention to their environmental 
consequences. 
Industrial production generates deleterious by-products 
with direct and long-term impacts on public health and 
the environment. As noted earlier, agricultural chemicals 
used to increase food production are not only a direct 
hazard to the user but also pose a hazard to the general 
public health due to residues in food and water, and to the 
entire ecosystem.35 
The only effective method of dealing with these dangers 
inherent in international exchanges in industrial and agri-
cultural technology is to anticipate and pre-empt them. 
Environmental impact assessment has become the pre-
dominant tool for anticipating and pre-empting the 
adverse consequences of the development process.36 The 
environmental impact assessment mechanism ensures 
that social and ecological costs and other side-effects of 
development programs are considered. 
The Kenya Government recognizes the crucial role of 
environmental impact assessment in rational development 
planning.3 7 To date, no composite law laying down the 
procedure and substance of the mechanism has been 
passed. However, there are rudimentary legal frameworks 
in several sectors. Two examples, with a public health 
orientation, follow: 
Water Act. Under the Water Act, an applicant for an 
abstraction permit has to indicate the industrial process in 
which the water is to be used, the characteristics of water 
wastes to be expected, the proposed methods for the dis-
posal of such wastes, its potential to cause water pollu-
tion, and the steps to be taken to avoid such pollution. 
In approving the application, the Water Apportionment 
Board may impose conditions in the permit to pre-empt 
pollution. 
Pest Control Products Act. Under the Pest Control 
Products Act, the Pest Control Products Board which 
licenses the importation and sale of pest control products 
has the power to refuse to register a product if it believes 
that the product poses unacceptable risk or harm to public 
health, plants, animals or the environment. 
These legislative instruments are restricted to matters 
falling within their sectoral jurisdictions. Hence they do 
not conceptualize the problems of the impact of the 
development process on the ecosystem as a whole, nor 
give a comprehensive strategy for dealing with them. 
There is also a notable absence of clear guidelines. Given 
the wide discretionary powers provided under the law, the 
desire to attract investment and increase production may 
override ecological and public health considerations. 
The impact assessment process is administered across 
sector by the New Projects Committee of the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry in collaborat ion with the 
National Environment Secretariat. There is no legal 
basis for this process, and its impact on development 
planning is probably very limited. In any case, the 
emphasis has been on using economic criteria to evaluate 
applications for new projects. Ecological and public 
health considerations do not go beyond a perfunctory 
concern over the potential impact on air and water qual-
ity.38 The need for a legislative framework for a cross-
sectoral environmental impact assessment mechanism 
with mandatory incorporation of the ecological and social 
dimension in development planning, cannot be over-
emphasized. 
C o n c l u s i o n 
This brief survey reveals that there is a formidable array 
of legal rules and regulations designed to promote public 
health and facilitate efficient public health administration. 
It also reveals major gaps in the legislative framework in 
certain critical areas. However, institutions have been 
created and conferred with wide powers to implement and 
enforce measures necessary for the promotion and 
maintenance of good health. Norms have been enacted to 
define acceptable standards of social conduct. Through 
legal compulsion they have sought to mould behaviour 
along patterns that enhance public health. 
The recurrent health problems in Kenya cannot be 
explained only on the basis of deficiencies in the legal 
regime. There is a remarkable lack of effective enforce-
ment of the existing normative structure. In addition, 
health problems arise out of circumstances for which 
legal regulation and prohibition are hardly the cure. 
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Chapter 2 
A THEORY ABOUT POPULATION 
IN EGYPT 
SOAD EL SHARKAWY 
In troduct ion 
The population in Egypt increased by around one mil-
lion people in nine months, an average annual growth 
rate of over three per cent. This announcement by the 
Egyptian Central Agency for Statistics and Mobilisation 
testifies to the failure of family planning in Egypt, de-
spite the millions of pounds the government spends on 
the Family Planning Agency. Clearly, the population 
explosion in Egypt can not be solved by the propaganda, 
songs, orders or pronouncements used by the government 
to date. 
The population explosion in Egypt is a deep-rooted 
problem, aggravated by complex social, economic and 
legal situations. The government spends large sums to 
limit population growth whi l e at the same time spending 
like sums which stimulate population increase. Thus, for 
the family planning policy to yield tangible results, the 
causes of the problem need to be determined. 
An integrated theory should be formulated in order to 
solve a problem which has appeared baffling and beyond 
remedy. 
The Theory and its Advantages 
This theory on population attempts to establish a link 
between changing elements and to find a general formula 
to explain some of the natural and social manifestations. 
Validity of theories in natural sciences can be verified 
through laboratory experiments. However, it is difficult 
and often impossible to do so in the social sciences. 
Thus, in the social sciences, the proponents of theories 
rely on citing examples from the past by way of illustra-
tion, using geographical evidence and statistics collected 
to reveal the validity of the theory. 
Soefial theories constitute a basic reference to which we 
resort to explain faults, disorders and ambiguity. They 
are a manifestat ion of civilization, which may be 
described as "a constant struggle against fear." Social 
phenomena are of ten wrapped in mystery no less 
ambiguous than natural phenomena, leaving us anxious 
and fearful about tomorrow. Theories relieve us by 
clarifying some confusion and giving us a source of 
reference and criteria for predicting the future. 
However, if social theories did not go beyond explain-
ing the relationship between changing elements, they 
would be explanatory, static and passive. Social theories 
can be constructive and useful if they remedy situations or 
liberate man from powers to which he has succumbed. 
Man could use social theories to overcome problems that 
still appear difficult to solve, in the same way that the 
law of gravity was discovered and exploited to invent 
rockets and aircraft. Such problems include wars, hunger 
and population increase (specifically in the more backward 
and poorer societies). 
The Proper Arrangement of Society 
The question is whether we need to limit population 
growth in our country now. Since we desire to improve 
the individual standard of living we should limit procre-
ation to stabilize the population size. To achieve this, 
the rate of economic development must be much higher 
than the rate of population growth. Although no accurate 
data is available on the rate of actual economic develop-
ment, we can safely assume that this rate is less than that 
of population growth. Hence, population increase must 
be controlled if we intend to enhance the living standard 
of the individual. 
A controlled population growth rate requires much effort 
sustained over time, after which the population will be 
stabilized for decades. This entails accepting the current 
standard of living throughout these years. However, the 
rate of development will be reversed should population 
grow at a higher rate than the increase of production. 
Three main factors promote the upsurge of population: 
economic, social and legal. 
The Economic Factor 
The best policy to promote childbearing is to subsidize 
essential commodities and services. Subsidizing staple 
commodities and essential services is related to popula-
tion increase. Thus the state spends millions of pounds 
and hard currencies to encourage childbearing, as well as 
on family planning. 
In the advanced countries which experience a fall in the 
birth rate, childbearing is boosted by granting economic 
assistance to families which beget the third child, and a 
higher premium for the fourth child and so on. Egypt 
offers unlimited inducement assistance in kind to each 
family that procreates. Such assistance involves price 
support for processed baby foods and milk, subsidies for 
antibiotics that reduce infant mortality, bread subsidies 
and free education in all stages to any number of children, 
and subsidized energy and water. 
These subsidies promote unlimited childbearing since 
individuals come up against no obstacles or limits to 
make them consider the material cost involved before 
begetting a baby. 
Rationalizing subsidies is unworkable. Subsidizing sta-
ple commodities and essential services has forced heavy 
economic burdens and loans on the state from abroad . 
These financial obligations endanger the country's future 
and the coming generations, compelling us to look for a 
solution. 
The solution can not be found in proclaiming the 
necessity of rationalizing the subsidies, as such guidance 
is inconsistent with subsidizing. Rationalization here 
means restoring logic and discernment to the citizen when 
he consumes any commodity. As long as the commodity 
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is sold below its real price, no individual will think of 
saving 'the cost. Because it is a symbolic price, it will 
neither add nor diminish anything from the consumer's 
budget or standard of living. 
The only course of action that will restore rationality to 
the consumer rests on suspending the subsidies from all 
commodities. Commodities should be sold at their real 
price, with guarantied threshold income to civil servants 
or those whose income is decided by the government. 
Wages and salaries for all others shall be determined by 
the interplay of supply and demand, as is the case for pri-
vate sector employees, craftworkers and merchants. 
Subsidizing staple commodities can not be an equitable 
means of distributing the national income, since people 
with two children must subsidize those with ten. That 
the recipient of subsidies (in the guise of commodit ies 
and services at symbolic prices) feels no inducement to 
work and produce has been proven. This situation has 
become so widespread in the Egyptian countryside that 
the village now fails to produce all the foodstuffs it con-
sumes, and imports them from the city, or sometimes 
even from abroad. 
Distribution of income on a sound basis. The distribu-
tion of national income must rest on the participation of 
each one of the factors of national production. If these 
factors are labour, land and capital, labour must incorpo-
rate distribution on the basis of contribution to produc-
tion. This does not preclude considerations for old age, 
incapacitation or disease, the victims of which may be be 
granted cash assistance , provided that it is confined ex-
clusively to these cases without granting assistance to 
those who are capable of producing but deliberately 
choose not to. 
Subsidies of staple commodities and essential services 
negatively influences the size of production. Hence, it has 
a negative effect on the standard of living of all individu-
als, whether employed, unemployed, productive or un-
productive. 
We cannot live in economic isolation. Economic princi-
ples of production and distribution can not be overlooked, 
because we do not live in isolation in this world, but deal 
with countries which respect these principles. We are 
compelled to deal with these countries either by request-
ing loans and grants or through trade. For example, ac-
counts are squared on the basis of economic structures. 
Loans carry interest, grants have set limits that may not 
be overstepped and commodities are priced on the basis of 
cost. 
W e can not rely on grants and other aid since they are 
temporary and are stopped in certain political and interna-
tional circumstances. For example, in the past, Egypt 
relied on assistance from some countries. Due to politi-
cal developments, however, the assistance was cut. This 
occurred after these countries had repeatedly reminded us 
that they were not pleased with the economic principles 
we applied in utilizing the assistance. 
Borrowing from abroad is effected at high interest rates; 
much higher rates than we charge when lending to the 
world, and higher than the domestic rate of interest. 
Ignoring the sound economic rules by alleging the 
existence of social considerations does not benefit the 
have-nots. Instead, it draws the whole society into the 
world economy which harbours no pity, and is not con-
cerned with social considerations. The utmost deference 
that can be paid is to recognize the international economic 
interests and the political terms and circumstances of the 
world. 
The Social Factor 
Absence of standard of living threshold leads to popula-
tion increase at a higher rate among the poorer and more 
backward classes. The Egyptian Constitution of 1971 
provides for the welfare of motherhood and childhood: 
The State assumes the protection of maternity and 
infancy, it gives heed to the nascent generations and 
youths and provides them with the appropriate cir-
cumstances for development of their aptitudes . . . 
However, this text refers to those social and economic 
f reedoms which do not create legal obligation for the 
state, but are mere aspirations whose achievement depends 
on the potential i t ies of the state. This is the view 
adopted by jurists of both constitutional law and public 
international law when they classified man's rights pro-
claimed in 1948. 
If we investigate deeper into practical facts, we find that 
usage has left absolute freedom to parents over the educa-
tion of their children and their progeny. Both parents are 
free to give or deny their infants the best upbringing and 
education. Parents are also free to squeeze ten children 
into one room, or to leave them out in the cold receiving 
crumbs of bread and passing most of their time playing in 
the street. 
There is no objection to the lack of a higher material, 
knowledge and cultural advancement for any individual 
because this is the only course that can lead to the 
progress of the whole society. The fundamental objection 
is that there should be no lower limit to the standard of 
living of the individual in terms of accommodat ion , 
clothing, cleanliness and education. This can only be 
achieved if real obligation by both parents exists, together 
with penalties for negligence in bringing up their chil-
dren. Advanced countries ascertain that both parents give 
their children basic education. Penalties are imposed 
upon whoever fails to discharge this duty. The state also 
details experts to ensure that the child's housing meets all 
the health standards. As it is, the care exercised over ma-
ternity and infancy is not merely a constitutional text, but 
a fact enforced in practice. 
In Egypt, fathers go well beyond neglecting their chil-
dren when they push them to do work, somet imes 
strenuous work. From an early age, .these children be-
come a source of livelihood. This was common practice 
in the nineteenth century in Europe, where infants were 
put to work crawling on all fours, before the practice was 
legally ended. This practice still continues in our society, 
without significant opposition f rom the incumbents in 
charge of social matters. 
The issue is rendered more complex by the fact that the 
section of society which fails to take care of the health, 
mind and upbringing of its children is larger, with a 
speedier growth rate, than other sections. This leads to 
increased procreation with a concomitant decline of the 
level of knowledge, character and economy. This nega-
tive result is tangible and confirmed by statistics, and 
threatens society as a whole. 
5 8 
The Legal Factor 
Illiterate citizens enjoy the full rights of citizenship, 
compassion, and unjustified respect. They are entitled to 
vote in elections, open a current bank account and have a 
savings passbook, drive a car and get employment—even 
in state agencies. The illiterate may be lucky enough to 
have the additional honour of representing the people in 
local councils and parliament. This situation is reflected 
in the level of work in these councils, and on the standard 
of rendering services to society. 
This honour paid to illiteracy and ignorance aggravates 
the population issue, due to the undeniable relationship 
between illiteracy and population growth. Leading jurists 
of constitutional law have recommended disenfranchising 
the illiterate as an efficient way of combating illiteracy. 
We need not go far to cite examples of the gradual 
manner legislation induces individuals to study and teach 
their children. Under the provisions of the fundamental 
regulations of the Consultative Council of Deputies (22 
October 1866 under the reign of the Khedive Ismail) 
Organiza t ion Regula t ions required the Consu l ta t ive 
Council of Deputies to make literacy a condit ion for 
those who may elect the deput ies in the Eleventh . 
Assembly elections. 
As elections were to be held every three years, the elec-
tion law gave illiterates a time limit of thirty years to 
learn and qualify to participate in elections. It would be 
quite a boon to adopt this system, with a curtailed time 
limit, to induce the illiterate to learn reading and writing. 
If the economic and legal considerations we have elabo-
rated are overlooked, the steady increase of population 
will deepen the gap between ourselves and the world. In 
Egypt , un l imi ted populat ion growth will ser iously 
jeopardize the entire society, threaten the happiness of 




LAW AND POPULATION 
A Reassessment 
ADEL AZER 
Populat ion Profi le of Egypt 
To reassess the .theoretical and practical efforts achieved 
in law and population it is useful to look at the popula-
tion profile of Egypt. The population of Egypt has 
become too large to be compatible with the exploitation 
of the country's resources, and has therefore become a 
national problem. In thirty years the population has 
doubled, increasing from 19 million in 1947 to 38 
million in 1974.1 
This phenomenon is mainly due to a decrease in the 
death rate and persistently high birth rate. The average 
number of children per family is 5.1, and a new child is 
born every 22.1 seconds. Marriages are on the increase. 
In 1973, some 339,000 marriages were contracted, 
compared with 383,000 in 1977. There are 9.5 to 10.3 
marriages per thousand. These marriages yield 39.5 
births per thousand. 
Statistical data in 1947, 1960 and 1976 show an 
increase in urban population (33%, 37% and 44% respec-
tively) and a corresponding decrease in rural population 
(67%, 63% and 56% respectively). In 1976, the 
economically active population was estimated to be 
11,000 persons, representing 30 per cent of the total 
population.2 Economically active males represent 54.1 
per cent of the total male population, while the females 
do not exceed 5.5 per cent of the total female population. 
In addition, there is a high dependency ratio: 2.5 depen-
dents to every person in the work force. 
Developing Populat ion Pol ic ies in Egypt 
Awareness of various issues regarding population can be 
traced back to 1922. However, f rom 1922 to 1951 the 
activities in this area were limited to individual initiatives 
through private associations, conferences and scholarly 
works in universities. This period witnessed medical 
attempts and services in family planning and treatment of 
sterility. 
The first official population policy was drawn in 1962 
and aimed at reducing the birth rate. In 1965, a Supreme 
Council for Family Planning was established to plan and 
coordinate policies. Its Executive Council was entrusted 
with implementation. During this phase, population 
policy took the medical approach to family planning 
through medical units run by the government and some 
private associations. 
In 1973, a new policy was adopted, giving priority to a 
socio-economic approach to reduce population growth.3 
The policy focussed on nine factors: the family's socio-
economic standard, education, the status of women, 
mechanizat ion in agriculture, industrialization 
(with emphasis on agricultural industrialization), reducing 
infant mortality, social security, mass media, and avail-
ability of family planning services. Each ministry con-
cerned was asked to promote this plan of action. 
Another phase began in 1975, adopting a developmental 
approach. Four targets for action were set: 
• To reduce population growth to an optimum rate 
within the f ramework of the country 's socio-
economic policy for development 
• To set up new communities in the western desert 
and in Sinai 
• To give more weight to development in rural areas 
• To promote the productivity of the labour force ' 
In 1985, the Population Council was reorganized and 
named the National Council for Population, under the 
chairmanship of the President of Republic. Among its 
present functions are to approve population policies 
which would promote the highest rate of economic and 
social development; approve the annual population pro-
jects, with special emphasis on family planning, child 
care, increasing employment for women and literacy. 
Meanwhile, annual population growth remains high and 
inconsistent. From 1961 to 1965, the rate of growth was 
2.8 per cent. In 1972, it dropped to 2 percent, and in 
1980 rose sharply to 3 per cent. In 1982, it dropped 
again to 27 per cent.4 The first drop (in 1972) is 
supposedly due to the Population Council's concentrated 
medically-oriented efforts in family planning. This inter-
pretation is debatable. 
The continuous population increase poses a serious 
problem, especially considering that the population has 
increased by 293 per cent in the past eighty years. Dur-
ing the same period, cultivated land area increased by only 
16.2 per cent. The situation would be even more critical 
if, according to forecasts, the population reaches 70 mil-
lion by the year 2000.5 
Theoret ica l Cons iderat ions 
Law and Social Change 
The social nature of law 
Controversies on the nature of law and its role as an in-
strument of social change still persist. Traditional trends, 
still extant in parts of the Third World, view law as a 
mere imperative, and restrict the role of legal scholars to 
analyzing basic abstract concepts and interpreting existing 
texts.6 Such views risk total detachment from the dy-
namic changes characteristic of contemporary societies. 
On the other hand, with the development of the social 
sciences, legal scholars became aware of the need to relate 
law to social phenomena. Ehrlich spoke of the "living 
law" which consists of the "ways of acting together of 
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men in society." 7 Later developments in the sociological 
study of legal phenomena asserted that an individual right 
is but a social interest protected by a legal norm. The 
German School (known as the Jurisprudence of Interests) 
stressed the need for studying prevailing interests in each 
society, aiming at eliminating potential conflicts between 
different social interests, and protecting those deemed 
important to society.8 
Among the criteria proposed for evaluating social inter-
ests, one of practical value was that each social interest 
should be evaluated according to its social role i.e., its 
participation in constructing the social order and in con-
tributing to society's social ideal.9 This, of course, 
should not conflict with human rights. The choice would 
also be influenced by the ideological stance of the ruling 
party or group. 
Law as instrument of social change 
Traditionally, law could only sanction the status quo. 
In contrast is the belief that law is omnipotent in all 
fields of social life.1 0 Neither view is justified since law, 
as any other social institution, may either contribute to 
social change or sustain the status quo. In both cases, the 
legislative policy is purposeful and should be based upon 
scientifically justified prediction of its effects .1 1 Since 
law does not function within a vacuum, but interacts with 
social, cultural, and economic factors, knowledge of the 
social reality becomes a pre-requisite to legislation. This 
knowledge can be acquired only if the phenomenon is 
studied dynamically, i.e., as it exists and interacts within 
its social context.12 
Assessing law as an instrument of social change goes 
far beyond the traditional legislative practice of drafting 
laws. The following crucial scientific processes are per-
formed prior to drafting:13 
• comparative studies of legislation and policies 
• recognizing the limitations of the legal instrument 
• adequate socio-legal analysis of the field covered by 
the legislation 
• becoming aware of the values of the population 
concerned and forecasting the expected psychological 
effects of the proposed innovation14 
• unifying all the information in a synthesis which 
would be used as core of the proposed legislative 
policy 
Law and the belief system 
The most resilient areas to social change through law 
are those related to strongly entrenched values in society's 
belief system. Legislators must become aware of the 
strength of such values, of the social forces which rein-
force them and of the degree of flexibility possible for the 
introduction of change. The different possible repercus-
sions must be carefully weighed. Past experience reveals 
that some laws promulgated contrary to deeply entrenched 
values and despite strong popular resistance succeed, 
through the use of coercive measures, in changing indi-
vidual behaviour. Nevertheless, the values remained in-
tact and people's attitudes persisted. Eventually, the legal 
grip loosened and traditional behaviour re-emerged.15 
On the other hand, if the belief system is undermined 
without being replaced by the alternative values, the 
whole social structure would be endangered.1 6 Scholars 
who witnessed Ataturk's forceful changes recorded the 
following observations: "We are facing spiritual chaos— 
the entire cultural heritage of a people was upset".17 
Despite the difficulties encountered in such cases social 
change is possible. Some authors suggest that the law 
should be supported by other social institutions. It is 
also reported that if an individual's needs are changed, or if 
his learned habits of thought and behaviour cease to sat-
isfy his need, adjustments in attitudes and values would 
possible.18 
Others argue that since individual belief is mostly 
derived group belief, strategies should envisage ways of 
influencing group belief. Group psyche—the result of 
interaction between individuals—can be influenced if 
changes are successfully introduced in the processes of 
individual interaction in society.1 9 These theoretical 
considerations serve as a background to our appraisal of 
law and population. 
Comparative Theory and Practice 
in Law and Population 
The legal position on population control is divided. In 
search of a rationale for intervention, it was suggested 
that family planning schemes would be an application of 
the Brazilian doctrine of social protection. This doctrine 
concerns itself with individual social problems which, if 
left unsolved, are felt to have a direct impact on other 
individuals and finally on society.20 
Another view claims that the right to life should be 
protected from the moment of conception. The propo-
nents of this view are against any interference with pro-
creation and propose restrictions on contraception and 
abortion. Others uphold the right to individual liberty 
and access to information and to means for family plan-
ning. This view allows the interruption of pregnancy on 
the woman's request. 
Meanwhile, the UN has adopted a balanced solution. 
The Teheran proclamation of 1968 stated that "parents 
have a basic human right to determine freely and respon-
sibly the number and spacing of their children". The UN 
Declaration on Social Progress and Development in 1969 
added that the "knowledge and means necessary" to exer-
cise this right should be made available to parents.21 
The 1984 International Conference on Population in 
Mexico City urged governments to "ensure that all cou-
ples and individuals have the basic right to decide freely 
responsible the number and spacing of their children, and 
the information, education and means to do so". 
Thus, an equilibrium is set up between the individual 
right to determine family size, and the right of society to 
promote the concept and methods of family planning and 
avail them for individual choice. 
Due to the UN position on this issue, lawyers have 
become interested in contributing to population studies 
and policies. Some fore -runners in this emerging field 
claim the existence of a Population Law. 
It is difficult to demarcate the boundaries of population 
law. Only a few have attempted to define it. Lee defines 
population law as "that body of the law which relates 
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direc t ly or indi rec t ly to the popu la t i on g rowth , 
distribution and those aspects of well-being affecting or 
affected by population size and distribution."22 
To support this view, reference is made to Waldheim's 
declaration that "demographic questions should examined 
jointly with other factors such as: public health, educa-
tion, employment, nutrition, housing and environment." 
The role of law in this area would not be limited to 
enforc ing policies, it would also reflect , re f ine and 
coordinate policies. In addition to being an instrument of 
social policy, law can also be used as a catalyst for social 
reform.2 3 
Another interesting attempt to def ine population law 
was the enactment of a General Law on Population in 
Mexico in January 1974. Article 1 stated the objective: 
"to regulate the phenomena that affect populat ion in 
regard to size structure, dynamic, and distribution in the 
national territory, with the goal of achieving just and 
equitable participation in the benefits of economic and 
social development."2 4 
The flexibility shown in demarcating the areas covered 
by population law is a consequence of the wide range of 
factors related to population. The relevance of these fac-
tors would naturally vary in different cultures, and accord-
ing to the prevailing socio-economic conditions. 
An assessment of the implications of law on population 
problems in Egypt has contributed to better understanding 
the use of law in this field. The main findings are sum-
marized below.2 5 
Marriage and divorce laws 
This section deals with the minimum legal age at mar-
riage, polygyny, and divorce. 
The minimum legal age at marriage. A survey of 
women's age at first marriage undertaken in several coun-
tries, has revealed that the average age ranges from 16 to 
24 (or 25) years old. However, various social and eco-
nomic factors, like poverty and low standards of educa-
tion, push young girls into early marriages. Forty per 
cent of those fifteen to nineteen years old in Africa, thirty 
per cent in Asia, fifteen per cent in America, nine percent 
in the Soviet Union and seven per cent in Europe were 
to have married.26 
It is often suggested that the minimum legal age should 
be raised, assuming that this would contribute to reducing 
birth rates. However , in countries with high fertility 
rates such as Latin America, raising the minimum age 
would have no effect . Evidence there has shown that 
women marry later, and still have large families.2 7 This 
issue is influenced to a great extent by cultural and socio-
economic variables as the fo l lowing examples f rom 
Egypt show. 
In Islam, marriage is a contract. The religion requires 
no formalities, yet the law states that the the marriage 
contract must be registered in order for any any law suit 
to be heard in court concerning the marriage.2 8 
In Egypt, Law 78/1931 sets the minimum legal 
age for marriage at 16 years old for females and 18 for 
males. Law 44/1933 forbids registration of a marriage if 
either the groom or bride is below the minimum age. 
Officials violating this law are to be penalized. 
According to official statistics in 1980, the average age 
of women at marriage was 22 years old. However, field 
study in the Law Population Project showed that the 
average age of the female sample was 18.7 years in rural 
areas and 19.3 years in urban areas. Off ic ia l statistics 
show that those who married at an early age, and had a 
long married life, also had a high birth rate. 
Should the law in Egypt adopt the frequent recommen-
dation that the minimum legal age be raised as a measure 
to reduce the period of fertility? An important phe-
nomenon (not revealed by official statistics) was mani-
fested in a number of marriages which had been contracted 
in violation of the legal minimum age: 5 per cent of the 
rural female sample stated that they had married at the age 
of twelve; 7.7 per cent at thirteen; 6.7 per cent at four-
teen; and 22.7 per cent had married at fifteen. Thus, the 
total percentage of rural women who had married before 
the minimum legal age (sixteen years) was approximately 
42 per cent of the rural sample. A few of the male sam-
ple had married before the legal age 2 9 
The law requires the local registration off ic ia l (the 
Maazun) to receive proof of the age at marriage . How-
ever, if the groom or bride does not have a birth certifi-
cate, the law allows him or her to presenting a medical 
certificate estimating the age. This legal flexibility pro-
vides a loophole resulting in many violat ions of the 
minimum age requirement. 
This is a situation of cultural lag: the law conflicts with 
social values and traditions, and consequently fails to 
achieve its intended goal. Early marriages result f rom the 
parents' wish to find suitable match for their daughters to 
preserve their chastity. Poor parents desire to reduce 
family expenses by marrying girls off early. Financial 
aid f rom the family makes these marr iages possible. 
Illiteracy is also strongly correlated to early marriage. 
Any attempt to raise the minimum age under these cir-
cumstances would be futile, considering the many socio-
economic factors contributing to early marriage. Saney 
reached a similar conclusion in Iran.30 
Polygyny 
The three main trends in Arab legislation concerning 
polygyny are: 
• Polygyny is permitted without restrictions, except 
the religious requirement of "doing justice to them 
dealing equally between them." This occurs in 
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Libya. 
• Judicial consideration of whether "equality in treat-
ment" is possible is required, as in Moroccan law. 
Syrian law empowers the court to forbid polygyny if 
the man is unable to provide for his family's needs. 
• Polygyny is prohibited and considered a crime. 
Egypt is among the countries which permit polygyny, 
but restrict it indirectly to avoid conflict with religious 
precepts. In Egypt, a law passed in 1980 (later replaced 
by act 100/1985) required the husband to state in the 
marriage contract any existing marital ties, and required 
the registrar to inform the previous wife(ves). An exist-
ing wife is entitled to ask for divorce if she considers the 
new marriage harmful to her. 
The Moroccan law entitles the women to insert in the 
marriage contract a clause prohibiting her husband to 
marry another. If the husband disobeys, the wife may 
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terminate the marriage. In Indonesia, the law requires 
court consent, and the husband may be fined if he does 
not treat all his wives fairly.31 
Polygyny and procreation. In 1980, p o l y g y n o u s 
marriages in Egypt represented 2.5 per cent of all Muslim 
marr iages. Of these, many were in rural areas, and 
motivated by the desire to have more children.3 2 Field 
research shows that polygyny was positively correlated 
with higher rates of childbirth. Polygynous marriages in 
rural areas had an average of 6.6 children , and 5.4 
children in urban areas. In contrast, an average of 4.18 
children were born in the total sample of married couples. 
Divorce 
Our study on law and population tested two hypotheses: 
that divorce contributes indirectly to population growth 
because wives believe that bearing several children stabi-
lizes the family:3 3 and that divorce contributes to popula-
tion growth if one or both partners remarry and have 
children 
A sample of divorcees was nearly equally divided in 
opinion as to whether divorce could have been avoided had 
they had more children. Meanwhile, research shows that 
the rate of childbirth among divorced women was very 
low. In fact 61 per cent of the rural divorced women and 
47 per cent of urban divorced women had no children— 
confirmed by official statistics. 
The alternate hypothesis maintains that divorce con-
tributes to population increase, if one (or both) of the 
couple remarries and has more children. Several findings 
negate this hypothesis: 
• 1970 official statistics show that 55 per cent of di-
vorces occurred during the first three years of mar-
riage. Naturally, women would have borne few 
children in this short period. 
• Women who remarried were compared to women 
whose marriages were uninterrupted by divorce. 
During the same period, the divorced women had an 
average of 8.7 years of married life and 1.4 children. 
The married women who did not divorce had an 
average of 18.4 years of marriage and 4.2 children. 
In addit ion, divorced women spend 7.5 years 
unmarr ied before remarrying. These years, of 
course, shorten their period of fertility. 
Fertility regulation 
A recent study on law policies affect ing fe r t i l i ty 3 4 
reveals that family planning services constitute the most 
common government activity undertaken to influence 
population growth. In 1965, only twenty-one countries 
supported family planning. By 1983, about 127 out of 
166 countries supported the provision of contraceptives . 
Government support may take the form of services or 
financial assistance to private associations engaged in the 
field, or both. 
Thirty-two countries, including Japan, Syria and Greece, 
do not provide support, but also place no restrictions on 
family planning. One of these countries, Rumania, has a 
pronatalist policy. Only seven countries restrict access to 
modern methods of fertility regulation.35 
In Egypt, the first stage of government involvement in 
family planning was in 1962. At present, the President 
of the Republic presides over the National Council for 
Population. The main targets for current population 
policies are family planning, child care, female employ-
ment and literacy. 
The bulk of family planning services is provided by 
rural and urban health centres under the Ministry of 
Health. Private associations under the auspices of the 
Minis t ry of Social Af fa i r s contr ibute to providing 
additional services. They are financially assisted by the 
Ministry and international donors, and are exempt f rom 
fees and custom duties. 
There are no restrictions on the production, importation 
and d is t r ibut ion of con t racep t ives , a l though some 
diaphragms, condoms and spermicidals are imported. 
Contraceptives are also manufactured locally by national 
and foreign pharmaceutical companies. The government 
facilitates raw material importation and no customs are 
levied. Contraceptives are dispensed in the family plan-
ning centres at subsidized prices, and sold in pharmacies 
without a medical prescription. Staff of government cen-
tres are given incentives for selling contraceptives. 
Voluntary sterilization 
Regulation of voluntary sterilization differs between 
coun t r i e s . 3 6 Some countries have special legal provi-
sions permitting sterilization for family planning, e.g., 
Austria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Spain, Turkey 
and Tunisia. A few other countries, like Burma, Chile, 
Iran, Saudi Arabia and Somalia, consider it illegal. Many 
countries have no specific legal regulations on steriliza-
tion—interpreted in favour of the operation—such as the 
UK, US, Canada, India, China, and Germany. 
In Egypt, no laws regulate or prohibit sterilization. 
However, according to medical ethics, the written consent 
of both the one undergoing the operation and the spouse 
should be acquired. Legal action can be taken against the 
surgeon if he does not obtain written consent. The 
I s lamic doc t r ine prohib i t s pe rmanen t me thods of 
s ter i l izat ion but approves s ter i l izat ion on medica l 
grounds.37 
Abortion 
The Egyptian Penal Law (1937) takes a harsh stand 
against abortion. Abortion is punishable by imprison-
ment, whether it is performed by the pregnant women 
herself or by another person. If a medical doctor, sur-
geon, pharmacist ,or midwife performs the abortion, the 
penalty is augmented to long-term imprisonment. 
Despite legal prohibition, abortion exists in Egypt and 
is widespread. In a study at Cairo University Hospital in 
1969, Kamal reported that abortion cases constituted 
thirty-seven per cent of all cases brought to the hospital. 
Of these, thirty-five per cent were induced.38 
Abortions are performed where the mother 's l ife or 
health is in danger. Abortions for economic and social 
considerations have become widely accepted, and in fact 
openly performed in some of the University hospitals. 
The situation presents a clear example of legislative lag, 
in which the law is outdated and lags behind the changing 
needs of society.3 9 Islam forbids abortion after 120 days 
of pregnancy when, because according to a hadith, the be-
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ginning of life occurs. However, if the general rule that 
"necessity legalizes prohibitions" is applied, pregnancy 
may be terminated if it endangers the woman's life. 
Islamic schools are divided over abortion during the first 
120 days, with some prohibiting it except in cases of ne-
cessity, and some allow it if: 
• the nursing mother's milk dries at the early signs of 
pregnancy, while the husband cannot provide a wet 
nurse. This has been interpreted by the Zaidiya 
school as allowing abortion in case of extreme 
poverty and inability to face the expenses of more 
children. 
• the mother's health would be injured by pregnancy 
• the baby is in an abnormal position suggesting a 
difficult delivery 
Despite the flexibility of the Islamic rules, no steps 
have been taken to change existing legal prohibition. 
Incentives and disincentives 
The use,of incentives or disincentives to influence be-
haviour affecting fertility is still controversial. Some 
nations, particularly in Latin America, have felt that is is 
inappropriate and instead stress voluntary fertility regula-
tion programmes. Other countries' laws state explicit in-
centives, such as allowing only three paid maternity 
leaves to a government employee, and limiting child al-
lowances to three children.40 In Egypt, taxation laws al-
low an exemption for "having one child or morel' The 
Tunis Symposium on Law and Population offered a bal-
anced view,41 recommending that: 
• Any benefits or services provided as incentives to 
family planning be in addition to the benefits and 
services to which all persons are entitled as basic 
human rights. 
• Governments ensure that any benefits or services 
withheld or withdrawn as disincentives in family 
planning do not infringe upon basic human rights. 
Appraisal of Efforts in Law and Populat ion. 
Within the context of Egyptian population policy, 
lawyers' contributions to the field of population have 
been modest. Law has contributed to the area of fertility 
regulation by describing the structure and organization of 
family planning agencies, and has removed restrictions on 
contraception. The legal tool has also been used to 
stipulate national policies on population. 
However, lawyers have made no attempt to change 
some laws which clearly conflict with population poli-
cies, such as the restrictive laws on abortion. Nor have 
they contributed to the formulation of population poli-
cies. 
Decisive Factors for Law and Population. 
Reappraising legal involvement in population matters 
involves answering such crucial queries as: what are the 
hurdles which face population policy. Where the 
problems lie, and which sector of society they concern. 
Why these issues are relevant to that particular sector. 
The following indicators may serve to answer these ques-
tions. 
Education and fertility. There is a strong correlation be-
tween the levels of education and the rates of fertility. In 
1960, statistics revealed that wives who were illiterate or 
with only basic literacy (read and write but do not hold a 
certificate) had the highest average number of births— 
4.47 and 4.95, respectively. The average dropped to 3.56 
children among holders of a primary certificate; and to 
2.21 among holders of secondary certificates. University 
graduates had only 1.82 births on average. Our research 
on law and population confirmed this correlation 4 2 
Illiteracy. School drop-outs are the primary source of il-
literacy. A recent study revealed that the two main causes 
are low standards among primary school students (usually 
underprivileged), and the need for child labour to increase 
family income. These reasons accounted for 60 per cent 
and 31 per cent of drop-outs, respectively.43 
Infant mortality. High infant mortality is correlated to 
the desire to give birth to a large number of children. In 
advanced countries, the rate of infant mortality is fifteen 
per thousand, while in developing countries it ranges be-
tween ninety to one hundred per thousand. In a few 
countries, it reaches between 125 and 149 per thousand. 
In Egypt, the infant mortality rate is about eighty-five 
per thousand.44 Our research findings show that 78.3 per 
cent of wives in rural areas, and 52 per cent of wives in 
urban areas have suffered the death of at least one infan t 4 5 
In addition,there is a high percentage of miscarriages 
among the underprivileged—35 per cent in rural areas and 
39 per cent in urban areas.46 This contributes to women 
wanting several pregnancies. 
Social security. The main goal of social security is to 
provide maintenance for individuals and their dependents 
who are in need, because of sickness, unemployment, old 
age or other infirmity.47 In some developing countries 
such schemes fall short of providing for the minimum 
standard of living 4 8 In such cases, parents rely to a great 
extent on their male offspring to provide security for the 
future. For instance, 72 per cent of rural women and 
30 per cent of urban women stated that a mother with 
only female offspring should continue to bear children 
until she gets a son.4 9 To this sector of the population— 
and under prevailing conditions—it would be futile to 
point out the utility and desirability of birth control. 
These indications, in addition to research finding in 
Egypt and in most of the developing countries, show a 
strong correlation between the hurdles which face popula-
tion policies, and the socio-economic problems suffered 
by the underprivileged sectors of the population. In this 
context, the Mexican Population Law which endorsed the 
promotion of "the full integration of marginal groups in 
national development" is particularly relevant.50 
Proposed Contribution to Law and Population 
If we concede that the underprivileged should be the 
main target for population policies, what constitutes a 
relevant policy for this sector of society? The point of 
departure is the assumption that parents have a basic hu-
man right to determine freely and responsibly the number 
and spacing of their children. 
A United Nations document on the status of women and 
family planning suggests that: "The responsible decision 
takes into account, among other factors, the right of every 
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child to be a wanted child, and the needs of the commu-
nity as a whole".5 1 This clarification overlooks a com-
mon situation in developing countries wherein the child 
is wanted, although this may conflict with the interests of 
society. For example, child labour may be an essential 
sourc; of income and having a large number of children 
could be the only source of security for parents in their 
old age. In such cases, parental decisions to have a large 
family should not be considered irresponsible or irra-
tional. 
Among the underprivileged, deprivation constrains 
choices, and needs dictate decisions. What is meaningful 
to them is that which proves functional. If a change of 
attitudes is sought, then there has to be a prior change in 
policy orientation and emphasis. 
Every policy related to population (such as develop-
ment, health, education, social security) should be 
formulated in accordance with the precepts of Social Jus-
tice. This is not just a simple application of the princi-
ple of equality. Rather, the proposed approach seeks to 
have far-reaching impact. 
Equality or equal opportunity as criteria would not 
contribute to social justice for the underprivileged. Social 
justice should be understood as distributive justice based 
upon equity. Social justice then, is a general approach to 
formulating socio-economic policy. At the same time, it 
is a particular goal to attained within each policy issue 
related to law and population. 
Adopting this approach to dealing with the underprivi-
leged, entails a different outlook and different goals, and 
would produce entirely different consequences from other 
approaches. For example: 
• It was thought that economic growth would, by it-
self, produce enough commodities to improve the 
population's standard of living.52 This proved to be 
a myth. With such an approach, deprivation per-
sis ts .5 3 A recent reminder of this are the serious 
social repercussions confronting conservative poli-
cies in the West, the result propagating economic 
growth but allowing mass unemployment. 
• The Mexican Law of population recommends pro-
moting "the full integration of marginal groups in 
national development." If government policy is 
geared towards social justice, the nature of develop-
ment would be questioned. Would marginal mem-
bers of society share in the fruits of such develop-
ment, or would they be integrated into an exploita-
tive development. In this context, the question 
should be raised: "Development for whom?"5 4 
• Providing basic needs also raises such queries. Is it 
conducive to a distribution of amenities based up 
equity? Or is the provision based on a strategy of 
coping and living with poverty?55 
This proposed approach to equity entails restructuring 
the components of social policy, especially concerning 
the underprivileged. Contradictions and conflicts between 
the components of socio-economic policy must be 
avoided, requiring clear vision and purpose. Sometimes, 
population policies are foiled by unwitting or unintended 
policies in other sectors, such as school books portraying 
the family as a large, extended entity, or the mass media 
propagating traditional values. There are two pivotal el-
ements of a policy based upon equity: 
• providing a service (or other component of socio-
economic policy) that will be considered functional 
for the underprivileged 
• implementation or delivery should be based on a 
process of outreach to the underprivileged 
Within this context, the following policy areas are of 
special importance. 
The Field of Education 
Population policies in developing countries often refer 
to the "elimination of illiteracy" as a primary goal . 5 6 
Statistics reveal that literacy (reading and writing without 
holding a certificate) does not bring about a change of at-
titude towards procreation. The same lack of impact has 
been observed in other areas, such as polygyny. 
Taha Hussein, the prominent Egyptian intellectual and 
past minister of education, has pointed out that literacy as 
a goal is ineffective. A person who undergoes such 
training, he added, "would acquire insignificant knowl-
edge, would be incapable of objective thinking, easily in-
fluenced and dangerous to himself and to society." 5 7 
School drop-outs, as mentioned previously, are a problem 
in various countries. 
The crucial issue in education is its relevance to the un-
derprivileged, the quality provided, and the educational 
goals which are sought.58 
Similarly, social security schemes would be ineffective 
if the pensions are below the standards of l iv ing . 5 9 
Health education and services would also have no impact 
unless the services (including family planning) reaches 
out to the underprivileged, and takes account of their val-
ues and traditions. 
C o n c l u s i o n 
Legal involvement is necessary to achieve equity and to 
translate this goal in socio-economic and population 
policies and social legislation. By adopting the proposed 
approach, the field of law and population would acquire a 
new countenance, and the components of this field would 
be functional, thus contributing to a reality which would 
be meaningful to the bulk of the target population. Only 
then, can we envisage free and responsible parenthood. 
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